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ABSTRACT 
 
Gothic Authors/Ghost Writers: The Advent of Unauthorized Authorship in 
Nineteenth-Century American Gothic Literature. (August 2008) 
Ki Yoon Jang, B.A., Sookmyung Women’s University; 
M.A., Sookmyung Women’s University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis Berthold 
 
  This dissertation proposes “ghost writer” as a new critical term for the “author” 
in accordance with what Roland Barthes calls the “death of the author.” For this purpose, 
the dissertation conjoins current gothic criticism, modern authorship theories, and 
studies of nineteenth-century American literature. Current gothic critics, in their 
endeavors to re-define the gothic as a serious genre that represents social, cultural, and 
historical anxieties and terrors, have obscured gothic authors’ presence. This indistinct, 
ghostly authorial existence within gothic criticism becomes relevant to modern 
authorship theorists’ reflection on the end of eighteenth-century sovereign and autarchic 
authorship due to the ever-interpretable text and ever-interpreting readers, by means of 
the self-effacing gothic writers in nineteenth-century America. American literary 
scholars agree on contemporary readers’ increasing power to assess writers’ 
performance. Gothic writers, especially susceptible to this power since the ambiguities 
of the gothic necessitate readers’ active constructions, composed their texts without self-
assumed authorial intentions. This dissertation considers how the century’s five most 
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representative gothic writers re-configure the author as a ghost that should come into 
being by readers’ belief in what it writes.  
 Chapter I examines the common grounds between the aforementioned three 
fields in further detail and illuminates the exigency of the ghost writer. Chapter II 
discusses Charles Brockden Brown’s prototypical exposé in Wieland of Edward 
Young’s typically romantic formulation of the originary and possessive author. Chapter 
III shows Edgar Allan Poe’s substantiation of Brown’s exposé through his conception of 
the author as a reader-made fiction in Arthur Gordon Pym. Chapter IV applies Poe’s 
author-fiction to Frederick Douglass and Louisa May Alcott, and investigates how those 
two marginalized writers overcome their spectrality with the aid of readers’ sympathetic 
relation to their texts, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass and “Behind a Mask,” 
and subsequent validation of their author-ity. Chapter V explores the author’s willing 
self-transformation into the ghost writer in James’s The Turn of the Screw, and ponders 
how the ghost writer goes beyond the author’s death. By introducing the ghost writer, 
this dissertation ultimately aims to trace the pre-modern shift from the autonomous 
author to the heteronomous author. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE GHOST WRITER 
 
Conjoining three fields, current gothic criticism, theories of authorship, and 
studies of nineteenth-century American literature, this dissertation proposes “ghost 
writer” as a new critical term that substitutes for an “author” in accordance with what 
Roland Barthes calls “the death of the author” or the end of the dominance of eighteenth-
century sovereign and autarchic authorship. The basic grounds for this proposal are 
encapsulated in the typically gothic adjective, “ghost,” as well as the distinction between 
the “author” and the “writer.” Whereas the author usually refers to one who 
autonomously assumes an authorial position and exercises authority over the text and 
readers, the ghost writer describes one who takes into consideration his or her 
interrelationship with readers and seeks readers’ acknowledgement of his or her author(-
)ity by adopting the ghostlike—that is, barely visible and disembodied—posture in the 
production and signification of the text. To demonstrate how exactly the ghost writer can 
work in the author’s stead, this dissertation will examine five major nineteenth-century 
American writers’ envisioning and practice of reader-initiated and reader-directed 
authorship in their representative gothic works, including Charles Brockden Brown’s 
Wieland; or, The Transformation: An American Tale (1798), Edgar Allan Poe’s The 
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (1838), Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Henry James Review. 
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the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself (1845), Louisa 
May Alcott’s “Behind a Mask; or, A Woman’s Power” (1866), and Henry James’s The 
Turn of the Screw (1898).    
Modern scholarly interest in gothic literature, though roughly begun as early as 
the 1950s,1 had not taken its definitive form until 1980 when the two most influential 
gothic studies concurrently appeared: David Punter’s The Literature of Terror, and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s The Coherence of Gothic Conventions. Noticeably, both of them 
focus on the representational capability of gothic literature. To Punter, “Gothic fiction 
has, above all, to do with terror; and where we find terror in the literature of the last two 
centuries, in Britain and in America, … we almost always find traces of the Gothic” (14). 
Based on this close affinity of terror to the gothic, Punter insists that we study the genre 
as a mode of literary expression of diverse kinds of terror in reality: “exploring Gothic is 
… seeing the various ways in which terror breaks through the surfaces of literature, 
differently in every case, but also establishing for itself certain distinct continuities of 
language and symbol” (21). Sedgwick makes an issue of how the earliest modern gothic 
criticism was customarily “privileging the spatial metaphor of depth from among the 
Gothic conventions” and “taking that metaphor to represent a model of the human self” 
as defined by the (Freudian) psychology of the inner unconscious (11). From Sedgwick’s 
perspective, such a custom results not from a close and proper reading of gothic 
                                                 
1
 Scholars generally agree that Robert Heilman’s 1958 essay, “Charlotte Brontë’s ‘New’ 
Gothic,” initiates such an interest. See Heilman, “Charlotte Brontë’s ‘New’ Gothic,” 
From Jane Austen to Joseph Conrad: Essays Collected in Memory of James T. Hillhouse, 
eds. Robert. C. Rathburn and Martin Steinmann, Jr. (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1958) 118-132. 
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literature itself, but from “an extreme critical irritation with the surfaces of Gothic 
novels” and subsequent endeavor to endow gothic superficiality with semantic 
profundity (11-12). Then Sedgwick, based on her own reading of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century gothic works, suggests revising that custom: she contends that “the 
major Gothic conventions are coherent in terms that do not depend on that psychological 
model” for “the strongest energies inhere in the surface,” and that gothic literature, 
therefore, rather works “to undermine the sense of inside and outside, the centeredness 
of the ‘self,’” in a proto-postmodern fashion (12, 27).  
Punter’s emphasis on the characteristically gothic “language and symbol” and 
Sedgwick’s revisionary proposition of new consistent gothic conventions of the surface 
simultaneously attest and show the way to contemporary gothic critics’ efforts to redeem 
gothic literature from its traditional status as nothing more than the lurid, sensational, 
and shallow writing and to re-define it as a primarily historico-cultural—and thus 
“serious”—genre. Following Punter and Sedgwick, ensuing critics have become in large 
part concerned with the ways gothic texts articulate otherwise unrepresentable anxieties 
and terrors in society. George E. Haggerty, in Gothic Fiction/Gothic Form (1989), 
argues that gothic writers from Horace Walpole to James conceive and develop a new 
narrative form of gothic “tale” in order to defy the standard realistic novel form that 
reflects “an eighteenth-century empirical worldview” and to “giv[e] private experience 
external manifestation” (7). Teresa A. Goddu’s Gothic America (1997), postulating that 
“the gothic registers its culture’s contradictions, presenting a distorted, not a disengaged, 
version of reality” (2-3), traces the eruption of American historical terrors such as 
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American Revolution, Indian massacre, and slavery in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century American gothic works. And Peter K. Garrett, in Gothic Reflections (2003), 
takes notice of “the typically Gothic multiplication of narrative versions” or 
interpretations as indicating the gothic’s exploration of “relations between extremity and 
the ordinary, between ‘privately bred’ isolated subjectivities and public norms,” and 
between the individual and society (6-7).  
This scholarly focus on the gothic’s textual formality in turn invests gothic texts 
with a representational agency and scholarly significance of their own and obscures the 
role of gothic writers in the production of those texts.2 It is, one might say, as if gothic 
texts overpower and even erase their own authors’ intention, consciousness, and 
presence. As a result, gothic writers become inconspicuous and inconsequential as 
authors to the point that, intriguingly, they are analogous to one of the most distinctively 
gothic characters they write about: ghosts. Put another way, in modern gothic criticism 
                                                 
2
 Critics like Haggerty and Garrett do point out the centrality of the author-reader 
relationship in the gothic. Haggerty notes that gothic authors count considerably on 
readers inasmuch as the representation of subjective feelings and emotions can become 
objectified and legitimate only “by each reader in his or her private terms” (8). Similarly, 
Garrett pinpoints as the peculiar power of the gothic its “narrative force, not only 
affective, rhetorical, and ideological force but the dynamics of plotting and that active 
engagement of readers which makes every narrative a dialogical transaction” (ix). Yet 
both Haggerty and Garrett stay in line with gothic criticism’s emphasis on the 
representational modality of gothic literature. After all, Haggerty attributes gothic 
authors’ invention of the gothic tale to the gothic’s “primary formal aim” of the 
“emotional and psychological involvement of the reader” (18), and Garrett’s point of the 
multiple narratives of a gothic story created by the intercommunication between the 
author and readers is subsumed for him under gothic narrative’s generation of 
“alternative perspectives on the relationship between an isolated consciousness and the 
social group” (220).  
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the authors build up the gothic House (or Castle) of Fiction but only to be merely 
haunting it, with their existence and effect not fully recognized. 
 While the image of the author as a ghost testifies to the insignificant and 
impotent status of the author within current gothic criticism, the same image may earn 
more positive and productive implications if we take another look at it with the help of 
contemporary authorship theories and studies of nineteenth-century American literature. 
Revolving around the (already quite gothic-sounding) issue of the death of the author 
that was originally brought up by Barthes’s pathbreaking 1968 essay, “The Death of the 
Author,” modern authorship scholars ponder the problematic of individualistic and 
authoritarian authorship. According to Barthes, the common conception of the author as 
a sole originator and owner of the text and controller of its meaning is doomed to 
termination. A text, becoming a “neutral, composite, oblique space” once it comes into 
being, denies any single and fixed origin or author, so that by simply writing the text, 
“the author enters into his own death” (142). Such a death, Barthes goes on, heralds a 
revolutionary modernization of literary studies in that in accordance with the 
dethronement of the “Author-God” there emerge readers, to whom “Classic criticism has 
never paid any attention” and whose multiple readings of the text guarantee equally 
multiple meanings of it (146, 148). Hence, “to give writing its future, it is necessary to 
overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
Author” (148). In Barthes’s view, then, the inevitable death of the author signifies the 
limit of the orthodox ideation of the author and calls for a new notion of the author, 
authority, and authorship, a notion that especially takes into account the role of readers.  
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Authorship scholars after Barthes, while conceding that the author no longer 
exists as a self-contained dictator due to the unspecified—and unspecifiable—mass of 
readers, have expanded on Barthes chiefly in two ways. Some of them trace 
retrospectively the economic, legal, cultural, and philosophical backgrounds of the 
eighteenth-century invention of autonomous authorship. Mark Rose’s Authors and 
Owners (1993), which investigates the history of copyright laws in Britain, and Martha 
Woodmansee’s The Author, Art, and the Market (1994), which probes the modern 
conceptualization of art mostly in eighteenth-century Germany, similarly show how 
eighteenth-century European intellectuals’ and writers’ shared insecurity about the 
newly rising literary market system and mass audience, combined with the rise of 
individualism during the period, conduces to the birth of the author as “a specially gifted 
person able to produce from the depths of personal experience an organically unified 
work of art” (Rose 132).3 Others attempt to comprehend and theorize the very event of 
the Barthesian demise of such an excessively individuated author. Michel Foucault, in 
“What Is an Author?” (1969), famously counters Barthes’s poststructuralist assertion of 
the ultimate extinction of the author from a sociohistorical point of view, by maintaining 
that even if the author as a discernibly dominating individual presence within the text 
may be gone, the author in the form of his or her proper name stays and keeps 
functioning as “the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning” or categorizing and 
                                                 
3
 For the historical study on the androcentric basis of eighteenth-century authorship that 
systematically exploits female writerly and readerly desire and conceals such 
exploitation, see Sonia Hofkosh, Sexual Politics and the Romantic Author (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1998).  
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systematizing our discourses on literature (159). Foucault’s portrayal of the author as an 
essentially “ideological figure” (159), which would never die as far as we use and value 
its proper name, is re-addressed within the (con)textual domain and equally famously 
deconstructed by Jacques Derrida. In his “Signature Event Context” (1971), Derrida 
pushes the boundary of Barthes’s point by opining that the author (and readers too) 
should be absent in the text in order to make it “iterable,” or ceaselessly signified and re-
signified, only within “contexts without any center of absolute anchoring” (315, 320). 
Then he applies that iterability to the signature of the author’s name, which is now the 
only mode in which the author is visibly related to the text but which, “In order to 
function … must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form” and “be able to detach itself 
from the present and singular intention of its production” (329). In this manner, Derrida 
refutes Foucault’s resuscitation of the author by means of his or her proper name, and 
reassures us that the author is deceased.    
With Derrida’s dissolution of the author or his or her (signed) proper name, 
which generated a myriad of followers who would constitute Derridean deconstruction, 
the author undoubtedly becomes a dead absence in the text. Such dissolution of the 
author, however, raises one crucial question: though the author is conceptually no more, 
there still remains in reality someone who starts writing and keeps writing for us readers; 
how, then, should we understand this writing subject that survives its own death as an 
author and lingers around us readers? The lack of a sufficient account for this question 
within Derrida’s paradigm seems attributable to his deconstructive tenets of “an 
overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system” 
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(Derrida 329). In other words, Derrida perceives the system of authorship in binary 
oppositional terms such as the author/the text, the author/the reader, and the author/the 
context. And by reducing the author’s presence to the detachable and reproducible 
signature, Derrida apparently succeeds in “overturning” those oppositional terms 
ultimately on behalf of the text (and the context), yet fails to “displace” that archaic, 
ineffective institution of authorship; he has to conclude that “it appears necessary, 
provisionally and strategically, to conserve the old name” of writing (329). Taking that 
failure as caused by modern authorship theorists’ neglect of the irreducible and 
irreplaceable truth that authors, readers, and texts (and contexts) are all symbiotically 
intertwined with one another,4 I will give attention to the writing subject that is left 
                                                 
4
 Such a failure of deconstruction is also demonstrated in Peggy Kamuf’s Signature 
Pieces (1988). Kamuf, à la Derrida, states that the author’s proper name has lost its 
power as it is practically superseded by the author’s signature, which is only “a piece of 
name” and thus works to dismantle the name by revealing its fragmentable nature (12). 
The pieces of the name, indeed, are none other than “arbitrary signifiers,” which, “at any 
moment, can be cut off from their referent—the bearer of the name—and left to their fate, 
floating in the currents of chance encounters with readers who are free to associate a 
meaning with the name” (Kamuf 3). By saying this, Kamuf underlines authors’ 
mandatory recourse to readers in order to have any “meaning” as authors: the 
decomposed authors can only be recomposed by means of readers’ construction of their 
texts and imagining of their authorial characteristics. Kamuf’s foregrounding of readers’ 
role that would give a new life to the dead, decomposed authors, however, arrives at the 
conclusion that attending to signature pieces is “an unnerving remainder or reminder, a 
fragment that was never wholly of the whole, be it author or work,” and “cannot … offer 
a method of exorcism, restitution, or any other rite performed in view of some eternal 
life” (20). I would say that Kamuf’s more or less nihilistic conclusion comes from her 
basically deconstructive purposes that hinge on the antitheses of the author/the reader 
and the author/the text: she can “overturn” or negate the author’s superiority over the 
reader and the text, but cannot go beyond and elaborate on the significance of that 
negation in productive ways.  
This impasse in deconstructive authorship theories seems to be resolved with the 
publication of Seán Burke’s The Death and Return of the Author in 1992. Observing that 
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behind after the annihilation of the author and continues talking with us readers, and 
think about how to update our knowledge of authorship on account of that subject, not 
simply “displace” it. By doing so, I aim to find a balance between the textual death of 
the author in Barthes and the social revival of that dead author in Foucault, so as to go 
beyond Derrida’s mostly analytical deconstruction of sovereign and autarchic authorship 
and point to a more practical mode of authorship. To be exact, I propound a linkage 
between the de-author-ized writing subject in modern authorship theories and the 
disempowered, ghostified author in current gothic criticism. That linkage, in turn, will 
allow us to configure an authorial identity as a ghost whose existence and effect is now 
only detectable and realizable through readers’ response to its writing.   
Significantly, our configuration of the author as the reader-dependent and even 
reader-created ghostly writing subject, or the “ghost writer,” can be substantiated by 
virtue of nineteenth-century American gothic writers, whose literary performance within 
remarkably reader-centered literary markets will provide us with sufficient literary 
evidence of the theoretical dismantling of the eighteenth-century author in concurrence 
with the empowerment of readers. Nineteenth-century literary scholars commonly agree 
                                                                                                                                                
the pronounced death of the author does not stop the scholarly reflection on the (defects 
of) the author, Burke argues that the author is dead but “returns on condition that his life 
is discontinuous, fictive” (31). Though ostensibly similar to my stance, Burke explains 
such a return of the dead author as part of a wider movement of the contemporary 
critique of representation: “What Roland Barthes has been talking of all along is not the 
death of the author, but the closure of representation” (48). Furthermore, Burke’s focus is 
mainly on the theories of Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, so that his potentially 
constructive conclusion—our ceaseless interest in the authorship question proves “the 
limit of an expressive world and the striving we make toward a beyond” (206)—remains 
unwarranted.  
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that during this time American writers in general were obliged to seek new ways of 
establishing their authorship, owing to the surge of the democratic worldview and 
sentiment and consequent changes in the conditions of literary production and 
consumption. Mark R. Patterson, in Authority, Autonomy, and Representation (1988), 
says that the period’s writers encountered a situation in which readers’ literary appetites 
became uncontrollably diversified and their power to evaluate literary works rapidly 
increased. In that situation, Patterson adds, American writers saw that the conventional 
principle of autocratic literary authority would not work; instead, they came to realize 
that authority now becomes what Carl Friedrich calls a “quality of communication,” and 
that “its boundaries and terms are fluid and relational” (xxvi). And such a realization 
drove the writers to “concede more to their audience, at least in principle, than their 
counterparts in the Old World” (Railton 19). American gothic writers, it should be noted, 
must have had to yield themselves to readers more willingly than their contemporaries. 
Their usually wide popularity in the markets did not suit the then-normative image of the 
author as a transcendental, anti-commercial, and self-evidently unique genius, and 
customarily designated them to be second-rate scribblers. In fact, this hierarchizing 
attitude toward gothic writers still reigns, as most studies on nineteenth-century 
American authorship euphemize or keep silent about canonical writers’ gothic works or 
tendencies; and my dissertation, which puts forward the notion of the ghost writer by 
attending to five nineteenth-century writers’ reader-reliant ways of establishing their 
authorship, will significantly deviate from that mainstream scholarly disposition.5 
                                                 
5
 Patterson discusses the gothic ambiguity of Brown’s Wieland as betokening the 
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Moreover, even in a huge pool of commercially successful writers of various genres, 
gothic writers would have stood out as the notorious ambiguities of the gothic make it 
essentially contingent upon readers’ active interpretations. In this respect, American 
gothic writers must have turned to readers with a sense of exigency for the recognition of 
their writing and the sanctioning of their career.  
Drawing on these observations, my dissertation addresses five nineteenth-century 
American gothic writers and investigates their composition of gothic texts with 
unspecified, spectral authorial intentions and personae that solicit their readers to 
construe their texts and determine their author-ity. The gothic texts in this dissertation 
have been chosen for the notably relevant delineation of author-figure characters, which 
embody the writers’ keen awareness of the insufficiency of self-assumed and self-
                                                                                                                                                
disruption of traditional authority and intentionality during the postrevolutionary period. 
Kenneth Dauber, in The Idea of Authorship in America (1990), similarly counts the 
“wildness and inconsistency” of Brown’s texts as indicating the instability surrounding 
the professionalization of authorship for the first time in American history (xviii). In 
addition, Dauber, in his chapter on Poe in the same book, underscores the plagiaristic 
intertextuality, among Poe’s diverse (and considerably gothic) writing traits, as 
bespeaking Poe’s Romantic desire for free inspiration and for transcendence from the 
professionalization of authorship. Stephen Railton’s chapter on Poe in Authorship and 
Audience (1991) focuses on Poe’s anxiety of authorship against ever-powerful readers 
that Poe supposedly shares with other representative nineteenth-century American (not-
necessarily-gothic) writers, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Herman Melville. Michael Newbury’s 
Figuring Authorship in Antebellum America (1997) posits Poe, along with Hawthorne 
and Fanny Fern, within the (de-gothicized) context of copyright law debates. 
Exceptionally, Nancy Ruttenburg, in Democratic Personality (1998), keenly captures and 
fully analyzes the eerie disembodiment of the speaking and writing subject in Carwin 
and Clara, the two main characters of Wieland. But her observation of that gothic 
disembodiment supports her fundamentally historico-religious argument for a de-
individualized, national democratic authorial personality in post-Puritan America that 
evolves through (once again, not-characteristically-gothic) classic writers like James 
Fenimore Cooper, Walt Whitman, and Melville.     
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justified authority and their revolutionary vision of the authorial identity as an 
immaterial ghost that can only be re-materialized by readers’ sympathetic belief in what 
it writes. As such, it should be made clear, some of those texts are not strictly 
categorized as gothic but nonetheless regarded as gothic here as far as they exhibit 
gothic qualities, including the representation of horror and the presentation of the 
uncannily destabilizing alternatives (i.e. the ghost writer) to the official, normal version 
of sociocultural institutions (i.e. authorship). Chapter I will examine the relationship 
between nineteenth-century American gothic writers and eighteenth-century sovereign 
and autarchic authorship so as to help us see more clearly how the former debunks the 
latter and pursues ghost-writership instead. To do so, I will place Brown, one of 
America’s (gothic) literary forefathers, side by side with Edward Young, one of the 
renowned European supporters of the author’s exclusive textual proprietorship, by 
reading Brown’s “The Rhapsodist” (1789), where a dogmatic narrator struggles against 
an intrusive reader for narrative control, as a critique of Young’s foundational 
theorization of the originary, possessive, and imperious author in Conjectures on 
Original Composition (1759). Then I will proceed to Wieland, Brown’s most well-
known gothic work and one of America’s first (gothic) novels, and show how Brown 
elaborates more fully his critique of Young’s formulation of authorship (or, 
Youngian/sovereign/autarchic/authoritarian/etc. authorship from now on): Brown in that 
novel describes at once the self-righteous first-person main narrator Clara Wieland’s 
failure in narrative authority because of the unidentifiable ventriloquist Carwin’s 
readerly and writerly intervention in her narration, and Carwin’s achievement of 
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authorship thanks to Clara’s readers’ credence in and curiosity about his version of 
Clara’s story. The chapter will end with a discussion of how Carwin’s reader-induced 
author-ization gives us clues to Brown’s quest for editorial, depersonalized, and 
prototypically ghostly authorship and foreshadows Brown’s nineteenth-century literary 
descendants’ continuation of that quest.  
Chapter II will consider how Brown’s innovative yet inchoate attempt at the 
ghost writer is accomplished by Poe’s “author-fiction.” I will start by looking at Poe’s 
“The Philosophy of Composition” (1846) to foreground his perception of the author as a 
fictional character that does not exist in its own right but should be taken as and made 
real by readers (hence the author-fiction, which reminds us of and prefigures the 
Foucauldian author-function, or our artificial construction of the author as a functional 
being for regulating our discourses on literature). Then I will move on to Poe’s one and 
only novel, and his most frequently studied gothic work, The Narrative of Arthur 
Gordon Pym, and explore how its main character and first-person narrator Pym stands 
for the Youngian author and how Pym’s inability to provide an absolutely authoritative 
account of his incredible South-Sea voyage on his own points to Poe’s insight into the 
fictive, reader-created essence of the author. I will conclude the chapter by regarding the 
incessant controversies over Poe’s authorial character ever since his death as the ultimate 
realization of his author-fiction in his own ghostly state of being and the effective 
shaping of his authorial identity as a ghost writer.     
Chapter III will apply the basic principles of Poe’s author-fiction to the reader-
initiated author-ization of writers from two socially marginalized, practically nonexistent 
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groups. I will see Douglass and Alcott the representative writers for those spectral 
groups and observe how they overcome their spectrality by obtaining valid author-ity 
with the aid of their sympathetic readers who have socially valid presence and identity. 
More specifically, I will discuss: how Douglass’s best-known autobiographical account, 
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, presents his self-story with not a typically 
autobiographical, a priori self but an absent-present, ghostlike narratorial self that is a 
fugitive slave writer Frederick Douglass, and lets his readers identify with that self and 
give it authorial rights and legitimacy; and how Alcott’s recently re-discovered, and 
most critically acclaimed thriller, “Behind a Mask,” features the story of governess Jean 
Muir’s attainment of a socially viable identity of Lady Coventry through the Coventrys’ 
readerly construction of her barely identified mask as such, and hints at powerless 
woman writer Alcott’s reader-directed characterization of her pseudonymous writerly 
mask, A. M. Barnard, as an officially existent author. At the end, I will emphasize that 
Douglass and Alcott transform from ghosts to ghost writers. 
Chapter IV will probe how not only socially absent-present writers like Douglass 
and Alcott but socially recognized authors as well willingly choose death and seek to be 
ghost writers. To do so, I will first bring up the nineteenth-century distinction between 
the author and the writer as practiced in the American literary sphere and theorized by 
Foucault. Then I will read The Turn of the Screw, a gothic novella by one of the classic 
American literary masters or “authors,” James, to demonstrate how it disrupts that 
distinction with the use of the main character, the unnamed governess: she initially acts 
as one of the period’s most impotent writerly figures, the ghostwriter, but later, via the 
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posthumous circulation and endorsement of her narrative by her readers, turns into the 
Jamesian—not Foucauldian—model of a self-de-author-izing and reader-author-ized 
ghost writer. I will round out this concluding chapter by contemplating how all the 
author-figures in this dissertation serve to illustrate and flesh out my notion of the ghost 
writer and how the notion contributes to illuminating and surmounting the inherent 
limitation of current deconstructive authorship theories as it permits us to look beyond 
the death of the author and discover the afterlife of that dead author in harmony with 
readers. In this way, my dissertation as a whole will locate the pre-Barthesian, pre-
modern shift from the autonomous author to the heteronomous author within the 
nineteenth-century American gothic literary realm by tracing the emergence and 
evolution of the ghost writer during the time.    
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CHAPTER II 
“THIS PHANTOM TO PURSUE MY STEPS”: THE FAILURE OF THE AUTHOR  
IN CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN 
 
Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland; or, The Transformation: An American Tale 
(1798) came out when professional authorship, along with the literary market system, 
was soon to be settled down in America. As such, it has been understood as the 
thematically and artistically founding text for American literature as a whole. Especially 
the novel’s gothic portrayal of the Wieland residence, located in the remote and isolated 
rural area of Mettingen, Pennsylvania, as a central stage for bloodchilling cases of 
spontaneous combustion, ventriloquism, religious fanaticism, and family massacre, has 
incited a number of scholarly arguments about Brown’s unique application of the 
traditionally European literary genre to represent the sociopolitical instability and 
disorder of the New World in the late eighteenth century. This chapter proposes yet 
another reading of the “American” gothicism of Wieland. To that end, it will examine 
the novel in terms of Brown’s innovative view of his own authorial career under the 
dramatic changes in the relationship between authors and readers, and discuss the 
novel’s significance as the prototypical “American Tale” that foreshadows ensuing 
American gothic writers’ participation in the “transformation” of the established author-
centered authorship to a protomodern reader-oriented one.    
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1. How the Author is Born to Fail: Edward Young’s Conjectures and Brown’s “The 
Rhapsodist” 
The eighteenth century marks a significant juncture in the history of authorship. 
It is during this period that intellectuals first directed their attention to authors’ role in 
the production of texts and tried to formulate the modern notion of the author. Such 
intellectual attention and effort was chiefly instigated by contemporary scholarly debates 
about copyright laws that began around 1710, when the Statute of Anne, or “the world’s 
first copyright statute,” was enacted in Britain (Rose 4). The statute allowed writers, for 
the first time in history, to own and regulate what they write, but at the same time it gave 
rise to a question about how and why they can achieve such an exclusive authority on 
their works.6 Among the proponents of writers’ rights to their texts, Edward Young 
                                                 
6
 There are a number of reasons for the rise of this question. According to Martha 
Woodmansee, writers up to the eighteenth century had not been qualified to claim the 
privilege of textual ownership, because they had been mostly considered either to be a 
“master of a body of rules, or techniques, preserved and handed down in rhetoric and 
poetics, for manipulating traditional materials in order to achieve the effects prescribed 
by the cultivated audience of the court,” or to be “inspired—by some muse, or even by 
God” (36). In either sense, writers during the Renaissance and neoclassical era would 
have been just “a vehicle or instrument” (36). The assumed passivity and impotence of 
writers is further suggested by the fact that copyrights of works had been usually owned 
not by writers but by booksellers and printers, due to the power of “a guild system in 
which the right to print a book was established through entry” in the register of the 
Stationers’ Company; according to its rules, “Once secured [by one stationer], the right 
to print a particular book continued forever, and thus a ‘copy’ might be bequeathed or 
sold to another stationer or it might be split into shares among several stationers” (Rose 
12). Such monopolization of copyrights by the guild system minimized writers’ role in 
the (re)production and circulation of texts. Moreover, writers before the eighteenth 
century had to depend upon the patronage of the aristocracy for financial support. All of 
these traditional conditions, however, changed as the market economy began to affect 
the literary domain in the eighteenth century: writers could have a chance to become 
more independent as they came to live on the sales of their works in literary markets 
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offered an answer for the question by introducing a new concept of the author and thus 
articulating “an emergent eighteenth-century construction of authorship” (Rosenthal 33) 
in his Conjectures on Original Composition. In a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles 
Grandison (1759). In this treatise, Young defines the author as one who produces an 
original text in contrast to one who simply imitates what others—especially the ancient 
literary authorities—wrote. The originality of the author’s text comes from its “vegetable 
nature”: because the text “rises spontaneously from the vital root of Genius” of the 
author, it is something that “grows” directly out of him (8). Also, as the text is naturally 
born of the author’s mind, it would contain the traces of his self and, by extension, 
become a kind of offshoot or even replica of his personality. Therefore, the text is in 
essence inseparable from the author and must be regarded as his possession.  
To Young, the author’s organic creation and rightful possession of the text 
should go hand in hand with his self-confidence that would distinguish him from others, 
insofar as the text embodies the author’s self and its uniqueness comes to be “dependent 
on the individuality of the author” (Rose 121). Without the strong sense of selfhood and 
self-esteem, Young states, the author just “makes one of a group, and thinks in wretched 
unanimity with the throng”; “Incumbered with the notions of others, and impoverished 
by their abundance, he conceives not the least embryo of new thoughts” and fails both in 
being a unique person and in producing the unique text (30). Now if the author believes 
in and respects himself, Young continues, he “will soon find the world’s reverence to 
                                                                                                                                                
consisting of numberless readers rather than a small group of aristocrats. The question 
about the legitimacy of writers’ textual proprietorship emerged in accordance with this 
commercialization of literature.  
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follow his own” and his works will be accordingly appreciated and “stand distinguished” 
(30). Such an image of the author as a self-assured and distinguished artist does more 
than help writers to overcome “considerable anxiety among [themselves] in the middle 
years of the century about the commodification of writing” in literary markets, as many 
authorship theorists emphasize (Rose 118). It serves to hierarchize the structure of 
authorship by at once mystifying and empowering authors and demeaning and 
subordinating readers. Young makes clear authors’ superiority to readers when he 
defines the act of writing as “a noble Amusement” and the act of reading as “more 
humble amusement” (5, 6). He proposes as authors’ essential duty the dedication of their 
genius or intellectual excellence to improving readers’ knowledge and virtue: “Wit, 
indeed, however brilliant, should not be permitted to gaze self-enamour’d on its useless 
Charms,” but “it should sacrifice its most darling Offspring [i. e. the author’s work] to 
the sacred interests of Virtue, and real Service of mankind” (4-5). The author is eligible 
for this “sacred” “Service” because he is the only one who can access, by means of his 
exceptional genius, “a delicious Garden of Moral and Intellectual fruits and flowers; the 
Key of which is denied to the rest of mankind” (5). Based on this moral and intellectual 
ascendancy, authors are deemed by Young even as equal to the ultimate noble figure, 
God, while readers are regarded as obliged to venerate the Author-God and obey its 
words/writings for self-improvement: “With regard to the Moral world, Conscience, 
with regard to the Intellectual, Genius, is that God within. Genius can set us right in 
Composition, without the Rules of the Learned; as Conscience sets us right in Life, 
without the Laws of the Land: This, singly, can make us Good, as Men; That, singly, as 
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Writers, can, sometimes, make us Great” (18). This apotheosis of the author results in 
the vertical separation of authors and readers, which in turn finalizes Young’s paradigm 
of original and sovereign authorship.     
The author’s characteristics depicted in Young’s Conjectures are also found in 
the American literary scenes of the eighteenth century. During this period, the dominant 
mode of authorship in the nation was constructed through the generic conventions of 
sentimental romance. Influenced by the novels of Samuel Richardson, who was a close 
friend and literary mentor of Young and played a significant part in Young’s 
conceptualization of the author in Conjectures,7 American writers were mostly 
producing works with an obvious authorial intent to give a moral education to readers. 
Ernest Marchand illustrates the trend when he says that “In order to make its way at all,” 
the contemporary American novel “had to surround itself with a thick coating of moral 
sugar” (550). Also, W. M. Verhoeven notes that phrases like “Moral benefit” were 
formulas “any writer had to briefly invoke at the time (and in the ‘enlightened,’ post-
Revolutionary America even more so than in Britain) whenever he expressed himself 
favorably about fiction” (157, fn. 44). There is a distinctively “American” reason for 
such enormous popularity of, and writers’ considerable recourse to, sentimental didactic 
romance among many other literary genres. According to Emory Elliott, in America “the 
                                                 
7
 It is well known that Richardson actively encouraged Young to compose Conjectures 
and offered enthusiastic advices on its revision. See Rosenthal 34-35, and Rose 116-117. 
See also Robert L. Chibka, “The Stranger within Young’s Conjectures,” ELH 53. 3 
(1986): 541-656; Alan D. McKillop, “Richardson, Young, and the Conjectures,” Modern 
Philology 22. 4 (1925): 391-404; and Patricia Phillips, “Richardson, Young and the 
Conjectures: Another Interpretation,” Studia Neophilologica: A Journal of Germanic and 
Romance Language and Literature 53 (1981): 107-112. 
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intimate relationship between literature and religion” had “prevailed well beyond the 
Revolution” in that literature had played “the moral and spiritual role” to guide people 
throughout the turbulent process of building up a nation (7-8). That role of literature is 
embodied as the idea of the “gentleman of letters,” which had reigned over American 
society and culture from the colonial era up to the eighteenth century. The gentleman of 
letters, collectively referring to a “self-conscious elite” group of “Ministers, magistrates, 
lawyers, and the gentry,” produced works to promote civic virtue and knowledge and 
“dominated both intellectual life and the social structure as part of their paternal exercise 
of authority” (Watts 196). The dominance of the gentleman of letters in the early period 
of America paved the way for the prevalence of Young’s notion of authorship in 
eighteenth-century American literature, in that the gentleman of letters, like the 
Youngian author, would have presented in the text an intellectually outstanding authorial 
character and morally defined writing intention, with a condescending air towards 
readers. The types of texts by the gentleman, including “devotional literature and 
scientific treatise, classical allusion and rhetorical skill, law and history” (Watts 196), 
show authors as authoritative specialists in the reputable fields of knowledge who work 
to improve society spiritually, ethically, and intellectually. And by virtue of this 
honorable and exemplary persona, the gentleman-author “expected and received 
deferential respect from below,” that is, from readers (Watts 196). Hence, through the 
custom of the gentleman of letters, the authorial position in America was exalted above 
the readerly one and constituted a sociocultural high class.    
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Considering this stratified texture of the early American literary realm, we might 
say that the first American novelists’ involvement with sentimental romance in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century passes “the mantle of moral preceptor and intellectual 
leader” to “artists and poets” (Elliott 12), and points to their desire for the spiritual, 
ethical, and intellectual leadership of their predecessors and insistence on the 
hierarchical division between authors and readers. For this reason, sentimental romance 
would have proven especially apt, since the genre, being “didactic,” features the author-
reader relationship basically as lecturer-audience, teacher-student, and thus superior-
inferior. Moreover, sentimental romance, being “literary,” permits writers to be 
entertaining yet directive towards readers. For example, in Susanna Rowson’s Charlotte 
Temple: A Tale of Truth (1794), a huge bestseller of the time, we see the authorial voice 
frequently meddling into the captivatingly heartbreaking story of the corruption and 
tragic death of an innocent American girl and specifically telling readers what to learn 
from the story. Such manner of meddling renders Rowson as a Youngian author who 
skillfully creates the text to instruct readers in strict agreement with her lofty authorial 
aim.   
Although not strictly categorized as a writer of sentimental romance, Charles 
Brockden Brown has been generally considered as a representative eighteenth-century 
American novelist and a model of the conventional pedagogic author-figure. Earlier 
scholars agreed with Marchand’s emphasis on “thorough-going didacticism” of his 
authorship (562) and described him as a preacher or “giver of advice in palatable form” 
(Warfel vi). The moralistically didactic orientation of Brown in turn characterized him as 
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an author who hankers for power over his readers, as critics began taking notice of 
Brown’s debt to William Godwin, especially his best-known novel of purpose, The 
Adventures of Caleb Williams; or Things as They are (1794).8 To those critics, Caleb 
Williams epitomizes Godwin’s self-definition as a potent author who can not only edify 
but also transform readers. In his 1832 account of the composition of the novel, Godwin 
talks about how he has endeavored to write a novel that would exactly coincide with his 
authorial design and “ultimate conclusion,” for the consequent “entire unity of plot” and 
“the unity of spirit and interest in a tale” would enable him to have “a powerful hold on 
the reader” (xxvi). The author’s “powerful hold on the reader,” in Godwin’s view, 
translates into the author’s sovereign power to induce a significant and beneficent 
change in the reader, which is his primary goal as a novelist: “I said to myself a thousand 
times, ‘I will write a tale, that shall constitute an epoch in the mind of the reader, that no 
one, after he has read it, shall ever be exactly the same man that he was before’” (xxvii). 
Scholars who insisted on Brown’s affinity to Godwin applied this idea of an author with 
absolute mastery over readers to Brown by searching for his authorial objective of 
affecting and molding readers’ character and mind.  
Such scholarly quest for the administrative Brown had a deep impact on Brown 
criticism to the extent that, though the early opinions on him as a conspicuously didactic 
                                                 
8
 For instance, Michael T. Gilmore says that “Godwin’s Caleb Williams had a major 
impact on Brown”: “its publication in 1794 prompted the American turn to the writing of 
fiction” (107). Attention to Godwin’s influence on Brown was initiated by William 
Dunlap’s The Life of Charles Brockden Brown (1815), the first biography of Brown. 
Dunlap notes that Brown “was an avowed admirer of Godwin’s style, and the effects of 
that admiration, may be discerned in many of his early compositions” (qtd. in Bell 163, 
fn. 27).  
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writer have gradually lost their appeal, critics keep describing his authorship as 
fundamentally relying on the formula of the magisterial author and the obedient reader. 
This critical disposition is especially well-demonstrated in John Seelye’s and Frank 
Shuffelton’s discussions of Brown. Seelye differentiates Brown from the typical didactic 
writers of late eighteenth-century America by observing that “his fiction operates on a 
more speculative plane, where moral values are seldom absolute, ethics are situational, 
conclusions indeterminate” (184). But Seelye remains in synch with the critical 
consensus on Brown as a commander of readers as he concludes that “we can see the 
uniqueness of Brown’s brand of didacticism, which seems aimed at educating his 
audience away from any easy faith in rational or ‘moral’ behavior” (184). More recently, 
Shuffelton, noting the general scholarly assumption that most eighteenth-century 
American novels are essentially “about teaching virtue to a republican readership,” 
insists that Brown’s novels do not really fit in that assumption because they contain 
unsuitable materials for the education of young readers, including “homicidal 
sleepwalkers and mischief-making ventriloquists” (91). Then he states that “Brown’s 
democratic lessons emerge not out of the content, the ‘moral,’ of his fiction but out of 
the act of reading itself and the continuous judgments it simultaneously necessitates and 
problematizes” (91). Shuffelton’s statement exemplifies how critics still cling to the 
image of Brown as an ultimate superior who intentionally gives “lessons” to readers-
inferiors even when they no longer agree with the inherent “moral”-ity of his works.9   
                                                 
9
 Critics’ inclination to characterize Brown as intentional and domineering is especially 
noticeable in their readings of Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (1799), 
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Though Brown scholars have continuously portrayed our “founding father of 
American literature” as a respectable author-figure who takes charge of readers with a 
benevolent aim, Brown himself was in fact quite doubtful about the hierarchical 
compartmentalization of authorship and readership implied in literary didacticism. It is 
well known that Brown, during his first attempt at novel writing in 1795, made a self-
conscious remark on himself being “unfitted for the instructor’s chair” (qtd. in Pattee 
xvii),10 yet even before that remark, Brown already put into question the mainstream 
power structure between authors and readers in his writing. “The Rhapsodist,” Brown’s 
earliest work consisting of four essays serialized in The Universal Asylum, and 
Columbian Magazine in 1789, illustrates the collapse of the strict stratification of authors 
and readers and subsequent destabilization of authoritarian authorship. More 
significantly, such collapse and destabilization is seen by Brown as resulting from 
readers’ responses to authors’ texts, which reflects his perception of the realities of the 
literary production and consumption in America that were gradually moving against the 
orthodox tenet of authorial superiority. As fully examined by many literary historians, 
between the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century the nation observed the 
                                                                                                                                                
which they usually regard as exhibiting most obviously Godwin’s influence on Brown. 
Jane Tompkins observes that “the model of right conduct that Brown wishes his readers 
to make their own [in this novel] is benevolence” (68, emphases added). James Dillon, in 
his discussion of how Brown stresses a necessary cooperation of objective historians and 
imaginative romancers to produce a reliable record of human actions and sentiments, 
labels Brown as the romancer and argues that “The reader [of Arthur Mervyn] … is not 
merely a reader, but works as an apprentice romancer” for Brown (249, emphases added).  
10
 Harry R. Warfel suggests that the novel implied in this remark must have been Arthur 
Mervyn, which was Brown’s first try at a novel but completed and published after 
Wieland (viii). 
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advance of printing technology and transportation networks that would have made 
possible the mass manufacture and wider distribution of cheaper books with speed, as 
well as the increase of the average literacy rate and, consequently, the number of 
potential readers or consumers.11 In this situation, readers came to have a great influence 
on authors as their reading and evaluation of works became an important factor to 
authors’ artistic and financial success. From this view, one might say that at that time 
authors and readers were about to clash on a more or less equal level and have to 
struggle for the meanings of texts.  
Such clash and struggle is foreshadowed in “The Rhapsodist” in the forms of a 
dynamic between the first-person narrator, who overlaps in many respects with Young’s 
notion of the author, and his unidentified reader, who, eager to respond to the narrator’s 
writing, intervenes in his authorship. This dynamic does not just epitomize “the ironic 
subjection of literary authority to public opinion” (Simpson 95): it bespeaks Brown’s 
belief in the necessity of taking into account readers’ growing eagerness to partake in 
literary creation. The narrator first introduces himself simply as a rhapsodist and 
proclaims his purpose of explaining who he is. At a glance, he seems to accept and be 
fully aware of the transition of the author-reader relationship in progress: he says that he 
regards his writing of these essays as “a voluntary obligation” to readers and that he will 
write as if he “converse[s] with his reader not as an author, but as a man” (I: 3, 5). The 
                                                 
11
 For more information about the development of the literary industry and the rise of the 
reading public in America from the late eighteenth to the nineteenth century, see William 
Charvat, The Profession of Authorship in America 1800-1870 (New York: Columbia UP, 
1992), and Cathy N. Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in 
America (New York: Oxford UP, 1986).  
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actual text of the essays, however, exposes the narrator’s underlying affiliation with sole, 
sovereign authorship. According to him, he entitles the essays “The Rhapsodist” for, 
with a title directly relevant to “my acknowledged character” as such, he can achieve a 
“Unity of design” and create “a bond of union between parts utterly disimilar [sic], and 
otherwise unconnected with each other” (I: 4). This account, designating the 
narrator/rhapsodist himself as the title and the structural principle of the essays, aims to 
confirm his origination, possession, and control of his text. Also, his design to describe 
“The character of a rhapsodist” (I: 5) throughout the essays signifies his object to make 
his text a copy of himself filled with the marks of his authorial character and thus 
enhance his authorship and textual proprietorship. The narrator goes on to solidify his 
authorial station by singling himself out as an eminent and noble author. The rhapsodist 
always seeks to be “in the deepest recesses of his garden” or retire “to muse and 
meditate in his chamber,” since “It is only when alone that he exerts his faculties with 
vigour, and exults in the consciousness of his own existence” (II: 7, 6). By isolating 
himself, the rhapsodist also becomes able to “preserve his dignity sacred from 
promiscuous intercourse” among undistinguished ordinary people (II: 7). As such, the 
narrator asserts, the rhapsodist is no other than a “poet” with “a sublime and elevated 
devotion” to his art that would “raise him to a level with the most illustrious of 
philosophers” (II: 9). With this assertion, the narrator seeks to associate himself with 
sovereign authorship and to place him in an undeniably superior position to readers.      
Yet the narrator’s objective to obtain the authority of the transcendental and 
divine poet is soon held in check by the “unseasonable interruption” of a letter from one 
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of his readers (II: 11). The narrator immediately expresses his feeling of annoyance and 
even resentment of that interruption, which, to him, violates the inviolable partition 
between authors and readers that he has set up: after lamenting that “In vain the 
Rhapsodist announces to his Readers, that he hates the intrusion of a visitor,” he adds 
that the letter is clearly against “my pretensions to unlimited sovereignty over my own 
person and actions” and “my strong original propensity to silence and reserve” (III: 12). 
As further implied in his continuing remark that “I loved to be alone, and spoke in a 
language unintelligible to any but myself” (III: 13), the narrator writes essentially self-
servingly; he at best writes “to” readers, while deciding on his own how they should read 
what he writes. The reader’s letter threatens this self-directed authorship, as it breaks 
down the narrator’s system of one-way communication in spite of his will and forces 
him to deal with how the reader thinks of the essays. Now the narrator has no choice but 
to get into communication “with” the reader, by acknowledging the reader’s letter-
response and introducing it in his text: he is “compelled to pay obedience, tho’ 
grudgingly, to the laws of society” (III: 12), that is, to the laws of the world of 
“promiscuous intercourse.”       
The letter turns out to be indeed highly detrimental to the narrator’s authority, as 
it is written by a kind of reader who wants to not only speak out his opinion on the 
narrator’s writing but also do his own writing, and who thus destabilizes the strict 
division between an authorial act and a readerly act. The reader at first identifies himself 
as the narrator’s “friend” on account of his reading of the first number of the essays (III: 
17). Then he boldly argues for “so great a resemblance [of the narrator] to myself in the 
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common qualifications of an author” that has motivated him to write the letter (III: 17). 
Ironically enough, given that the essays were supposed to distinguish the narrator as an 
author with extraordinary and unique talent, the reader finds his similarity with the 
narrator and his opportunity to become an author himself just like the narrator. The 
reader’s finding, obviously unintended by the narrator, evinces the impossibility of 
authors’ total control of texts because of readers’ interpretation, and weakens the 
narrator’s authority. Based on what he has discovered, the reader then professes his 
willingness to try his hand at an authorial post: “I have unwarily admitted in my bosom, 
a belief that literary fame is a prize not altogether unattainable” (III: 17). The reader, 
however, has in effect already made himself an author, as he has his own writing 
introduced in the narrator’s writing—“I am, even now, entitled to share with you the 
honour of publication” (III: 17)—and, more important, has written the letter “to” the 
narrator and turned the narrator into his reader. This inversion of the authorial and 
readerly positions bestows the reader with power over the narrator. The reader continues: 
“In the mean time, permit me to address you as an author, and to close this epistle with 
some directions respecting the composition of your essays” (III: 18). Even if he says, 
“permit me to address you as an author,” and appears to agree with the narrator being an 
author, the reader is actually highlighting the fact that it is he, not the narrator, who 
makes the narrator an author. The narrator cannot obtain authorship autonomously but 
needs the reader who would “address [him] as an author” to be one; and for now, or “in 
the mean time,” the reader would regard him as an author, whereas he, in other times, 
may not. What is more, the reader’s proposal to give the narrator “some directions” 
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intimates an imminent possibility of his intervention in the narrator’s authoring act and 
appropriation of the narrator’s authoring position.    
The narrator, perceiving such intimidating connotations of the reader’s words, 
tries to re-claim his authority by abruptly cutting off the letter: “The narrow bounds to 
which I am restricted [as a periodical writer], will not suffer me to insert the whole of 
this letter at present” (III: 18). Yet now that the reader’s voice in his essays has become 
too loud to be ignored in that despotic manner, the narrator cannot help but re-introduce 
the letter. In doing so, he endeavors to restrain the reader’s growing effect on him by 
calling the reader’s proposed help mere “assistance” and thus subordinate to his writing 
(IV: 21). The re-introduced portion of the letter, however, shows the reader already 
ready to write, with a claim to the “liberty of judging for myself” and “entire freedom 
with respect to composition, and the qualities of stile [sic],” and “a subject” (IV: 22, 23). 
And he begins to write about a certain medical condition called “itch of writing” (IV: 23). 
The topic is quite an appropriate choice for his attempt at authorship inasmuch as it 
looks as if he himself had that itch: his narrative is comprised of a jumble of medical 
knowledge and personal meditation with an impulsive tone. Alarmed by the reader’s 
unpremeditated and spontaneous writing, the narrator interrupts once again to “impose 
silence upon my correspondent, with remarking, that he does not appear to consult 
propriety” (IV: 24). By judging the reader’s writing in terms of “propriety,” the narrator 
subjugates the reader to his power to determine what should be said in his text, and 
finally manages to put an end to the reader’s dangerous intervention. But it still does not 
restore to the narrator his authorship, for along with the reader’s writing his own essays 
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end as well: after the conclusion of the fourth number with the “propriety” remark, we 
never see him come back and finish up “The Rhapsodist.” This incomplete closure 
reveals the narrator’s interrelationship with the reader. To be more exact, since the 
reader’s break-in with the letter, the essays as a whole have become a record of the 
narrator’s interaction with the reader so that now it is impossible for the narrator to 
continue writing without the reader. In this sense, “The Rhapsodist” illuminates readers’ 
fundamental involvement in authors’ composition of texts.  
Such illumination, then, allows us to read “The Rhapsodist” as Brown’s call for 
an almost mandatory dissolution and change of dictatorial authorship in consideration of 
readers. And the fact that those essays are what made Brown a “published author” 
(Cowie 313) supports the idea that Brown looks for such dissolution and change of 
authorship right from the beginning of his writing career. Indeed, Steve Hamelman 
observes that “The Rhapsodist” “spelled out the literary theories that would soon find 
fictional expression” in Brown’s novels (173). Yet Hamelman, like many other Brown 
scholars who argue for Brown’s sovereign authorship, reads the essays as thematizing 
“Brown’s repeated theme of originality” that is later fictionalized in Edgar Huntly; or, 
Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799), and affirms that “The Rhapsodist (ever eager to 
rhapsodize about his infatuation with nature, solitude, and self), Edgar Huntly, and 
Charles Brockden Brown speak in harmony” (186). Disagreeing with Hamelman’s 
portrayal of Brown as a self-regarding and self-dissociating, and thus essentially 
Youngian author, I would maintain that “The Rhapsodist” theorizes Brown’s re-
configuration of the author according to the mutation of readership and his quest for an 
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alternative type of authorship built on that re-configuration, and propose that their 
“fictional expression” is most discernibly found in his first published gothic novel, 
Wieland. 
Several critics, taking mainly two different standpoints, have already paid 
attention to how Wieland represents Brown’s problematization of the traditional notion 
of authorship. The first standpoint, concerning the location of originality and authority in 
the novel, is well illustrated in Walter Hesford’s and Mark R. Patterson’s discussions. 
Hesford, pointing out how the uncertainty of who causes all the calamities in Wieland 
raises a question about “the author, the initiator, of the bloody, confusing action,” opines 
that the novel “works to deconstruct the idea of single authorship, and, with it, belief in a 
single, authoritative source of meaning and action,” by making the reader “something of 
an author, a constructor of meaning” (239, 246). Patterson similarly notes that Wieland 
has no author in the sense of “one who creates or causes an action” insofar as “we can 
never safely trace events back to their authors,” and insists that such a lack testifies to 
Brown’s transference of “the power to judge the value and verifiable truth of his novel” 
to readers (68, 69, 73). These readings, while shedding light on how Wieland showcases 
Brown’s dubiety about the supremacy of authors’ origination and his recognition of the 
importance of readers’ construction, only focus on the general idea of the author as a 
creator of an action, and neglect a more specific, “literary” sense of the author as a 
creator of a “story.” For that reason, they fail to address how the novel is more self-
consciously concerned about the “act” and “process” of authoring—of composing a 
story and claiming its ownership—chiefly by means of the first-person narrator and 
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“writer” Clara Wieland. This failure seems to be made up for by the other critical 
standpoint to Wieland, which heeds the import of Clara’s narration. It especially takes 
notice of her anxious but fruitless efforts to provide a satisfactorily complete narrative of 
events, as indicating the inherent limitations of the author’s unshared control of the text. 
According to Mark Seltzer, Clara’s incapacity to causalize events exemplifies “the 
difficulties that [Brown] encounters in the act of writing,” which can be summed up as 
“the uncertain relation between intent and effect, between the verbal performance and 
the actions and reactions which it instigates” (81). Cynthia S. Jordan, remarking that the 
precipitate ending in Clara’s narrative shows her “attempts to impose order on an 
anarchic reality,” contends that the deficiency of such an ending signifies Brown’s 
message that “the motives and actions of other people, are ever inscrutable, and thus any 
interpretations of such realities must remain inconclusive ‘stories’” (158, 170-71). Later 
Toni O’Shaughnessy expands Seltzer’s and Jordan’s opinions in a poststructuralist 
perspective, and claims that “the inadequacy of Clara’s interpretive efforts, and, by 
analogy, of other interpretive efforts” similarly relying on single accountability, 
demonstrates Brown’s idea that neither author nor reader but language itself becomes an 
agent, “more important for its power to effect behavior than for its source or meaning” 
(49). All these observations certainly contribute to illuminating Brown’s depiction in 
Wieland of the impossibility of the purely author-directed production of the text due to 
the fundamental relatedness of the authorial act with the readerly act. But they still do 
not offer an insight into his actual application of his awareness of that impossibility to 
the practice of authorship per se.   
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Drawing on these observations, I will argue in this chapter that Wieland registers 
Brown’s attempt to put into practice his realization of at once the insufficiency of 
contemporary autarchic authorship to handle readers’ irrefutable influence on authors’ 
performance and the necessary transformation of the notion of the author to overcome 
that insufficiency. To do so, I will focus on not only Clara, who has been the center of 
critical attention, but also Carwin, who, despite the novel’s allusion to him as “the 
principal person” (3),12 has been depreciated, if not neglected, by critics owing to his 
mostly unexplained and ghostly existence and motivation.13 As Roland Hagenbüchle 
notes, Wieland illustrates through Carwin Brown’s employment of the gothic convention 
                                                 
12
 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist (Ed. Jay 
Fliegelman, New York: Penguin Books, 1991). All quotations from the novel will be 
taken from this edition. 
13
 Earlier critics denied any significance to Carwin due to his lack of distinctive identity. 
William M. Manly sees that “Carwin, in fact, is for the most part a shadowy background 
figure whose final confession reveals him to be more of a pathetic bumbler,” and asserts 
that “Though he is the mechanism behind mysterious events, the dramatic heart of the 
novel is not in the events themselves but in the reaction of Clara and Wieland to them” 
(319, 320). David Lyttle agrees with Manly, saying that Carwin’s ability “to mimic 
voices” only “symbolizes his failure of identity” and, by extension, as a character in the 
novel (265, fn. 19). Toward the mid-1970s Carwin has gradually appealed to critics, but 
only as a textual device to articulate Brown’s authorial ideas precisely through his 
unidentified presence in Wieland. To Michael Davitt Bell, Carwin’s character is Brown’s 
fictionalization of the problematic of authorial sincerity that he has originally brought up 
in “The Rhapsodist”: “If Clara represents the Rhapsodist’s ideal of absolute literary 
sincerity, then Carwin represents his fear that all literary expression, being “artful,” leads 
inevitably to artificiality and deception” (147). Miroslawa Ziaja-Buchholtz sees 
Carwin’s hollowness as a means of Brown’s invocation of readers’ participation. 
Because Carwin is “never objectively, omnisciently described,” readers “may choose 
either to trust or reject” his story at the end (28). Recently, critics Paul Downes and 
Hsuan L. Hsu discuss Carwin more exclusively, by attending to an unfinished sequel to 
Wieland, “Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist” (1803-1805). Yet their discussions are 
mostly devoted to the exploration of the historiopolitical implications of the sequel 
rather than the textual analysis. Hence the critical tendency toward regarding Carwin as 
an essentially symbolic figure still continues.  
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of “character instability and character ambivalence (along with unfathomable 
motivation)” (130). As a character defined by incongruity between the interior and the 
exterior, Brown’s Carwin marks “a doubling that, like the superimposition of two 
picture-puzzles, defies all attempts at unriddling,” and exists as “ambivalence incarnate” 
(130). I propose that we embrace the spectral ambiguity and unreadability of Carwin as 
it is, by linking it to the ungraspable identity and unprecedented weight of the newly 
emerging reading public in late eighteenth-century America that would have bewildered 
and threatened many contemporary writers. Therefore, if Carwin signifies the gothic 
qualities of Wieland as Hagenbüchle sees, he does so by embodying and reviving 
what/who should be repressed for the proper operation of sovereign authorship: readers. 
In this light, I will initially view Clara and Carwin as respectively an authoritative author 
and an intrusive reader. Clara, the main narrating voice, represents an author whose 
authority counts on her undivided possession of the text; Carwin, the ventriloquistic 
voices haunting Clara and her narrative, epitomizes readers’ ubiquitous presence around 
the author and unpredictable responses to the text that would debilitate Clara’s authority. 
Viewing Clara and Carwin in this way will elucidate how the conflict between the self-
contained author and the responsive reader in “The Rhapsodist” is reenacted in Wieland. 
Furthermore, it will point to how such conflict incites the birth of a new kind of author 
and authorship out of readers when Carwin eventually turns into an author of his own 
narrative, “Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist” (1803-1805), as the consequence of 
readers’ responses to him. Carwin’s transformation will in turn show how Brown’s later 
career as a magazine editor can be understood not an alternative choice for his failed 
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literary authorship, as many critics think, but an attempt at a reader-inspired mode of 
authorship. Paralleling Carwin’s transformation with Brown’s own will support my 
ultimate argument in this chapter that Wieland presages Brown’s literary descendants’ 
efforts to establish their authorship in harmony with readership in nineteenth-century 
America.  
 
2. How the Author Fails, and Thrives: Clara, Carwin, and Brown in Wieland 
From the beginning, Wieland makes clear its deep involvement with the 
changing environment of American literary markets at the end of the eighteenth century. 
The “Advertisement”14 in particular represents that involvement: it practically puts the 
novel up for sale and tries to attract readers/consumers, who “must be permitted to 
decide” the “lasting reputation” of the novel, by bringing up the story’s similarity to “an 
authentic case” that they “will probably recollect” and must be curious about (3, 4).15 
The “Advertisement” also posits the narrator Clara as a writer under the same 
increasingly reader-inclined circumstances. It is noted that the narrative of Wieland is 
                                                 
14
 Among Brown’s novels, only Wieland begins with the “Advertisement”; others have 
more conventional opening segments such as a letter from a main character to another 
(Ormond; or, the Secret Witness), a “Preface” (Arthur Mervyn), an author’s self-
explanatory address “To the Public” (Edgar Huntly), and so on. This fact clearly 
distinguishes Wieland from Brown’s other works as a text reflecting authors’ increasing 
dependency on readers in contemporary America.  
15
 “An authentic case” adverts to a notorious family massacre committed by a religious 
maniac James Yates in 1781. The reader-appealing effect of this incident is clearly 
pointed out in one reviewer’s comment on Wieland in the North American Review in 
1819: “Sometimes the author takes advantage of a recent event amongst ourselves, as in 
Wieland, which is too shocking to receive any aid from exaggeration or to lose any 
interest from its notoriety” (qtd. in Wiley 100).  
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“addressed, in an epistolary form, by the Lady whose story it contains, to a small number 
of friends, whose curiosity, with regard to it, had been greatly awakened” (4). Here we 
are given the presupposition of Clara’s narration/writing: she would write on equal terms 
with readers (they are her “friends,” as in “The Rhapsodist”) and in response to readers’ 
reactions to her story (her friends are “curious” about what has happened to her and, 
presumably, want to know about it in detail). This presupposition, emphasizing the 
“epistolary form,” delineates Clara as a writer in close affinity with readers. Since the 
epistolary mode is basically designed to feature an intimate transaction between senders 
and recipients, the epistolarity of Clara’s narrative leads us to look forward to finding her 
friendly and familiar correspondence with readers in the novel.    
The actual text of Clara’s narrative, however, exhibits neither her writerly 
consideration of readers nor her intimate communication with readers. Rather, it reveals 
Clara’s attempt to be the kind of author defined by Young, that is, an author who aspires 
to the non-communicative relationship with readers, to exclusive textual ownership, and 
to a distanced and transcendent authorial position. The narrative begins with Clara 
directly addressing and responding to her friends’ “curiosity” about her story. Yet her 
own response to her friends betrays her anxiety about readers’ excessive closeness with 
her narratorial position and her effort to detach herself from them. What we notice first 
of all is her “little reluctance in complying with your request” for her storytelling, 
followed by a decisive remark that “You know not fully the cause of my sorrows”; she 
adds that “You are a stranger to the depth of my distresses,” so “your efforts at 
consolation must necessarily fail” (5). Strictly speaking, as suggested in the 
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“Advertisement,” it might be her friends’ “request” for her story that encourages and 
even empowers her to write it in the first place. But Clara simply seems to belittle such 
significance of the readerly “request,” as she not only sets about her narration 
mentioning her “reluctance” but also quickly underscores the impossibility of readers’ 
sympathetic understanding of what has happened to her. Then by stating that her story is 
“not intended as a claim upon your sympathy” (5), Clara in effect establishes a 
communicative gap that dissociates her from them.       
Clara’s self-dissociation in turn enables her to formulate the author-reader 
relationship as she wants. She grants her readers “right to be informed of the events that 
have lately happened in my family,” and asks them to “Make what use of the tale you 
shall think proper” (5). Right after this seemingly reader-concerned comment, however, 
she promptly proposes her intended use of her story: “If it be communicated to the world, 
it will inculcate the duty of avoiding deceit. It will exemplify the force of early 
impressions, and show, the immeasurable evils that flow from an erroneous or imperfect 
discipline” (5). Here, Clara acknowledges readers’ “presence” but not their “agency 
beyond a ‘right to be informed’” (Ferguson 7). Or, I would add, Clara wants readers to 
remain mere addressees or passive receivers of her epistolary narrative, who shall not 
reply to her with their “sympathy.” By contrast, she can be an active and authoritative 
dictator, who determines the meaning of her story by herself. Clara proceeds to reinforce 
this dictatorship by rendering her experience unsharable and her narrative essentially her 
own, which consequently endows her with sole authorship. For the experience she has 
gone through is something that “no human being can furnish a parallel” and that she, 
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“beyond the rest of mankind, should be reserved for a destiny without alleviation, and 
without example!” (6). Clara’s “unparalleled” experience individualizes her case and 
elevates her writerly status “beyond the rest of mankind” including her readers. As a 
result, she now steps “on this dreadful eminence” and can claim that she is the only one 
who is “still alive” and “able to relate” her story (6). In this respect, Clara’s epistolary 
and thus supposedly dialogic narrative reveals its underlying tendency towards a 
“massive monologue that parodies the epistolary conceit” (Wallach 8).  
Clara’s self-elevating and monologic authorship can be further examined in 
terms of her familial and geographical backgrounds. As to the former, the story of her 
grandfather provides important clues. Most critics have only focused on how the history 
of Clara’s father, the elder Wieland, prefigures his son and Clara’s brother Theodore 
Wieland’s religious zealotry and maniacal murder of his own family and Clara’s own 
latent insanity and conspicuous secrecy.16 Yet the history of Clara’s grandfather equally 
                                                 
16
 J. V. Ridgely points out that the elder Wieland’s “tendency toward a private belief 
which leads to insane conclusion is inherent in the Wieland family” and that “Like her 
father and brother, Clara is eventually led by her untested perceptions into mental 
disorientation” (13, 14). Jordan observes that the elder Wieland’s “imperfect tale” about 
how his body was caught on fire hints at “more integral cause of narrative imperfection” 
of Clara’s storytelling in that in both of their narratives “not only does external reality 
remain inscrutable, but storytellers themselves are shown to be unreliable” (163). Also, 
Jordan continues, Clara keeping her father’s manuscript in her closet “metaphorically 
strengthens the idea that she has inherited the psychological limitations implicit in his 
imperfect authority” (164). Norman S. Grabo adds to Jordan by saying that Clara tries to 
conceal her own resemblance with her father. In Grabo’s view, Clara “apparently intends 
to explain her brother’s madness by including this extraordinary event [of her father’s 
possible spontaneous combustion]” and insisting on her belief that “Theodore’s madness 
relates to their father’s peculiar death” (8). By “externaliz[ing] Theodore’s inheritance of 
guilt, faith, and obedience to a sense of divinity” from their father, Grabo’s Clara 
attempts “to hide that she also shares that inheritance,” not knowing that “what she 
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deserves our attention as, epitomizing the fate of an aristocratic artist in conflict with a 
newly constituted mercantile and democratic society, it casts light on Clara’s Youngian 
view of art and artists. According to Clara, he was the first one among the noble Wieland 
household who gave up the family prerogatives owing to his marriage to a woman from 
the merchant class. Consequently, he had to “search out some mode of independent 
subsistence” to overcome his “poverty,” and came to resort to “literature and music,” 
which had been the “sources of amusement” in his earlier aristocratic habitat but now 
became his “means of gain” in the world of commerce (7). But his venture into that 
world was not very successful. His artistic accomplishment was, as described by Clara, 
praiseworthy enough to posit him as “the founder of the German Theatre” at a time when 
“there were few works of taste in the Saxon dialect” (7). His artistic performance was, 
however, overall a failure; his “sonatas and dramatic pieces” were “not unpopular, but 
merely afforded him a scanty subsistence” (7). This conflicting outcome of the 
grandfather’s career exemplifies not just “the committed artist’s inability to cope with 
the world in mundane vocational terms” (Ferguson 148), but the aristocratic artist’s 
incapability to communicate and share his high-class art with his non-aristocratic 
audience. Yet the obviously laudatory and proud tone in Clara’s relation about her 
grandfather—she extols “the fruitfulness of his invention” and “the soundness of his 
taste” (7)—bespeaks that she does not regard his “unpopularity” as failure but rather 
cherishes the image of artists as distinguished yet solitary creators whose preeminent 
                                                                                                                                                
imputes to and exteriorizes in her brother is first of all true of herself (26, 27).  
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achievement can be justly appreciated only by a few with an equally preeminent artistic 
taste, like her.  
Clara’s aristocratic view of art and artists is also backgrounded geographically, 
by the “self-imposed isolation” (Vickers 1) and self-sufficiency of her life in Mettingen. 
Clara, along with Wieland, has been “exempted ... from the necessity of personal labour” 
thanks to her father’s property “equally divided” to them (23, 24). By virtue of that 
financial security, she could have lived a tranquil life, withdrawn “from the society of 
others” or strangers while keeping a selective company with Wieland and his friend 
Henry Playel as well as Wieland’s wife and Pleyel’s sister Catharine, whose “tempers” 
and intellectual “pursuits” are “remarkably congenial” to Clara (23). With this tightly 
bound group of people, Clara can maintain a safe “distance” from, and assume a 
privileged indifference to, “calamity” outside Mettingen that tends only “to heighten 
enjoyments”: “The sound of war had been heard, but it was at such a distance as to 
enhance our enjoyment by affording objects of comparison,” “agitating our minds with 
curiosity, and furnishing causes of patriotic exultation” (25, 29). In this disconnected and 
self-absorbed mode of life, art is not a communicative act that requires an audience from 
outside but just a self-satisfying means of pleasure. As narrated by Clara, “Our tasks, our 
walks, our music, were seldom performed but in each other’s company” (23). She also 
“sung, and talked, and read, and occasionally banqueted” with the group at a temple, a 
private, insulated artistic shrine that allows them to nurture the self-appointed artistic 
authority and contend, for example, “to admire the performance [i. e. the bust of Cicero], 
without waiting for the sanction of connoisseurs” (26). Clara’s self-pleasing experience 
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of art in Mettingen, combined with her strong sense of privacy and “independence” even 
within the place (Shelden 20) as reflected in her decision to live alone, “three quarters of 
a mile from my brother’s,” for “administering a fund, and regulating an household, of 
my own” (24), provides grounds for Clara’s sovereign authorship with no attention to 
the sympathy of readers/outsiders. 
It is, nonetheless, exactly because of a reader/outsider that Clara’s autonomous 
authorship is put into danger as in the case of the narrator in “The Rhapsodist.” Carwin, 
a mysterious intruder in Mettingen, disrupts Clara’s narratorial authority by generating 
numerous interpretations of and responses to her Mettingen story and her authorial 
character from the inside. In doing so, he at first acts as a prying and meddling reader of 
Clara, and then turns others, especially Wieland and Pleyel, into equally prying and 
meddling readers by inducing their responses to his readerly act. As a result of this chain 
reaction, Clara has to strive against the reader-responses so as to keep the legitimacy of 
her version of the story and preserve her authorial image as she intends. In this sense, 
unlike the common gothic reading of Wieland according to which Carwin is a villain 
who sneaks into Mettingen and disrupts its peace whereas Clara plays the roles of an 
innocent victim or a damsel in distress, Carwin’s intrusion in Mettingen works to 
liberate a readership from oppression under Clara’s tyrannically selfish narration/writing.      
Carwin’s invasion begins to affect Clara through Wieland, who hears Carwin’s 
mimicry of Catharine’s voice and, after contemplation, creates a “narrative” of his own 
(38), the process of which is not totally regulated by Clara’s narratorial authority. It 
should be noted first that Carwin’s mimicry or re-presentation results from his 
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undetected observation or reading of Clara’s clique. Despite Clara’s careful management 
to maintain privacy, he “often caught parts ... of [their] conversation” while wandering 
around the temple, and became “well acquainted with the voice” of Catharine and 
informed of her marital relationship with Wieland (228). One day Carwin, hiding 
himself at the empty temple, senses Wieland’s approach, and to stop it, throws 
Catharine’s voice. So he essentially interprets and recomposes what he heard/read about 
Catharine and Wieland in order to protect himself. Carwin’s ventriloquistic 
interpretation and recomposition in turn gets Wieland, now as Carwin’s audience, to 
wonder how to explain what he hears. Yet before Wieland’s attempt at explanation, 
Clara, as a narrator, steps forward to impose her explanation of what he hears. When 
Wieland returns home and tells others about Catharine’s voice, Clara readily concludes 
that his account bears a “shadowy resemblance” to “my father’s death” in a way that 
Wieland’s “senses should be the victims of such delusion” as the father’s (39). Clara’s 
conclusion, heavily reckoning on her subjective belief in the father-son resemblance, 
foreshadows her self-imposing authorial trait that will become more and more salient 
toward the end of her narrative. The conclusion simultaneously points to the problematic 
of such authorial traits because she can by no means prevent Wieland from expounding 
or making a story about the Catharine incident in his own ways. She observes that after 
the incident, “He was less disposed than formerly to converse” with her and others, 
which makes it “difficult to ascertain the exact species of impression which it made upon 
him” (40). Wieland’s reserve upsets Clara for she cannot complete her account of the 
incident: his untold reaction becomes a semantic hole in her narrative and fails her 
  
44 
formation of the ultimate conclusion. Thus Clara ventures to ask him directly about how 
he feels so that she can get hold of “the state of his thoughts” (40), but he would not be 
caught in her hold; he only answers that “There is no determinate way in which the 
subject can be viewed” and that “To suppose a deception will not do,” for “there are 
twenty other suppositions more probable” (40-41). We know that Wieland in fact has 
already taken the incident as the proof of God’s presence, which is fully narrativized in 
his confession about his family slaughter later in the novel and which contradicts Clara’s 
narrative that blames Carwin for the slaughter. But at this point he refuses to reveal his 
thought to Clara and place it under her authorial scrutiny, which evinces the 
impossibility of authors’ thorough governance of readers.  
It is likewise noteworthy that Wieland, after his encounter with Carwin, comes to 
perceive a possibility of “twenty other suppositions” about a single incident. Indeed, 
Carwin’s readerly act stresses the fact that everyone has, and should be allowed to have, 
an opinion about the same issue, which undermines Clara’s homogenizing authorship. 
Such a function is especially well shown in Carwin’s other interference in the 
conversation between Wieland and Pleyel. Wieland and Pleyel discuss whether the 
former should move to Europe to claim his rights of “male primogeniture” on his Saxon 
ancestors’ property (42). Wieland is reluctant about the idea, not sure if Catharine as 
well as Clara agrees with it, but Pleyel pushes him to put it into action. Whereas Pleyel’s 
motive is, on the surface, for the sake of his friend’s legitimate rights, he actually wants 
to move to Europe to re-unite with his lover there—the Baroness de Stolberg, or Theresa. 
But he would not go there alone and be out of contact with his long-time friends in 
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Mettingen, and thus is eager to procure Wieland’s company. Yet Pleyel “anxiously 
concealed from [Clara and Catharine] his purpose” because he himself anticipates their 
“efforts against him” once they know of his selfish plan (45). And he makes use of the 
spousal influence of Catharine’s opinion on Wieland by asking him, “when she knows 
your pleasure, will she not conform to it?” (50). Then suddenly Catharine’s voice, 
ventriloquized by Carwin who has been listening to their conversation out of their sight, 
intervenes and answers “No” to Pleyel (50). Carwin’s intervention, originating in his 
reading of the conversation and subsequent speculation on Catharine’s opinion, holds in 
check Pleyel’s self-interested attempt to suppress others’ opinions. Moreover, Carwin’s 
intervention leads Pleyel to discard his plan and say that “I cannot hope to prevail with 
my friends to accompany me” (50). This whole transaction, in which the unpredictability 
of Carwin’s interruption once again underscores the spontaneity and uncontrollability of 
the readerly response, proves how Carwin serves to dismantle single authorship as his 
ventriloquism gives a sense of presence to the absent readers and materializes their 
reactions that would have been otherwise silenced and misused by a self-centered and 
willful speaker/writer.17      
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 Interestingly, we now can see that Carwin’s first two interventions are made with the 
voice of Catharine, who, throughout the novel, remains silent and almost invisible 
comparing to the other three main characters. Catharine’s silence and invisibility or 
insignificance is in a sense promoted by Clara, who rephrases most of Catharine’s words 
in her own words in her narrative. Also, Clara at one point describes Catharine as “clay, 
moulded by the circumstances in which she happened to be placed” (88), which 
emphasizes the latter’s essential passivity and lack of individuality. In this respect, 
Carwin’s ventriloquization of Catharine makes audible, visible, and tangible her 
presence in Clara’s narrative and counterbalances Clara’s autarchic authorial disposition.   
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Carwin’s function to represent reactive readers enables him, or his intervention, 
to revive the dialogic nature of the author-reader relationship that Clara endeavors to 
stifle, as demonstrated in his conversation with Clara’s circle at the temple. Carwin is 
officially introduced into Mettingen society by Pleyel, who met him in Europe in the 
past, and soon becomes a frequent visitor and close friend. One day he is invited to join 
in Clara’s group’s discussion about the recent mysterious voices, and, after listening to 
their relations of the incidents, volunteers to relate some other similar instances. But his 
storytelling, which is another readerly act on his part, is not welcomed by Clara who 
believes that “his narratives, however complex or marvelous, contained no instance 
sufficiently parallel to those that had befallen ourselves, and in which the solution was 
applicable to our own cases” (85). Clara’s judging of Carwin’s story indicates her 
authorial tendency to keep every part in her narrative in accordance with her intention, 
which here is to convey the discussion about those mysterious voices in Mettingen; for 
that reason, she must point out the irrelevance of Carwin’s story(telling). But despite her 
domineering gesture, Carwin’s interference engenders varied readerly opinions. To 
Carwin’s conclusion that his own instances as well as the Mettingen incidents may result 
from “a human agent,” Wieland counters that they rather imply “the probability of 
celestial interference,” whereas Pleyel gives credit to “his senses” as the only reliable 
measure to determine the matter (85, 86). Carwin’s conclusion does not aim at his 
readers’ unanimous agreement with it; as Clara later recollects, throughout the whole 
discussion Carwin “never explicitly declared his opinion as to the nature of those voices, 
or decided whether they were real or visionary,” and “recommended no measures of 
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caution or prevention” (109). His conclusion, instead, encourages his listeners’/readers’ 
articulation and exchange of views with one another, and gives rise to continuous 
interpretations of the given topic. On the contrary, Clara does not partake in that active 
communication: detaching herself as a narrator/referee, she simply states that Carwin’s 
conclusion is still “insufficient to impart conviction to us” (87) and adheres to her 
opinion.  
Nevertheless, Clara’s authorial principles of non-communication and hierarchical 
distance are broken by Carwin, who turns her into the object of readerly attention and 
(re)interpretation. Such objectification originates from Carwin’s intrusive interest in her 
character. He happens to hear about Clara from her maid and his secret lover Judith: as 
he confesses later to Clara, “According to my companion’s report, your perfections were 
little less than divine. Her uncouth but copious narratives converted you into an object of 
worship” (230). His initial response to Judith’s “narratives,” which coincide with Clara’s 
earlier self-portrayal as a distinguished and superior being, is to doubt the probability of 
such a portrayal: he calls Clara “a prodigy,” and feels as if “some dæmon of mischief” 
propels him to make certain “whether [she was] such an one” (230). Then following that 
“dæmon” inside him, Carwin infiltrates the “interior of [her] chamber” and her closet 
(234). His infiltration, generally analyzed as the trespass on “Clara’s very identity” 
(Russo 69) or “an inner part of her mind” (Ringe 285), can also be viewed as his 
intrusion into the textual foundation of Clara’s authorship because, among many other 
things, the closet contains the fullest version of her (Mettingen) story: her journal that 
records “the most secret transactions of my life” in short hand (218). Her double 
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concealment of the journal in her closet within her private room signifies her intense 
desire for inviolable ownership of her text and power over her readers: by having the full 
version of her narrative to herself, she would be the only one who knows the very truth 
of what has happened to her and who decides what should be told and what should not.18 
By accessing that journal, and obtaining the knowledge of Clara that only “conjugal 
intimacies can give” (234), Carwin sufficiently contravenes her authority-driven “policy 
of concealment” (Samuels 62).     
Carwin goes on to interpret and re-make her authorial character through his 
reading of her journal. In the process, significantly, he receives aid from another reader: 
Pleyel. Pleyel’s participation proves especially helpful in denigrating Clara’s eminent 
authorial image due to his original belief in her perfection. When he was in Germany in 
childhood, Pleyel exchanged “copious and uninterrupted” letters with Clara (138). Their 
correspondence tips us to Clara’s dictatorial authorship in that in addition to continuing 
their friendship, it inscribes a reputable image of her in Pleyel’s mind. The effect of such 
inscription is illustrated when Pleyel, returning to Mettingen and finally seeing Clara in 
person, remarks that “Here ... is a being, after whom sages may model their transcendent 
intelligence, and painters, their ideal beauty. Here is exemplified, that union between 
intellect and form, which has hitherto existed only in the conceptions of the poet” (138-
                                                 
18
 Jordan, attending to Clara’s journal, similarly proposes that we understand Clara as “a 
suppresser of information, a distorter of truth”: the journal, written in short hand, 
implicates her attempt to “conceal the truth” since “the original information, ‘disguised’ 
as it may be, is virtually transformed into a symbolic representation that offers only 
partial data to readers” (164, 165). But Jordan does not extend her observation to the 
discussion about the implication of Clara’s power relationship with her readers: she only 
concludes that Clara is “an eminently unreliable narrator” (165). 
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139). Pleyel’s immediate and unhesitating identification of Clara’s real person with the 
“transcendent” and “ideal” image may evidence his total submission to her authorial 
design, for her letters to him, as authored by herself, must have consisted of her 
information selected and arranged by herself. After all, those letters were the only source 
for his understanding of Clara’s character on account of the geographical distance 
between them, which would have allowed her a maximum degree of the authorial liberty 
to depict herself whichever way she wants. In this sense, her letters altogether might be 
an example of another seemingly epistolary but virtually monologic narrative by her that 
requires readers to accept what it says as decisive and true. Indeed, Pleyel, like Judith, 
acts for a while as Clara’s minister who delineates and solidifies her venerable character: 
he writes down Clara’s conduct, which he believes to be flawless, so that he can make a 
“copy” of her and thus an “example” and “model” for other women—including his own 
Theresa—to look up to and learn from (139, 140).  
Yet Pleyel soon changes into a nosy reader of Clara as his proximity to her in 
Mettingen no longer obstructs his own reading of her. Significantly, Pleyel’s readerly 
acts come to resemble Carwin’s in terms of unexpectedness. Pleyel’s change is 
instigated by “The spirit of mischievous gaiety” (142), which reminds us of “some 
dæmon of mischief” that stimulates Carwin. Also, Pleyel, like Carwin, intrudes in her 
room furtively and gets a glimpse at her journal. One day he visits Clara and, informed 
that she is writing in her room, impulsively decides to go and see by himself that private 
scene. He enters the room and approaches her stealthily, out of the aforementioned 
“spirit of mischievous gaiety,” and “pr[ied] into [her] papers” over her shoulder (142). 
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His prying, caused by his “strong” “curiosity” and committed “almost spontaneously,” in 
turn permits him to catch part of her journal, including words like “summer-house” and 
“midnight” and “a passage which spoke of the propriety and of the effects to be expected 
from another interview” (142-143). Pleyel’s glimpse at Clara’s journal, along with her 
“trepidation and blushes” when she finds him standing right behind her (143), marks 
readers’ ungovernable and almost unruly interest in texts.    
Pleyel’s partial reading of Clara’s journal contributes to Carwin’s re-making of 
her authorial character as it gives rise to a story about her “clandestine interview” with 
Carwin, “which [she] afterwards endeavoured with so much solicitude to conceal” (143). 
Pleyel’s imagination of Clara’s liaison with Carwin not only attests to the independence 
and creativity in readers’ construction on texts, but also symbolizes the effect of such a 
construction to make self-protective authors related and even vulnerable to readers. 
More specifically, put in a relationship with Carwin by Pleyel, Clara’s authorial 
character goes through a drastic transfiguration regardless of her will. Shortly afterwards, 
Carwin manipulates Pleyel to hear/read his ventriloquized conversation with Clara, in 
which he, using his knowledge of her “personal history” and “most secret thoughts” 
from her journal, mimics her voice and personality and re-writes her character as a fallen 
woman secretly in love with him (240). Carwin also features himself as a “murderer, 
thief, guilty of innumerable perjuries and misdeeds,” and Pleyel, in light of his 
assumption of Clara’s involvement with Carwin, comes to regard her as equally 
“debased … to the level of such an one,” as “most specious, and most profligate of 
women” who shares “the base, grovelling, and atrocious character of the wretch” (240, 
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119).19 In this way, Clara is “pushed from [her] immoveable and lofty station, and cast 
upon a sea of trouble” (80) by her two unanticipated readers, notwithstanding her belief 
in her isolation from and immunity to the readerly influence.   
Facing this crisis of self-debasement by her intrusive and (re)creative readers, 
Clara blames Carwin the outsider’s mysterious, gothic appearance in Mettingen, and 
strives to “guard myself against future injury from Carwin” (121) and to regain her 
dignity. She first blocks any chances of readerly meddling with her authorial image, and 
re-confirms its inviolability. When reproached by Pleyel for her association with Carwin, 
Clara remains “passive and silent,” “Wrapt up in the consciousness of innocence” (121). 
Her silence here makes a nonverbal statement of her self-evidently honorable character: 
                                                 
19
 Critics have usually explained Pleyel’s belief in the fallen Clara in terms of the 
predominant sentimental romantic literary and cultural codes in late eighteenth-century 
America, and agreed that such belief marks Brown’s critique of the genre’s static 
assumptions about human nature. Larzer Ziff characterizes Pleyel as “the self-righteous 
agent of the sentimental values,” who “matches each of [Clara’s] shows of protestation 
with the corresponding conventional response of the wronged sentimental lover” without 
looking at the “facts of life” beyond that convention (53). Therefore, Ziff contends, with 
Pleyel “Brown achieves one of the greatest condemnations of that tradition in the history 
of the American novel” (53). Micheal D. Butler similarly views Pleyel as “a conditioned 
reader or writer of sentimental fiction,” who leaps “to a conclusion prepared by popular 
fiction’s definition of woman as weak and highly susceptible to seduction,” which 
“Wieland repeatedly denies” (134, 135). Hesford opines that Pleyel is unable to see 
“other aspects of [Clara’s] personality which make her a more complex, more human 
person than [his] exalted, supposedly exact literary version of her suggests,” and states 
that his inability to perceive Clara as a person, along with “The ease with which 
Carwin’s fictive involvement with Clara deconstructs Pleyel’s model,” indicates “the 
fragility of such supposedly authoritative portraits of virtue eighteenth-century writers 
were fond of holding up for their readers’ edification and encouragement” (245). All 
these analyses throw light on Brown’s authorial stance outside contemporary mainstream 
sentimental romantic conventions, but they deem Clara as an essentially passive victim 
misunderstood by Pleyel, and thus fail to notice her agency in the construction of her 
earlier ideal image.  
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she would not bother to prove her innocence since she is incontrovertibly faultless, and 
such a character of hers would be immutable because “Yesterday and to-day I am the 
same” (130). Her silence also betokens her rejection of intercommunication with her 
reader Pleyel so that she would not give him a second chance to respond to and interpret 
her against her authorial intent.  
Yet Clara’s pretension to her unquestionable self-righteousness and persistence 
in non-communication soon encounters another readerly challenge, this time from 
Wieland. She visits him to ask for advice regarding Pleyel’s accusation, and Wieland, 
who has already heard of Pleyel’s story, demands that she vindicate herself “from 
aspersions so foul, if vindication be possible,” while offering himself as “a judge” (124). 
Wieland’s assumption of the role of her “judge,” signifying the necessity to consider 
readers’ judgment of texts in one’s claim to authorship, compels Clara, however enraged, 
to comply with his demand. Yet her way of self-exoneration does not concern the reader-
judge, counting on the absolute authoritativeness of her words/writing. She says that 
“Perhaps [Pleyel’s] tale has been different from what I suspect it to be. Listen then to my 
narrative. If there be any thing in his story inconsistent with mine, his story is false” 
because her story is “the truth” (123, 124). Clara’s assertion, on account of the fact that 
the detail of the story is not fully given in her narrative, can be seen as her endeavor to 
maintain her authorial independence from readers. Keeping her self-vindicating account 
beyond “the hands of a precipitate and inexorable judge” and “his arbitrary verdict” (130, 
127), she underlines its indisputable sincerity and reliability with Wieland’s eventual 
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discard of his doubts. By manipulating her narrative as such, Clara reaffirms her 
autonomy and re-certifies her authority.   
Nonetheless, Clara cannot stay independent from readers as Carwin begins to 
intervene in her authoring act and authorial station more aggressively. So far, Carwin’s 
intervention has affected her via his interactions with Wieland and Pleyel that convert 
them into readers, but now he actively engages himself in her narration/writing by 
speaking/writing directly to her. Moreover, his engagement forces Clara to respond to 
and interpret what he says/writes, and thus renders her as his reader and inverts the 
positions of the author and the reader. Hence Carwin becomes reminiscent of the reader 
in “The Rhapsodist.” Carwin’s first intrusion of this kind occurs with his sudden letter to 
Clara to request an interview after she has caught him hiding in her closet. To her, the 
letter, written by “one capable of plotting against my life and my fame,” and saying that 
he has some story “of the utmost importance to [her] happiness,” is “perfectly 
inexplicable,” and she struggles to figure out what he might really plan and whether she 
ought to accept his request (157). Carwin, in a word, impels her to analyze his text as its 
reader and entangles her into a network of correspondence that she has tried to shun. 
Meanwhile, reading the letter in consideration of a number of possible meanings 
completely dismays Clara, who has relied on a system of single authorial intention and 
single interpretation: “My mind seemed to be split into separate parts, and these parts to 
have entered into furious and implacable contention” (159). Eventually she resolves to 
see Carwin, believing that “the means of defence and resistance” is still “in my power” 
and euphemizing her gothic sense of self-split and confusion as “The poet’s chaos,” 
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which testifies to her tenacious clinging to the title of the author (161). Such tenacity, 
however, is no longer effective, for the interchange of authorial and readerly positions 
between Clara and Carwin is already set in motion with her response to his letter and 
entering into a communication “with” him. Clara comes back home from a trip to the 
city to meet Carwin, but notices that her room is “pre-occupied” by, presumably, Carwin. 
This unexpected situation leads her to behave as if she is breaking into someone else’s 
place: she “paused to deliberate on the propriety of advancing” and, after knocking at the 
door and getting no answer, “determined to gain access behind” (165, 166). Her 
behavior, like that of a stranger to her own residence, signifies her losing the authorial 
post to Carwin. She becomes an outsider to her own “place” while Carwin, an original 
outsider, is envisioned in her mind as an insider who newly takes up that “place.”  
Indeed, since this figurative dislocation of Clara from her proper authorial place, 
her narration starts exhibiting at once the deterioration of her narratorial ability and her 
struggle to compensate for that deterioration by recovering her place. On her way 
upstairs to meet Carwin, Clara feels frustrated by the indescribability of her emotions: 
“Alas! my heart droops, and my fingers are enervated; my ideas are vivid, but my 
language is faint; now know I what it is to entertain incommunicable sentiments. The 
chain of subsequent incidents is drawn through my mind, and being linked with those 
which forewent, by turns rouse up agonies and sink me into hopelessness” (167). To 
Clara, who used to giving the definitive account of every incident and situation in 
Mettingen, this experience of “incommunicable sentiments” certainly imperils her 
authorship, marking a breach between language and its user, between her narrative and 
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her authorial grip on to it. And Clara tries to fix that breach by identifying her writing 
with her being: “Yet I will persist to the end. My narrative may be invaded by 
inaccuracy and confusion; but if I live no longer, I will, at least, live to complete it” 
(167). Clara’s strong desire for “completing” her narrative till death implies her taking 
on a full responsibility for and proprietorship of what she has been writing. She will 
never give up her authoring task and authorial position to anybody else, namely Carwin, 
no matter what kinds of “inaccuracy and confusion” he might cause, and will keep the 
narratorial role under her sole possession.  
Clara then strengthens her resolution for lifelong, nonnegotiable authorship with 
a rhetorical question: “What but ambiguities, abruptnesses, and dark transitions, can be 
expected from the historian who is, at the same time, the sufferer of these disasters?” 
(167). Her self-characterization as a “historian” needs to be understood especially in the 
eighteenth-century sense of the term, which is one who would “speculate on underlying 
causes of, and seek meaningful patterns in, human affairs” (Dillon 239). This definition, 
endowing historians with the sacred duty “to record truth for the instruction of mankind” 
(Hugh Blair, qtd. in Dillon 241), in turn renders them the nobler version of contemporary 
sentimental romantic writers with the didactic objective and the ultimate version of the 
imperative author with lofty responsibility. By calling herself the “historian,” then, Clara 
puts her forward as a serious and potent author and belittles “ambiguities, abruptnesses, 
and dark transitions” in her narrative, caused by her anxiety about Carwin’s possible 
appropriation of her authorial standing, as just some of those obstacles that she 
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commonly encounters in producing the most authoritative and trustworthy text dutifully 
and will soon surmount on her own. 
Accordingly, the historian Clara now devotes herself to composing the 
determinative Mettingen story that pictures Carwin as the very origin of all the 
mysterious events and their dismal outcomes. Entering her room for an interview with 
Carwin, Clara discovers the dead body of Catharine in her bed. Soon, news reaches her 
that Wieland has confessed his murder of Catharine and their children to prove his 
obedience to God and has been put in jail. In relating this unbelievable family tragedy, 
Clara jumps to the conclusion that Carwin should be blamed for it. Such a conclusion 
would benefit her authorship in that it contains Carwin within her narrative as a 
(villainous) character and puts him under her narratorial authority. To this end, Clara 
first has to distort Wieland’s testimony for his murder. So she “incorporates only a part 
of the text into her own story” (Jordan 161) and makes it consistent with her 
conclusion.20 Or it might be that she appropriates Wieland’s story, just as she takes the 
place of “Wieland,” the title character of the novel, by making her presence more 
conspicuous than Wieland through her egotistic narration/writing. After presenting the 
testimony up to the point where Wieland admits the murder of his children, Clara 
abruptly stops by saying that “I had discontinued the perusal of the paper in the midst of 
the narrative; but what I read, combined with information elsewhere obtained, threw, 
perhaps, a sufficient light upon these detestable transactions” (200). Her words, 
                                                 
20
 Jordan adds that Clara’s misrepresentation of Wieland’s testimony “suggests the type 
of material ‘transformation’ ... that stories undergo in the telling” (161). To me, Clara’s 
misrepresentation is more deliberate, attesting her self-directed authorship.  
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suggesting that what she has shown of Wieland’s testimony is, and must be, “sufficient” 
enough for readers to understand the whole, betoken her commanding attitude to readers. 
In fact, the original testimony is unattainable: it is “copied down by an unknown person” 
among the audience of Wieland’s trial and “finally copied down again by Clara” (Jordan 
161). Clara thus has got the opportunity of distorting it for her purpose. She of course re-
introduces the rest of the testimony, but only as skipping a considerable part of it and 
giving a brief summary of how it ends: “I turned over the leaves till I came near the 
conclusion. The narrative of the criminal was finished. The verdict of guilty reluctantly 
pronounced by the jury, and the accused interrogated why sentence of death should not 
pass” (200). Then Clara wraps up the testimony by de-criminalizing Wieland and 
condemning Carwin: “yet was it indisputably certain that their murderer [i. e. Wieland] 
was criminal? He was acquitted at the tribunal of his own conscience; his behaviour at 
his trial and since, was faithfully reported to me; appearances were uniform; not for a 
moment did he lay aside the majesty of virtue; he repelled all invectives by appealing to 
the deity, and to the tenor of his past life; surely there was truth in this appeal” (206-207). 
After these subjective favorable comments on Wieland (again, readers would never 
know if his original testimony really reflects “the majesty of [his] virtue”), Clara makes 
the equally subjective condemnation of Carwin as “the grand deceiver; the author of this 
black conspiracy; the intelligence that governed in this storm” (217). Then she forces 
readers to agree with her by adding that Carwin is “an object ... on which we may pour 
out our indignation and our vengeance” (217). Although Clara’s denunciation of Carwin 
is basically her “indignation” at and “vengeance” on his menacing approach to her 
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authorial position, she aims to validate herself by saying “our indignation and our 
vengeance”—both hers and readers.  
Despite her efforts to criminalize Carwin and thus confine his effect within her 
narrative, Clara cannot frustrate him from writing and telling his story. Carwin, all of a 
sudden, comes directly to her, with no formal request for an interview this time, to give 
his own account of what has happened in Mettingen that he has composed in “some 
retreat in the wilderness, inaccessible to [her] inquiry” (242). Carwin’s ensuing 
storytelling, as Clara has been afraid, damages her authorship in uncontrollable ways. On 
the surface, he comes to “confess my errors” and “expiate my crimes” to her (223, 225), 
yet his actual story is “anything but repentant” (Bauer 316). What his story is really 
intended for is, rather, converting her into his audience/reader: “Will you not hear me? 
Listen to my confession, and then denounce punishment. All I ask is a patient audience” 
(225). By telling—or, to be more exact, ordering—Clara to “Listen to” him, Carwin 
instantly usurps the narratorial role from her and invades her narrative with his own 
Mettingen story. Carwin’s invasion in turn encourages readers’ active signification in a 
way that his story, written/narrated from his perspective, allows readers to compare it to 
Clara’s narrative and figure out how to comprehend the Mettingen incidents through that 
comparison. Also, his story displays a different type of writer than the authoritarian one 
like Clara inasmuch as it mostly consists of how Wieland, Pleyel, and even Clara have 
reacted to his ventriloquistic meddling with them. All he says about his own design is 
that he lacks one: “I am the undesigning cause ... I have acted, but my actions have 
possibly effected more than I designed” and that “I meditated nothing” (223, 229). In a 
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word, Carwin’s storytelling, demonstrating the possibility of composing texts through 
writers’ intercommunication with readers, draws a sharp contrast to Clara’s dictatorial 
way of writing and questions its legitimacy. 
Against Carwin’s reader-encouraging storytelling, Clara refuses to listen to him 
and resumes her narration. Right after Carwin finishes his story, she quickly comments 
that “it is enough that he owns himself to be the agent; his tale is a lie, and his nature 
devilish. As he deceived me, he likewise deceived my brother, and now do I behold the 
author of all our calamities!” (246-247). Then she re-affirms the unity of her being and 
her writing and, by implication, the untouchability of her authorial standing and her 
narrative: “When I lay down the pen the taper of life will expire: my existence will 
terminate with my tale” (252). But Clara’s re-affirmation is put on trial when Wieland 
unexpectedly appears and, to fulfill his self-sacrifice in the name of God, tries to take 
away her life and thus terminate her writing. This situation symbolically reveals the self-
destructive quality of Clara’s rigidly self-directed authorship: though she has distorted 
and repressed Wieland’s readerly interpretation of the Mettingen incidents, his 
interpretation never really dies but returns for its substantiation and haunts her. And such 
gothic haunting of Clara the author by Wieland the reader entails the end of her 
(authorial) being in that her writing principles are incompatible with authors’ 
intercommunication with readers. Ironically, therefore, Clara now must resort to 
Carwin’s ability to interact with Wieland in order to save her life and authorship: she 
asks Carwin to “exert the powers which pertain to thee, whatever they be, to turn aside 
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this ruin” and “interpose in my defence” (259, 261). Her unavoidable reliance on 
Carwin’s interposition further highlights the limitation of single authorship.  
Yet Clara would not acknowledge her inevitable dependency but only try to 
cover it up by persevering in her authorial design for Carwin. Although she herself asks 
for his interposition, Clara is still anxious to restrain its impact on her narratorial 
authority: watching him ventriloquizing God’s voice and successfully appealing to 
Wieland, she wonders, “Why did he [i. e. Carwin] not forbear when this end was 
accomplished? Why did his misjudging zeal and accursed precipitation overpass that 
limit? Or meant he thus to crown the scene, and conduct his inscrutable plots to this 
consummation?” (262). She is worried that Carwin, through his vocal mediation, might 
“overpass that limit” of a subordinate and take charge of the scene and her narrative. 
Accordingly, as soon as Carwin successfully dissuades Wieland from killing her, and 
Wieland kills himself with her penknife—which implies her ultimate silencing of the 
reader by her authorial pen21 and her final accession to the post of “Wieland” in Wieland 
by her narratorial advantage—Clara tries to expel Carwin out of her narrative. She treats 
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 Some critics have proposed that Clara actually kills Wieland. Jordan mentions that 
“just as Wieland’s actual death is caused by Clara’s penknife ... so might his ‘suicide’ 
have been effected solely by Clara’s pen” and that “Clara might have killed her brother 
and suppressed half the truth in the later telling” (165). James R. Russo, in his argument 
for Clara’s insanity, observes that when Clara says, “My hands were sprinkled with his 
blood as he fell,” her “earlier prediction, that someday she would awaken with her own 
hand imbrued with blood, comes to pass, and the young girl is seen to exhibit fully the 
Wieland legacy of insanity and violence,” and states that “Theodore Wieland, then, is 
murdered by his sister” (82). Although such scenario is not impossible, we cannot be 
sure due to the lack of the reliable textual evidence. I would rather agree with Hesford’s 
opinion that “The author who closes Theodore Wieland’s life is his sister, Clara, who 
first provides him with the penknife with which he kills himself, and then, as our 
narrator, concludes his story with her pen” (242-243). 
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him as insignificant, with total disregard: “I did not listen—I answered him not—I 
ceased to upbraid or accuse. His guilt was a point to which I was indifferent. Ruffian or 
devil, black as hell or bright as angels, thenceforth he was nothing to me” (264-265). She 
also denies her reliance on Carwin: “He intended, by the final effort of his power, to 
rescue me and to banish his illusions from my brother. Such is his tale, concerning the 
truth of which I care not” (266, emphasis added). At the same time, her “frantic 
defensiveness becomes obvious” (Grabo 22): after the death of Wieland, Clara converses 
with her friends and uncle who come to her chamber when Carwin calls for help, but all 
we hear is her voice alone, which entreats them to listen and assent to her reproach of 
Carwin and exclaims that “my work is done!” (266). That is, she endeavors to guard her 
narrative against Carwin’s further interventions as well as others’ possible different 
opinions about him, through her almost autistic manner of narration and hasty 
declaration of the end of her narrative. And, as if such an effort is not enough, Clara adds 
another epistolary narrative—the last chapter written three years thereafter—to make a 
doubly conclusive conclusion.22 In that new narrative, she inserts the story of one 
Maxwell. The story, as many critics have conceded, does not really synchronize with the 
other parts of her narrative but rather gives an impression that she is channeling readers 
into her intended message that Carwin is the ultimate villain. At first, she seemingly 
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 Clara could only produce this new narrative after moving to Europe, where her will to 
live, and thus to write, is resuscitated: “My curiosity was revived, and I contemplated, 
with ardour, the spectacle of living manners and the monuments of past ages” (271). 
Such circumstance intimates her failure to get adjusted to the increasingly reader-
directed environment of American literary domain as well as her affinity to the old 
structure of power relationship—“living manners of past ages”—including the author-
dominant institution of authorship upheld by Young and his “European” contemporaries.  
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acknowledges readers’ right to apprehend the Maxwell story by saying that “I leave you 
to moralize on this tale” (278). But soon, just as she did at the very beginning of the 
novel, she forces readers to ponder the consequences of “the evils of which Carwin and 
Maxwell were the authors” and underscores Carwin as “the double-tongued deceiver” 
(278). Thus with yet another monologic epistolary narrative Clara manages to exorcise 
Carwin’s presence and voice and finally achieves her autarchic authorship.23   
But, of course, Carwin is not to be exorcised that easily, under Brown’s scenario 
of the destabilization of the kind of authorship that Clara bears. Clara’s (and Carwin’s) 
readers, out of their curiosity about and wish to know more of what he has to say/write, 
would restore his presence and voice and transform him into an author in his own right. 
Such transformation, or author-ization, by readers is hinted at in the “Advertisement” of 
Wieland, which specifies that “The memoirs of Carwin, alluded to at the conclusion of 
the work, will be published or suppressed according to the reception which is given to 
the present attempt” (4). And, indeed, even though Clara wants it “suppressed” in 
Wieland, Carwin’s story would be “published” and serialized under the title, “Memoirs 
of Carwin the Biloquist,” in an American literary journal, The Literary Magazine, and 
American Register, from 1803 to 1805. This real-life publication of Carwin’s memoirs, 
because of the specification of the “Advertisement,” becomes (not merely one of 
Brown’s works but) that which is realized by readers’ approving “reception” of Carwin’s 
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 Hagenbüchle similarly attends to the monologic narrative mode in the final chapter of 
Wieland: “The narrator, from the start, anticipates the conclusions of her story-telling 
and factually ends where she begins,” which characterizes Clara’s narrative as a whole 
as “circular” and thus self-contained (141). 
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Mettingen story in Wieland, and exemplifies the mechanism of reader-made authorship 
while testifying to the ultimate failure of Clara’s self-appointed authorship.24    
The fact that the “Advertisement” hints at the failure of Clara’s authorship owing 
to readers’ approbation of Carwin’s authorship is, in turn, significantly relevant to 
Brown’s peculiar representation of his own authorship in Wieland. Throughout the novel, 
we have two different authorial characters that can refer to Brown: the writer of the 
“Advertisement” and editor “C. B. B.,” and the nominal author “Charles Brockden 
Brown.” C. B. B., appearing sporadically in the novel, fosters readers’ diverse readings 
and challenges the authority of Charles Brockden Brown, just as Carwin, barging into 
Clara’s narrative here and there, induces readers in its signification and impairs her 
authorial mastery. In the “Advertisement,” C. B. B. introduces the authorial purport of 
Charles Brockden Brown as “the illustration of some important branches of the moral 
constitution of man” (3). But then he proceeds to entitle readers to “be permitted to 
decide” the reading of the novel and in effect diminishes the weight of Charles Brockden 
Brown’s premeditated purport (3). And, in the footnotes, C. B. B. provides readers with 
the factual information regarding the issues addressed in the novel, including 
spontaneous combustion and ventriloquism, as well as the sources of the in-text 
references and quotes, and satisfies reader’s varied interests and boosts their construction 
                                                 
24
 It seems that Brown devised and composed “Memoirs” deliberately in association 
with Wieland. Hsu reports that Brown “had completed part of ‘Carwin’ by September 
1798,” about the time when he finished Wieland, but “waited until November 1803 to 
begin publishing it in installments” in Literary Magazine (152, fn. 13). Hence, 
borrowing Downes’ words, “Memoirs” occupies “the intriguing status of already-written 
and yet-to-come within the text of Wieland” (116, fn. 48). 
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on the novel beyond what is officially given by Charles Brockden Brown. In this way, C. 
B. B. invites readers to access the work of Charles Brockden Brown with no constraint 
and endorse the authorship of Charles Brockden Brown voluntarily as in the case of their 
ratification of Carwin’s authorship.   
C. B. B.’s subjugation of Charles Brockden Brown to readers suggests Brown’s 
perception of the inefficacy of sovereign authors to cope with participative readers and 
the necessity of the alternative author-figure, which avoids overwhelming readers by 
writing from the secondary and marginal position and looks forward to their assessment 
of the text. Moreover, it represents Brown’s mockery of his own public authorial persona 
that had to preface “his novel with a conventional moral tag” as in the “Advertisement” 
(Hagenbüchle 124), following the customs of contemporary didactic authorship. This 
self-mockery obviously contributes to the gothicism of Wieland, betokening the self-
bifurcation of Brown’s authorial image. What should be also noted, however, is Brown’s 
use of the editorial character C. B. B. to ridicule his conventional authorship, since it 
might explain the radical change of his career from a novelist to a magazine editor 
around 1803.25 Critics have usually seen this change as Brown’s shameful departure 
                                                 
25
 Strictly speaking, Brown had been already involved in magazine editorship while 
writing novels. Between 1799 and 1800, he had been an editor of The Monthly 
Magazine, and American Review, founded by the New York Friendly Club, a private 
intellectual group to which he belonged. Yet it was with Literary Magazine in 1803 that 
Brown became a devoted magazine editor; he kept the office until 1807. Of course, 
during his editorial period, Brown tried his hand at translations, book reviews, and 
essays as well, but his occupation of a magazine editor might represent the second phase 
of his career if we consider that American literary markets in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century were configured mainly with two kinds of writing: novels and 
periodicals. The popularity of novels at the time is extensively examined by Davidson in 
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from novel writing due to his artistic and financial failure at literary authorship. Elliott 
regards the change as at once the end of Brown’s career in the middle of “obscurity and 
personal failure” and “the frustrated efforts of the first generation of American writers to 
achieve the elusive goal of winning popular acclaim and critical praise in the new 
republic” (218). Steven Watts backs up Elliott in observing that Brown had to discard his 
novel writing because he obtained neither “Economic success” nor “popularity” (131). 
These negative opinions have been very often corroborated by the following remark 
from “The Editors’ Address to the Public,” written by Brown himself but signed with no 
name, in the first number of Literary Magazine in 1803: 
 I am far from wishing, however, that my readers should judge of my exertions  
 by my former ones. I have written much, but take much blame to myself for  
 something which I have written, and take no praise for any thing. I should  
 enjoy a larger share of my own respect, at the present moment, if nothing had  
 ever flowed from my pen, the production of which could be traced to me. (I:  
 4)  
The critical consensus reads this remark as Brown’s straightforward confession of regret 
for his earlier unsuccessful novel writing in his immaturity. But recently Michael Cody 
                                                                                                                                                
Revolution and the Word. As to the popularity of periodicals, Warfel provides clues in 
his introduction to Rhapsodist: according to him, “The most popular form of [non-
creative] prose composition in the eighteenth century was the periodical essay in 
imitation of The Tatler and The Spectator,” and “To begin with the essay, as did Oliver 
Goldsmith, and one day to write a novel became a common literary experience” (vi). 
Warfel’s report conveys the fact that American writers during the time, including Brown, 
were mostly categorized as “either” novelists “or” periodical writers, and supports the 
validity of my characterization of Brown’s later career as magazine editorship. 
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presents another interpretation. Noting that Brown does not make clear what works he 
means by “my former ones,” Cody objects to the idea that Brown blames his own 
writings. To him, the remark evinces Brown’s “choice of anonymity—not denial of 
work already performed or ‘self-hatred,’” and his “wish to disassociate his name from 
his writing” (29). That choice and that wish, Cody adds, reflects Brown’s “realization 
that public knowledge of him—his character, reputation, past work, personal 
associations, and beliefs—or even a public representation of him as an identifiable—and 
therefore knowable—individual negatively affected the validity of any public ventures 
such as the Literary Magazine” (29). In Cody’s view, Brown’s conversion into an editor 
is his conscious determination to be a nameless and selfless writer, that is, a writer with 
no distinctive “character” or “reputation” that results from a limited number of works 
produced under his full name and that might prejudice readers’ judgment of his entire 
writing performance. In this respect, Brown’s decision to be an editor is not an attempt 
to desert authorship but an effort to try a new form of authorship via a different medium 
with different conventions, which, in his own words, require him only to “collect 
materials from all quarters” considering “the variety as well as copiousness of [the] 
contents” of a magazine and to present them only with “a desire to please readers” 
(“Address” I: 5, 6). As such, Brown the editor might be no other than Brown the author 
with no self-ordained authority.26   
                                                 
26
 Cody similarly observes Brown’s lack of authority in his editorship: “As editor, Brown 
most often seems to exercise no authority over the miscellany’s contents beyond simple 
selection, allowing the articles that appear in a given issue to compete on equal terms for 
a reader’s interest and sympathy” (20). 
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If we look at Brown’s transformation from a novelist to an editor as his venture 
to try out anonymous, editorial, self-erasing, and, most important, ghostlike authorship, 
then we can re-examine Carwin’s authorship as the prototype of that kind of authorship. 
According to Hesford, during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was common to 
distinguish an author from “a mere compiler or translator”; and drawing on this common 
sense, Carwin the author-figure rather fits in the latter category since “When he puts his 
abilities to work on the people he wishes to manipulate, test, or dazzle, it is often their 
own voices he compiles and imitates” (244). Indeed, Carwin’s story in Wieland contains 
various episodes of his interactions with Wieland, Pleyel, and Clara, under no unifying 
perspective or principle of his own. This mere compilation of episodes certainly has a 
reader-engaging effect in that it becomes the readers’ job to causalize those episodes and 
define the compilation as a whole. Also, throughout his story as well as Wieland, 
Carwin’s identity remains unidentified: not to mention his hazy past, his name “Carwin” 
itself is a mystery for it is a pseudonym, “a Spanish name” that he uses “instead of his 
own” (77). His notorious ability to throw voices from a distance only characterizes him 
as essentially unlocatable and thus even more unknowable. Carwin’s pseudonymity and 
unknowability are further accentuated by his ghostly, absent existence in the novel, 
especially from the moment when he begins to tell his story to Clara and assume an 
authorial stance. Carwin’s unanticipated appearance at Clara’s chamber for his 
storytelling makes her feel as if she is visited by a “shadow” or “horrid apparition” that 
she wishes to “vanish” (221, 222). And when Carwin ventriloquizes God’s voice to 
communicate with Wieland, he “glided through the door” of the chamber like a spirit 
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while Wieland “seemed to notice not the entrance or exit of” him (260).27 Finally, 
through Clara’s oddly apt description of him intervening in her narrative and life as “this 
phantom to pursue my steps” (260), Carwin’s spectral being translates into a new mode 
of the author that would soon overtake and substitute for the normative one, that is, into 
a ghost writer without any graspable personal or authorial characteristics that prepossess 
both authorship and readership, but only with invisible, editorial hands that compose a 
book of gathered materials for readers to enjoy.   
It seems that Brown sought to concretize his vision of an editorial, absent-present, 
and ghostlike author-figure by serializing “Memoirs” in Literary Magazine and further 
promoting the combination of literary authorship and editorship in Carwin. Such an 
effort, however, failed after all as the serialization underwent a number of irregular 
appearances and was eventually left unfinished in 1805. It might be said that the abrupt 
abortion of the “Memoirs” project indicates Brown’s ultimate inability to represent the 
unprecedented ghostly authorial being of Carwin.28 If so, Brown’s inability would mean 
his incapability to handle his brilliant self-mockery in Wieland: he was aware of an 
uneasy coexistence of the traditional and revolutionary authorial dispositions in himself, 
but could not resolve their conflict or break away completely from his contemporary 
sense of self as an author who was supposed to control and take responsibility for what 
                                                 
27
 Russo also attends to “phantomlike” quality of Carwin in this scene, but he interprets 
it as “the insubstantial, imaginary quality of his presence in Clara’s mind” (81). 
28
 Watts, grouping Carwin with Stephen Calvert from Brown’s Stephen Calvert, sees 
them altogether as at once “a desperate, floundering individual set loose in a society of 
confusing possibilities and terrifying choices,” and “a ghostly spectre of the fragmented 
liberal ego of early capital culture,” and opines that “Brown half-consciously tried to 
evade or repress their realization” because the result would be beyond his control (181). 
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he produces. To see an author’s further dissociation from his own authorial status and 
complete deconstruction of Youngian authorship, we have to wait thirty more years for 
the emergence of another self-mocking and self-negating author, who is armed with the 
similar perception of both the growing power of readership and the impending need of 
ghostly authorship that comes from the similar experience of magazine cultures to 
Brown’s: Edgar Allan Poe.  
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CHAPTER III 
EDGAR ALLAN POE AND THE AUTHOR-FICTION 
 
 Toward the mid-nineteenth century, America observed a remarkable 
development of its literary markets chiefly through an explosion of journalistic writings, 
corresponding to readers’ fast-growing demands for affordable sources of varied 
information. Pursuing his authorial profession at the heart of this reader-catering 
magazine culture, Edgar Allan Poe has been actively studied in terms of contemporary 
readers’ undeniable influence on authors’ performance. Such studies, however, have 
altogether stubbornly produced the same image of Poe as an author whose primary 
motivation is the desire for total control over readers and texts. Associating this 
curiously long-lasting unanimity in Poe scholarship with the insistence of Young’s 
notion of authorship, this chapter will find the other, more reader-oriented authorial 
image of Poe in his one and only gothic novel, and modern Poe scholars’ most talked-
about text, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (1838). The novel has 
been taken as gothic mainly for its presentation of the first-person narrator Pym’s 
fantastic and horrific sea adventure, which has in turn been read as either Poe’s masterful 
hoax of a merely sensation-seeking readership or his equally masterful representation of 
the unrepresentable. Yet I will show how the gothicity of Pym rather lies in Poe’s 
description of Pym’s character and narrative that reveals the true nature of an authorial 
subject as an insubstantial, fictive identity like a ghost, and how Poe realizes, both in the 
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novel and through his real-life writing career, a ghostlier version of Charles Brockden 
Brown’s editorial, self-erasing author-figure.     
 
1. Poe’s Philosophy of Composition, According to Poe 
At the end of his investigation of the history of copyright in Britain in Authors 
and Owners (1993), Mark Rose discusses the persistence of the eighteenth-century idea 
of authorship in the present. According to him, the obvious “continuity between earlier 
literary-property debates and modern copyright doctrine” shows that the Romantic 
representation of the author as “a specially gifted person able to produce from the depths 
of personal experience an organically unified work of art” (132) has steadily dominated 
our understanding of artistic creation. Such a dominance, Rose goes on, has been 
possible due to the gradual expansion of the concept of authorship in accordance with 
the emergence of new types of art works, such as movies, “photographs, sculptures, 
sound recordings, and choreographic works” in the modern era (132). Rose describes 
this expansion as “the enclosure of new territories,” quoting Peter Jaszi’s words that a 
copyright purchaser now obtains “a general dominion over the imaginative territory of a 
particular literary or artistic production” (133). Yet if we remind ourselves from Chapter 
I that Youngian authorship basically postulates an artistic work as the re-presentation 
and replica of its author, it would be reasonable to substitute “new artists” for “new 
territories” in Rose’s formulation and restate his opinion as follows: the conception of 
the exclusively creative, possessory, and regulatory author could persist because newly 
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emerging artists since the eighteenth century have been continuously incorporated into 
the boundary of that conception.    
This “enclosure of new artists” is especially well demonstrated in Poe 
scholarship. From a scholarly perspective Poe has been a “new artist” for a long time; 
after a certain period of obscurity, he was discovered first by the French symbolists in 
the late nineteenth century and then by American literary scholars in the twentieth 
century. As is well known by now, Poe was not a very popular or critically acclaimed 
writer in America during his lifetime.29 It was French poet Charles Baudelaire who for 
the first time assessed him as a literary genius. Baudelaire contributed to making Poe 
known to nineteenth-century Europe by writing essays on him in the 1850s and 
translating his works between the late 1840s and 1860s. What is noteworthy is that 
Baudelaire’s discovery of Poe went hand in hand with his characterization of Poe as a 
typical eighteenth-century artist, that is, “as an isolated and brilliant victim of his artistic 
temperament, neo-European and aristocratic, essentially opposed to his bourgeois 
American milieu of ‘money-making’ journalism and democratic mediocrity” (Allen 11), 
                                                 
29
 According to Killis Campbell, “it was as critic that he was chiefly known in his day 
and time in America, though as a fearless and caustic and not always impartial critic 
rather than as a just and discriminating critic” (“Contemporary” 145). Indeed, Poe’s 
contemporary reputation was for the most part built upon his severe and harsh reviews 
and criticisms, which earned him the nickname of “the tomahawk man” by 1836. 
Timothy H. Scherman informs us that “Poe’s editorial commentary and critical notices 
were generally unsigned, but by the end of 1835,” right after Poe became an editor of the 
Southern Literary Messenger, “few readers of the Messenger failed to see the change in 
the tone and style of its book reviews” (11). In contrast, his tales and poems seem to not 
have appealed to a wide range of the contemporary audience. It was his gothic poem, 
“The Raven” (1845), that finally gave him “the brightest of limelights he would ever 
enjoy during his lifetime” (Rainwater 305).    
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and as “a sensitive artist struggling to survive in a merciless, mercantile environment 
that valued neither art nor the artist” (Magistrale 261). Through this characterization—
which echoes Young’s delineation of the solitary and noble author in Conjectures and 
Clara’s depiction of her aesthetically praiseworthy yet commercially failed late 
grandfather in Wieland in the previous chapter—Poe was rescued from the unknown, if 
not mis-known, and “newly” included into a constellation of sovereign artists that shines 
above and against the tasteless, common people.   
Thanks to Baudelaire, and his followers like Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Valéry, 
and Algernon Charles Swinburne, “by the 1870s it would become a truism among 
American critics and textbook writers that Poe was more appreciated in Europe than ‘at 
home’” (Peeples 10). To most Americans, it seems, Poe was still a relative stranger, or, 
what Allen Tate calls “a dejected cousin” (40) at best.30 It was not until the 1920s that 
Poe became more familiar to his natives. At that time, Michael Allen reports, “a new 
generation of literary historians in American universities” was “engaged in discovering 
and explaining the American literary tradition” (11).31 In the process, they turned their 
                                                 
30
 Kenneth Dauber also mentions Tate’s description of Poe as Americans’ “cousin” in his 
examination of the common ambivalence towards Poe. Observing how people usually 
admire Poe’s genius but feel frustrated in comprehending his works, Dauber puts that 
“He is a relative for whom allowances must be made. And it is only because Poe seems 
to stretch the allowances beyond any reasonable bound that difficulties arise” (125). 
31
 Scott Peeples argues that the Americanization of Poe began earlier than the 1920s, 
mainly by post-Reconstructionists. He says that “after the war [i. e. Civil War], given the 
national anxiety over reconciliation and nation-rebuilding, the question became more 
prominent in the larger discussion of Poe’s status,” and that several commemorating 
speeches at the commission of Poe’s bust at the University of Virginia in 1899 addressed 
Poe and his writing as “essentially American” (17, 18). Peeples also points out various 
new editions of Poe’s works—with his notorious first editor Rufus Wilmot Griswold’s 
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attention to Poe in Europe and tried to transplant him into the American artistic soil. To 
that end, scholars underscored Poe’s career-long involvement with nineteenth-century 
American journalism as an editor, commentator, and contributor.32 Such underscoring 
certainly worked to illuminate “an encouraging sign of his Americanness” (Allen 13) by 
associating him with American readership and thus taking him into a network of 
American literary production and consumption during the period.    
To be sure, even after the literary historians’ efforts between the 1920s and the 
1950s, it took some more time for Poe to be fully accepted as an American writer 
because of the lingering scholarly reluctance to canonize his mostly “too gothic”—too 
fantastic, too pathological, and too sensational—writings.33 Yet since the 1980s, critics 
begin to call into question the legitimacy of that reluctance, and embark on the 
Americanization of Poe, which means the re-configuration of his authorial identity as a 
more Americanized version of the Romantic author than Baudelaire’s. More specifically, 
Poe’s formerly awkward, otherized standing as Americans’ “dejected cousin” is 
attributed to his self-understanding as an author who, despite his unavoidable catering to 
                                                                                                                                                
(deliberate) errors cleaned out—appearing between the 1870s and the 1900s.  
32
 Poe became an editor for the Southern Literary Messenger in 1835, and after leaving 
the magazine two years later, became an assistant editor of Burton’s Gentleman’s 
Magazine in 1839; he officiated as the appointed editor in 1841. Poe became a sub-editor 
of the Evening Mirror in 1844. In 1845, he got an editorial position with the Broadway 
Journal, and acquired its sole proprietorship later that year. The proprietorship soon 
ended in debt in early 1846.  
33
 The most well-known example of this reluctance would be F. O. Matthiessen’s 
1941discussion of American Renaissance canonical writers, which does not include Poe 
in it. Also, Edward H. Davidson, in his 1957 study of Poe, talks about Poe’s lack of 
interest in “the questions of man in the new mass world of democratic society” (256). 
Louis A. Renza additionally lays a finger on Harold Bloom’s “conspicuous silence about 
[the] anxiety-seminal influence [of Poe’s works] on later American writers” (59). 
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the mass audience during the nineteenth century, clung to eighteenth-century sole textual 
ownership and was never comfortable with, and even hostile to, the same audience’s 
increasing influence upon literature. In this way, Poe, after re-discovered as a “new” 
American literary figure, is successively contained once again within individualistic, 
autarchic authorship.  
Such containment of the re-discovered Poe is initiated by Jonathan Auerbach in 
the early 1980s. Objecting to the scholarly view of Poe as “an anomaly in American 
literature” and his works as ahistorical, Auerbach proposes to see Poe as “the 
professional journalist, engaged in the day-to-day business of winning over readers” 
(341, 343). As a reader-sensitive journalist, Auerbach continues, Poe understood that 
“Once the author expresses himself in public, his written identity becomes common 
property, subject to ceaseless duplication and appropriation” by readers (343). And that 
knowledge deeply concerned Poe for he was “Craving recognition as an original 
American genius, yet fearing the consequences of public exposure” (343). Auerbach 
contends that “The problem we must address, then, is … how he sought to encode the 
self in a written form that would allow him to maintain control over his fiction after it 
was let out into the open” (343). Auerbach’s argument attempts to situate Poe within an 
antebellum American literary realm where the eighteenth-century assumption of authors’ 
natural claim on their works was rapidly de-stabilized, and to depict him as an author 
who strives to overcome that de-stabilization by identifying who he is with what he 
writes and keeping his authorship inviolable to readers.     
  
76 
The image of Poe as a possessive and self-protective author is reproduced by 
Louis A. Renza and Michael J. S. Williams towards the end of the 1980s. Renza 
postulates that Poe’s works are essentially autobiographical in a sense that they reflect 
“Poe’s reading of his own texts as he imagines them being misread by others in order to 
regard them as his dialectically confirmed exclusive private property” (60). “Poe’s 
tales,” Renza proceeds, “produce two distinct tiers of reading,” by which he could keep 
to himself his “own secret relation to his initial aesthetic composition of [the text], and 
‘never-more’ allows the reader access to this relation” (67). This is why, Renza 
speculates, Poe has slipped through “the various critical attempts to recuperate the major 
canonical status of his works or his proper place in the ‘American Renaissance,’” and 
“foster[ed] his ambivalent status in American literary history” (82, 83). In Renza’s view, 
the previous scholarly indisposition to finding Poe American simply testifies to Poe’s 
artistic greatness that frustrates and rejects average reading attempts at his writings. 
Williams similarly ascribes the label of Poe as “an other (‘irresponsible,’ ‘vulgar,’ 
‘abnormal’)” to scholars’ inability to grasp that Poe’s “tales, regardless of their 
ostensible character, consistently explore the conditions of their own meaning and the 
displacements implicated in any act of signification,” motivated by his “anxiety” about 
“the attenuation of an (originating) authorial voice once its text has been launched in 
time to undergo subsequent interpretation and reinterpretation” (xiii, xv). Yet, Williams 
adds, Poe also “fears the failure to gain a readership,” and this mixture of “anxiety” and 
“fear” led him often to resort to hoax, “which pandered to the popular taste of the day 
while at the same time preserving his own sense of power” insomuch as its “duplicity 
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keeps readers perpetually hesitant to claim Poe’s texts for their own” (65, 66). As 
Williams suggests, Poe’s self-guarding and antagonistic attitude towards readers 
becomes the signature trait of his authorship.  
In the 1990s, Poe’s somewhat defensive authorial stance changes into a more 
aggressively authoritarian one, as demonstrated by Stephen Railton and Peter K. Garrett. 
Noticeably, both Railton and Garrett emphasize as Poe’s principal authorial tenet his 
notion of unity of effect—priority of effect over all the other literary elements in the 
composition of a work—which he first presented in his 1842 review of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s Twice-Told Tales (1837), and which Poe scholars have deemed as the 
foundation of his aesthetics. “[C]ontrol is,” Railton affirms, “the central, informing 
preoccupation of Poe’s uneasy career as an American writer,” as Poe’s unity of effect 
itself modifies A. W. Schlegel’s concept of “unity of interest” by “shift[ing] the 
emphasis from the reader and how he or she feels about a work, to the writer and how he 
or she is forcing the reader to feel,” and thus foregrounds writers’ ability “to coerce, 
even to oppress” readers (133, 138). So Railton’s Poe, even if he would ironically find 
himself “caught between his contempt and his need for the mass audience” insofar as the 
unity of effect, for its proper operation, essentially necessitates readers to be affected 
(151), actively and obstinately seeks to cultivate and uphold his dominancy over readers. 
Garrett takes notice of Poe’s yearning for control over readers likewise when he claims 
that “All of Poe’s writing, including his criticism and poetry, his detective stories, 
burlesques, parodies, and hoaxes, pursues and reflects on [his] struggle for the control of 
reading” (54). And the struggle “reaches its greatest intensity and complexity in his tales 
  
78 
of terror” where “The writer’s dream of total mastery, subordinating representation and 
meaning to unity of effect, aims at reducing the otherness of the reader to a register of 
his power, so that ‘the soul of the reader is at the writer’s control’” (54, 57). To be more 
specific, Garrett explains, in his gothic tales Poe models his first-person narrators’ ways 
of storytelling precisely after readers’ ways of reading his tales; therefore, “even as we 
suppose we are assuming a position outside the narrator’s account we find ourselves 
inscribed within it” (63). Though Garrett then says that Poe’s stories ultimately let 
readers “recognize the necessarily open and dialogical nature of even the most 
insistently self-enclosed narrative or authoritative reading” (63), he after all portrays Poe 
as an authoritarian author who aims to contain in his writing even that kind of 
“recognition.”   
Most recently, James L. Machor fully establishes Poe’s controlling authorship as 
a critical norm. Machor intends to contribute to Poe criticism’s “examinations of his 
relation to the newly developing antebellum marketplace for literature and the expanding 
mass readership that accompanied it,” by investigating how Poe’s career as a reviewer 
also fits in his “quest for authorial power even as he asserted the need to give the 
marketplace and its public what they wanted” (163). Machor attends to Poe’s unity of 
effect following Railton and Garrett, and opines that the notion, “undergirded by the 
assumption … that the successful author would be a virtual enchanter who controlled the 
audience with his or her spell-binding artistic performance,” alludes to Poe’s belief that 
“to achieve [an] effect” is “a matter of exercising power and control as the sine qua non 
of his artistic identity” (169, 171). As Poe was, Machor continues, always writing to 
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“produce himself ... as a singular influence” on readers, so his reviews “frequently 
consisted of a variation on a single principle: a work’s failure at effect as an index to the 
inability of the writer to assert authority by taking irresistible control of the reading 
experience” (176, 177). Thus Poe the reviewer chiefly sought to criticize “the 
inadequacy of a work that allowed readers an opening to seize the authority the text had 
failed to hold” (177). Machor’s observation, notwithstanding his ending comment that 
Poe’s attempt to unify his writerly and readerly practices was “always in danger of 
tipping toward self-cancellation” (178), consummates the scholarly encompassing of Poe 
within the category of the masterful authors by rendering every type of his writing as 
domineering.   
As such, Poe acquires a secure place within American literary history under the 
ever-embracing effect of Youngian authorship upon our conception of artists since the 
eighteenth century. Critics’ formation of his place, however, significantly betrays an 
inherent problem of that effect. While Poe has been almost unanimously identified as the 
antebellum American author who most aggressively pursues authority, it has been 
obscured and repressed that there is actually evidence in his texts pointing to the other, 
far-from-authoritarian, version of authorship. This critical obscuring and repression is 
precisely what Michel Foucault points out in “What Is an Author?” (1969) as a main 
factor in the continuing “enclosure” of writers by the eighteenth-century ideation of the 
author. In identifying an author, Foucault says, “Critics doubtless try to give this 
intelligible being a realistic status, by discerning, in the individual, the milieu in which 
writing originates” (150). “Nevertheless,” Foucault goes on: 
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these aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author  
are only a projection ... of the operations that we force texts to undergo, the  
connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the  
continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice. (150) 
Put another way, an author is by no means a natural origin of the text, but an artificial 
construct reflecting critics’ imposition of their own comprehension of the text. Such a 
construction, Foucault adds, necessarily involves critics’ oversimplification of the 
diverse characteristics of authors so as to make them function as “the principle of a 
certain unity of writing” and serve “to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a 
series of texts” (151). It is, then, by this critical unification and neutralization that the 
author has been constantly claimed as the “single” originator, possessor, and controller 
of his or her entire body of works. By the same token, I would say, it is by critics’ 
enforcement of the unity of Poe’s authorial image that he has been all the while 
envisioned as an author who obsessively tries to keep his text in perfect unity with his 
authorial power and intention.  
One of the most telling examples of critics’ compulsive homogenization of Poe’s 
authorial performance is their reading of “The Philosophy of Composition” (1846). This 
famous essay34 specifies the process of the composition of Poe’s most successful literary 
work throughout his life: “The Raven” (1845). Poe begins the essay with the following 
remark on writers in general:   
                                                 
34
 Before its publication in Graham’s Magazine in April 1846, “Philosophy” was 
delivered as a lecture right after the success of “The Raven.” 
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I have often thought how interesting a magazine paper might be written  
by any author who would—that is to say who could—detail, step by step, the  
processes by which any one of his compositions attained its ultimate point of  
completion. Why such a paper has never been given to the world, I am much  
at a loss to say—but, perhaps, the authorial vanity has had more to do with  
the omission than any one other cause. Most writers—poets in especial— 
prefer having it understood that they compose by a species of fine frenzy—an  
ecstatic intuition—and would positively shudder at letting the public take a  
peep behind the scenes, at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought— 
at the true purposes seized only at the last moment—at the innumerable  
glimpses of idea that arrived not at the maturity of full view—at the fully  
matured fancies discarded in despair as unmanageable—at the cautious  
selections and rejections—at the painful erasures and interpolations— ...  
which, in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of the  
literary historio. (21)35 
Then Poe, noting that “I have [no] sympathy with the repugnance alluded to,” introduces 
his “design to render it manifest that no one point in [the] composition [of “The Raven”] 
is referable either to accident or intuition—that the work proceeded, step by step, to its 
completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem” (22). 
And he explains how the poem was composed mainly in consideration of “unity of 
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 Edgar Allan Poe, Literary Criticism of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Robert L. Hough 
(Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1965). All references to the essay will be from this edition. 
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impression,” “the design of rendering the work universally appreciable,” and the choice 
of “a close circumscription of space” for “keeping concentrated the attention” of readers 
(22, 23, 29). “Philosophy” arranged as such has been interpreted by critics as 
showcasing Poe’s authorial principles of unity of effect and total control over texts and 
readers. For instance, in Railton’s view, Poe’s analysis of “The Raven” evinces his 
insistence that “the poet creates a perfect order out of ‘the jarring and tumultuous chaos’ 
of the mind” and that “composition involves nothing short of a concentrated, sustained, 
conscious purpose, subordinated at every point to the faculties of rationality and 
analysis” (135, 136). Ergo, Railton maintains, the essay serves to underwrite Poe’s 
conviction of the importance of “the writer’s mastery of content” (137) and to show off 
his own extraordinary ability to perform that mastery. To Philip D. Beidler, 
“Philosophy” at first “promises an inside look at the mysteries of the creative process 
while simultaneously unwriting and demystifying the poem back down to a collocation 
of technical cheap tricks,” and thus works as “at once a valedictory stump speech on art 
and a last bitter hoax on the mob, the tasteless, unreasoning rabble to whom [Poe] had 
been beholden throughout his life for his meager living and reputation” (264). 
Accordingly, Beidler claims, the essay conveys Poe’s praise for “Aesthetic defiance, 
grounded in profoundly political [i. e. anti-democratic] contempt” (264). From Beidler’s 
standpoint, “Philosophy,” seemingly Poe’s reader-friendly guide to how to read his 
poem, communicates his scorn for the degraded state of literature as a mere object of 
popular entertainment and for general readers’ inability to appreciate a piece of art as 
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originally presented by the author, and asserts his intellectual and aesthetic superiority as 
a genius.    
Both Railton and Beidler, however, are too intent on proving how “Philosophy” 
in every aspect accords with Poe’s autarchic authorship, without acknowledging a subtly 
yet surely existing clue to a different way of reading it. There are, in fact, the two 
distinct Poes present in the essay: Poe the essayist and Poe the poet of “The Raven.”36 
The distinction is suggested when Poe the essayist, right after talking about “Most 
writers—poets in especial” (emphasis added) who tend to glorify their authorial 
personae through writing while hiding their real selves behind the surface of the texts—
mentions his lack of “sympathy” with them. Indeed, being a writer and main narrator of 
“Philosophy,” he exhibits no particular urge for self-expression: we are given no 
information about either who he is or what type of writer/narrator he wants us to see in 
him, but only his “mathematical” description of Poe the poet’s composition of “The 
Raven.” Therefore, the basic structure of the essay would be: Poe the essayist, standing 
at a distance and taking on an impersonal perspective, recounts how Poe the poet 
conceived and wrote his poem according to unity of effect, tone, and setting that would 
channel readers’ reception. If so, Raiton’s characterization of Poe in “Philosophy” as 
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 Eliza Richards also notices the existence of the two Poes when she says that Poe 
“adopts an incongruous critical voice” along with a poetic voice (“Feminine” 15). 
Despite her notice, however, Richards ultimately merges those two Poes to argue for a 
unified, transcendental image of Poe: “The vast difference between Poe’s critical and 
poetic voices enhances the mystique of Poe the author, for in trying to reconcile the 
disparity between the essay and the poem, readers must posit an author outside the two 
texts who stands behind both” (“Feminine” 16). Hence, Richards falls into line with the 
critical consensus on Poe’s self-dissociation from readers for his authority.   
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engrossed with “the writer’s mastery of content” and eager to flaunt such a mastery by 
himself, should be attributed to Poe the poet, not Poe the essayist. By the same token, it 
is not that Poe “unwrites” and “demystifies” his own poem in the essay for the purpose 
of deceiving readers out of arrogance, as Beidler observes. Rather, Poe the essayist 
“unwrites” and “demystifies” how Poe the poet creates his work and his image in 
conformity with his “authorial vanity” that craves for “universal appreciation” as a 
natural-born genius with rare poetic “intuition.” In this light, “Philosophy” marks not 
Poe’s affinity with the monocratic, unity-concerned authorial identity, but his 
detachment from it. And, more important, through his detachment, Poe in turn unveils 
that authorial identity as a mere effect of a carefully plotted composite of words, as a 
sheer textual product, and thus as a kind of fictive character that does not exist on its 
own but can come into effect only by virtue of readers’ belief in its natural perfection 
and their acceptance of its reality. This way of reading the essay finally enables us to 
discover a Poe who has been systemically excluded from the discourse of Poe studies 
under the continual dominance of eighteenth-century authorship.  
Based on this “discovery” of the other Poe, whose “philosophy of composition” 
includes an exposé of an authorial being as none other than a fiction, this chapter aims at 
recovering and reviving the more reader-oriented and reader-inviting nature of Poe’s 
authorship. Such a nature is in part already noted by Terence Whalen in Edgar Allan Poe 
and the Masses (1999). Whalen argues that Poe’s critical writings between 1842 and 
1847 betoken his departure from his aristocratic authorial posture in the 1830s, as a 
result of his gradual realization that “the popular text” is “a site at which writer and 
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reader produce meaning through collaborative labor” and that any flaws in the author’s 
work are after all “attributable to his neglect of the mass audience” (102, 103). I agree 
with Whalen’s implication that, unlike the critical consensus, Poe’s critical writings 
never consistently display his sense of supremacy over and disdain for readers.37 Yet I 
would go a step further and place more emphasis on the fact that Poe was writing in 
nineteenth-century American magazine culture where, borrowing his own words, “To be 
appreciated [authors] must be read” (Poe to Thomas W. White, April 30 1835, qtd. in 
Letters 58). And, considering that fact, I put forward the idea that Poe’s early gothic 
novel, Pym, dramatizes his awareness of the non-viability of authors’ complete 
governance of readers and his quest for a different kind of author-figure and author-
reader relationship from the onset of his writing career. To prove it, I will investigate 
how Pym debunks the first-person narrator and self-centered author-figure Pym’s 
pretension to his natural author-ity by revealing the fictive quality of an author that 
needs readers’ belief in his factual existence and their conception of his character. In this 
sense, the author-figure that Poe propounds in the novel resembles a ghost, a presence 
that is not self-determined and self-evident but determined and evidenced by the 
interpretive responses of its witnesses. And while I am exploring the analogy of the 
ghost with Poe’s fictive author-figure in Pym, the traces of Poe’s relatedness to his 
predecessor Brown will be detected through two editorial characters—Mr. Poe of the 
“Preface” and an unidentified editor of the “Note”—whose participations in the 
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 Machor brings to light critics’ overgeneralization of Poe’s bifurcated view of 
readership, when he says that “Poe never uniformly distinguished between mass and 
elite readers, at least in dealing with the magazine audience for fiction” (173).  
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production of Pym’s narrative function, in continuation of Brown’s editorial ghostly 
authorship, to accelerate the disclosure of Pym’s reader-conditional author-ness. The 
analogy will be concretized further in my conclusion in this chapter that the surge of 
various speculations on Poe’s “character” right after his mysterious death in effect 
realized his vision of the perpetually (re)interpreted and (re)imagined author through 
readers in his own ghostly state of being. This conclusion, in turn, will highlight the 
inadequacy of current Poe studies to take into account the Poesque “author-fiction,” due 
to its affiliation with the Foucauldian “author-function.”  
 
2. The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, According to Pym   
Probably what best qualifies Pym for tracking Poe’s suppressed critique of the 
Youngian author is the fact that, in spite of critics’ long-time depreciation, the novel is 
now “the pivotal text in current discussions of the author [i. e. Poe]” (Kennedy, “On 
Poe” 169). When it first came out as a book edition by Harper & Brothers in 1838, 
following the two installments of its opening segments in the Southern Literary 
Messenger in January and February 1837, Pym was “a disappointment all around,” both 
critically and commercially (Ridgely and Haverstick 79). Critics in the early twentieth 
century assigned this failure to the novel’s highly episodic narration of Pym’s first-
person account for his sea adventures, and its abrupt ending of his encounter at the South 
Pole with a gigantic white human figure. So Henry James, in his 1909 New York Edition 
preface to the volume containing “The Altar of the Dead,” assesses Pym as indicating 
Poe’s disqualification for a novelist: the novel fails “because it stops short, and stops 
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short for want of connexions. There are no connexions; not only, I mean, in the sense of 
further statement, but of our own further relation to the elements, which hang in the 
void: whereby we see the effect lost, the imaginative effort wasted” (257). Sharing 
James’s view of Pym as an artistically flawed story, the earliest Poe critics busied 
themselves locating nineteenth-century exploration literature that Poe might have used 
“for piecemeal development, or elaboration of details” of the novel (Bailey 513) yet 
without a skillful touch to fuse them in harmony. Around the 1950s, there appeared 
another group of critics who were devoted to finding the thematic and structural unity 
hidden under the incoherent narrative texture of Pym, and who seemingly suggested a 
more constructive way of reading the novel. But I would rather agree with L. Moffitt 
Cecil, who opines that those New Critics tried to explain away “an embarrassing number 
of lapses and inconsistencies, hardly to be expected in the work of one whose literary 
trademark came to be a pronounced unity of effect achieved through conscious artistic 
integration” (232).38  
In the 1970s, Pym criticism does become apparently constructive. Taking a cue 
from Jean Ricardou’s well-known point that Pym reflects its own textual state of being 
read in multiple ways, critics now pay attention to how Poe represents the problem of 
                                                 
38
 As to the criticism on Pym’s sources, see Robert Lee Rhea, “Some Observations on 
Poe’s Origins,” Texas Studies in English 10 (1930): 135-136; D. M. McKeithan, “Two 
Sources of Poe’s ‘Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym,’” Texas Studies in English 13 
(1933): 116-137; Bailey; Keith Huntress, “Another Source for Poe’s Narrative of Arthur 
Gordon Pym,” American Literature 16. 1 (1944): 19-25; and David Ketterer, “Tracing 
Shadows: Pym Criticism, 1980-1990,” Poe’s Pym: Critical Explorations, ed. Richard 
Kopley (Durham; London: Duke UP, 1992) 237-240. As to the criticism on the thematic 
and structural unity of Pym, see Cecil 232-233, and Josie P. Campbell. 
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representation in this ostensibly underrepresented novel. John Carlos Rowe, refuting the 
preceding New Criticism, proposes that “What critics have considered difficulties and 
inconsistencies in the text [of Pym] may also be considered self-conscious disruptions of 
the impulse toward coherent design and completed meaning” (104). Then, seeing the 
“eccentricity” of Pym as bespeaking Poe’s “modern awareness of the displaced center, 
the divided present, the irrecoverable origin,” Rowe asserts that the novel “deconstructs 
the idea of representation as the illusion of the truth and dramatizes the contemporary 
conception of writing as the endless production of differences” (105, 106). Rowe’s 
poststructuralist analysis of Pym greatly inspires subsequent criticism, as most notably 
discerned in John T. Irwin’s famously exhaustive, two-hundred-pages-long discussion 
about Poe’s Pym and other tales of a journey to the unknown in American Hieroglyphics 
(1980). According to Irwin, Poe is intrigued with the idea that “all physical shapes 
become obscurely meaningful forms of ... hieroglyphic writing each of which has its 
own science of decipherment” (61). As such, Irwin continues, Poe’s voyage stories, 
especially Pym, thematize “The essential precariousness, both logical and ontological, of 
the narrative act” (69). Thus Irwin’s Poe, through Pym’s subjective, erroneous 
interpretations of signs in the course of his journey and his inability to recognize the 
white human figure as a reflection of his own (interpretive) self at the end of that 
journey,39 reveals the self-centered basis of writing and deviates from single authorship.   
                                                 
39
 Here I put the word “interpretive” within parentheses because Irwin also mentions a 
possibility that the figure might be one of the “natural optical illusions” happening 
occasionally at the polar areas, and thus a literal reflection of Pym’s own shadow upon 
the screen-like mist (208).  
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Later on, Dennis Pahl, J. Gerald Kennedy, and Patrick Pritchett continue arguing 
for Poe’s deliberate destabilization of authorial mastery over the text in Pym. Pahl notes 
that our theorization of Poe is nothing more than an effort to “set in place a boundary 
between oneself and that other we designate as ‘Poe,’” “so as to be better able to master 
him” (“Framing” 1). Yet this binary oppositional theorization significantly overlooks 
“how the sort of framing or enclosing devices [are] actually pictured within his 
narratives” and “undermined ... through the violations of boundaries, the disruption of 
‘self-contained’ narrative spaces” (“Framing” 7). Pahl then claims that Pym best 
exemplifies how “writing in Poe, as well as Poe’s own writing, marks the disruption of 
truth, of boundaries, of frames that attempt to secure in place a world that Poe would 
otherwise have us believe is one marked by ‘unity’ and ‘totality’” (“Framing” 10). 
Kennedy focuses on the ubiquitous destruction and death throughout Pym’s gothic 
adventure, and counts it as Poe’s allusion to writers’ exchange of their “putative 
historical existence for that of a purely textual entity” and to the oneness of “the space of 
death and the space of writing” (“On Poe” 193, 194). Pritchett reiterates Kennedy by 
saying that Pym’s excessive concern about truthful narration ironically betrays the truths 
that “The written word carries more weight than the testifying person who writes it” and 
that writing is “a gesture of apophasis, of unsaying, or negation, in as much as the word 
must always stand in for the presence of the person” (41, 54). With Pritchett, Poe’s Pym 
becomes a gothic story about the Barthesian death, or total disempowerment, of authors 
by their own writing.   
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Certainly, the critics since Rowe permit us to re-view Poe’s authorial 
performance as less domineering, as they underscore his keen cognizance of the 
impossibility of authors’ absolute regulation of the texts. Yet they also have their own 
limitation. On the one hand, some of these critics treat Poe not as an individual artist but 
as a part of larger aesthetic and intellectual movements, so ultimately neutralizing his 
personal difference from conventional eighteenth-century authorship. Irwin regards Poe 
as an “heir” of an ongoing tradition since the Romantic poets that probes into “man’s 
linguistic relationship to the world” and that gives rise to literary works “whose inquiry 
into the origin of their own written presence on the page is a synecdoche for the inquiry 
into the simultaneous origin of man and the world in the act of symbolization” (55). For 
Pahl, Poe’s “self-questioning narratives” let us “understand the American romance in 
general as a kind of writing that dramatizes its own instability,” in contrast to “certain 
English romances—for example, Walter Scott’s Waverly—where authority and an 
authorized moral vision is finally asserted” (“Framing” 10). On the other hand, Rowe, 
Kennedy, and Pritchett, though making prominent Poe’s own insightful and subversive 
representation of authors’ subjection to writing, tend to minimize, if not ignore, Poe’s 
reader-consciousness in that representation. Consequently, those critics isolate Poe’s 
authorial principles and praxis from readers, and more or less conduce to the still-
prevailing image of him as a self-absorbed and self-concerned author. 
In fact, Pym starts out as making clear that authors’ existence per se depends on 
readers’ reception of the texts. In the “Preface” of the novel, Pym explains how he has 
come to publish his narrative. Pym at first hesitated to do so mainly owing to the 
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public’s probable disbelief in his too incredible adventure story. Then he met Mr. Poe, 
who was, just like the real-life Poe, “lately editor of the Southern Literary Messenger, a 
monthly magazine, published by Mr. Thomas W. White, in the city of Richmond,” and 
who tried to talk him into publishing his story and expecting readers’ possible belief in it 
(4).40 But Pym only agreed that Mr. Poe would write down the opening part of his story 
“under the garb of fiction,” and issue that writing in the Messenger with Mr. Poe’s name 
“in the table of contents of the magazine” (4). The public accepted Mr. Poe’s “fiction” as 
fact, and Pym, encouraged by this success, has decided to print the entire narrative under 
his own name by adding the rest in his own words to Mr. Poe’s portion.  
Critics have by and large argued that the “Preface,” obscuring the distinction 
between fact and fiction, carries out Poe’s scheme of fooling and estranging 
contemporary readers. Paul Rosenzweig states that “Under the guise of Pym’s reassuring 
the reader of the authenticity of his narrative, Poe ironically calls that authenticity into 
question” by italicizing/emphasizing such words as “‘appearance,’ ‘under the garb of 
fiction,’ ‘ruse,’ and ‘exposé’” (145). According to Kennedy, Pym’s confession of “the 
difficulty of affecting the appearance of the truth inherent in his statement” implies “that 
appearance and reality may not coincide”; ergo, “Through the mask of ‘A. G. Pym,’ Poe 
alludes to an underlying objective—to produce an ingenious deception—while evincing 
a high-minded concern for its reception as truth” (“On Poe” 172). Rosenzweig and 
Kennedy, in their Youngian approach to Pym in search of Poe’s authorial intent, fail to 
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 Edgar Allan Poe, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, ed. Richard 
Kopley (New York: Penguin, 1999). All references to the novel will be from this edition. 
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catch the very basic supposition of the “Preface” in particular and the entire novel: that it 
is Pym, not Poe, who is introduced to readers as the author of the narrative. Not to 
mention Pym’s first-person narration, the novel was at first published as a book 
anonymously, only with the main title, “The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of 
Nantucket.” This fact, pointing to Poe’s original design for the novel “to be a factual 
account of real experiences undergone by Pym, and, in some measure, actually written 
by him” (Quinn 563),41 leads us to heed a distance between Pym and Poe. And that 
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 Although Pym was anonymously published, it is likely that readers soon, or even 
instantly discovered Poe’s authorship of the novel, because, as the “Preface” tells us, the 
first two installments of the novel in the Messenger already appeared with his name. Yet 
Walter E. Bezanson, and J. V. Ridgely and Iola S. Harverstick inform us that the name 
was given at not Poe’s will but the publisher of the magazine Thomas W. White’s. 
Bezanson says that the first installment of Pym was “unsigned, but the table of contents 
on the inside of the blue wrapper noted that this piece, along with two poems, four 
reviews, and a brief statement of his resignation as editor, was ‘By E. A. Poe.’ The 
following month [i.e. February, 1837] a second installment appeared, and that was all” 
(149). Ridgely and Haverstick identify White as the one who “in an editorial note 
credited to Poe ‘the first number of Arthur Gordon Pym, a sea story,’ and also placed his 
name by the title in the table of contents” (66). This information supports Poe’s original 
purport to suppress his nominal authorship in favor of Pym’s.    
 The anonymous publication of Pym, of course, has been taken by a number of 
critics as part of Poe’s hoax. Patrick F. Quinn maintains that “All the factual apparatus is 
there to deceive the reader who is deceivable. The motif of deception ... is integrally 
present in [the novel’s] construction and subject matter” (579). Kennedy, in his article on 
Pym as satire, similarly associates Poe’s withholding his name with his authorial intent 
to mock readers. According to Kennedy, before they published Pym, Harper & Brothers 
had rejected Poe’s collection of tales, “Tales of the Folio Club,” in 1836, with the advice 
that his writing is “too learned and mystical” whereas the mass audience prefers a single-
edition book; Poe “thus found himself obliged to … turn his energies to the fabrication 
of a long narrative which would please the American reading public ... whose fondness 
for ‘stupid’ books he had decried in a review only two months prior to the letter from 
Harpers” (“Satire” 192). As such, Kennedy goes on, Poe “decided to conceal his 
authorship behind the persona of Arthur Gordon Pym,” so that he could “satisfy the 
requirements of Harper Brothers [sic], capitalize on the bad taste of the reading public, 
and salvage his artistic self-respect by turning the whole unfortunate episode into a kind 
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distance, in turn, allows us to see how Poe, from a detached standpoint, presents Pym 
himself as an author-figure for our observation, just as Poe the essayist in “Philosophy” 
indifferently proffers Poe the poet for our scrutiny.42   
If we treat Pym as an authorial subject and examine the “Preface” in view of his 
authorial disposition, what we consequently discover is the fact that Pym bears the 
features of the eighteenth-century self-contained and self-authorizing author. At the 
beginning of the “Preface,” when he is about to explain his initial reluctance toward 
publication, he makes a brief yet telling comment: “I had several reasons … for 
declining to do so, some of which were of a nature altogether private, and concern no 
person but myself; others not so much so” (3). Pym’s comment on some “private” 
reasons, as immediately followed by his seemingly unreserved and unrestrained relation 
of the presumably “not-so-much” private reasons, evokes a suspicion that he may not be 
telling readers honestly about himself, and that even what he is telling them openly about 
himself may not be true. In addition, the comment gives us an impression that Pym 
                                                                                                                                                
of esoteric joke” (“Satire” 192). Quinn and Kennedy obviously epitomize the typical 
critical emphasis on Poe’s hierarchical sense of readers as the very ground for his 
authorship. 
42
 Evelyn J. Hinz, in her analysis of Pym as a Menippean satire, similarly notes the 
distance between Pym and Poe. According to her, one of the clues to the satiric qualities 
of the novel is “in the title itself: The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket,” 
which implicates that “The subject of the work ... is not the adventures of Pym but his 
presentation of his adventures; not Pym as voyager but Pym as narrator; and not merely 
any narrative and any Pym but the narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket,” and 
that “Poe ... is directing the reader’s attention toward the literary and intellectual 
significance of the work and simultaneously toward the limited consciousness of his 
narrator” (382). “Thus the title,” Hinz concludes, “is a caveat against identification of 
Poe and Pym (which leads to the didactic interpretation) and confusion of the reader’s 
perception with that of Pym’s (the Bildungsroman approach) and finally, a literal-minded 
concern with the physical details of the voyage (the picaresque appreciation)” (382).  
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intends to draw a veil over himself, censuring and filtering what to say to readers. The 
impression of Pym’s veiling in particular reminds us of “Most writers—poets in 
especial” in “Philosophy,” who are anxious to prevent readers’ possible peek at them 
through the surface of their texts. So it can be said that Pym’s comment on the “secret” 
and unsayable reasons, other than “non-secret” and sayable ones, signifies his desire for 
self-concealment, self-protection, and self-dissociation from readers and his wish to 
maintain his authorial liberty of self-characterization.     
Securing his narratorial/authorial status from his readers in this manner, Pym 
proceeds to affirm its inherent authority. He says that as his narrative is full of “so 
positively marvelous” incidents, he “could only hope for belief among my family, and 
those of my friends who have had reason, through life, to put faith in my veracity—the 
probability being that the public at large would regard what I should put forth as merely 
an impudent and ingenious fiction” (3). Here, while he sounds as if worrying about the 
hardly believable appearance of his narrative, Pym in reality underscores his not needing 
to prove its “veracity” since it is already, naturally, proven by “my veracity,” or the 
“veracity” of his own authoring self. He is not implying that nobody would possibly 
accept his narrative as true. He is denoting that those who know his personality “through 
life,” and know his creation of the narrative, would believe in its verity, and that his 
authorship is thus self-guaranteed.  
Pym’s confidence in his self-evident, organic authorship is further detected in his 
interpretation of readers’ reception of Mr. Poe’s “fiction” as fact and his concluding 
remark on the clean-cut difference between his writing style and Mr. Poe’s. In his 
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opinion, readers must have taken Mr. Poe’s writing as true because “the facts of my 
narrative would prove of such a nature as to carry with them sufficient evidence of their 
own authenticity” (4). Pym is giving himself all the credit for the success of Mr. Poe’s 
story, by attributing the story’s verisimilitude to the “authenticity” of its origin—“the 
facts of my narrative”—and, by extension, to that of the author of that origin, himself. 
Here, we can take a look at Pym’s essentialistic perspective towards his authorship: 
though his narrative is re-produced and fictionalized by Mr. Poe, its factual nature never 
changes and remains always discernible. To Pym, therefore, it is his origination of the 
narrative that dismisses and subdues the possible “popular incredulity” (5). Based on this 
firm belief in his unquestionably verifiable and fundamentally immutable authorship, 
Pym ends the “Preface” by proclaiming the distinguishability of his authorial being and 
performance: “it will be seen at once how much of what follows I claim to be my own 
writing,” and “Even to those readers who have not seen the Messenger, it will be 
unnecessary to point out where his [i. e. Mr. Poe’s] portion ends and my own 
commences; the difference in point of style will be readily perceived” (5). Pym does not 
have to elucidate to readers the characteristics of his writing; all he has to do is present 
readers what he writes, and let it point to himself as its singular origin.    
Pym’s assertion of self-explanatory authorship is, however, simultaneously 
undercut by his non-understanding of the reader-directed mechanism of contemporary 
literary markets. The mechanism is hinted at in Mr. Poe’s advice to Pym on publication, 
which goes that Pym should “trust to the shrewdness and common sense of the public” 
and that “however roughly, as regards mere authorship, [Pym’s] book should be got up, 
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its very uncouthness, if there were any, would give it all the better chance of being 
received as truth” (4). Unlike several critics’ interpretation of it as insinuating Poe’s 
sarcasm toward contemporary simple-minded and superficial readers,43 Mr. Poe’s words 
enlighten us about authors’ loss of control over the texts in accordance with readers’ 
empowerment to decide the nature and value of the texts. More specifically, his words 
impart that Pym does not have to, and cannot, care about how to “get up” his narrative 
and make it truthful, for it will be truthful only if it is “received as true” by readers; 
therefore, Pym can only “trust to” and depend on readers. Also, Mr. Poe’s association of 
the “very uncouthness” of Pym’s narrative with the “better chance” for readers’ 
authentication suggests the ironic situation in which authors’ own artistic mastery is no 
longer relevant to their success as it is now the readers’ call to define their mastery. As a 
whole, Mr. Poe’s advice at once communicates the reader-dominant realities of the 
antebellum literary world, including the destabilization of authors’ sole regimentation of 
the texts and the degeneration of the previously privileged authorial profession into 
“mere authorship,” and embosses by contrast the inadequacy of Pym’s reliance on 
himself, not on his readers, to sanction his authority.   
What is more, Pym’s authorship does turn out to be ordained by readers as, 
despite his affirmation of the clear difference between his writing style and Mr. Poe’s, 
the main text of Pym does not exhibit that difference in any degree. Accordingly, Pym’s 
self-validating authorial attitude is immediately problematized by his own text, which 
                                                 
43
 Kennedy, for instance, contends that “Behind the pretense of complimenting the 
public on its collective ‘shrewdness and common sense,’ Poe manifests scorn for readers 
disposed to regard ‘uncouthness’ as a sign of truth” (“On Poe” 172). 
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does not designate him as its author, and his own authorial self, which is not 
distinguished from Mr. Poe’s. It is now only Pym’s readers who can designate him as the 
author of the narrative and distinguish his authorial self from Mr. Poe’s. Put another way, 
Pym does not exist as an author in his own right, but can come into existence only by his 
readers’ acknowledgement of what they think he writes and envisaging of what kind of 
author he might be. Pym’s ontological reliance on readers, then, reveals the essentially 
fictive inbeing of the author: the author ought to be created like a fictional character by 
readers. That Pym chiefly concerns such a fictitious quality of the authorial being is 
indicated in the very first sentence of the novel: “My name is Arthur Gordon Pym” (7). 
This plainly self-introductory sentence causes a lot of complication to Pym’s pretension 
to authorship. To begin with, the sentence, appearing in the first chapter of the narrative, 
is presumably written by not Pym but Mr. Poe. Also, considering that Mr. Poe’s writing 
is supposedly a fictional version of Pym’s factual account, the same sentence directly 
brings up questions like whether Pym really exists as well as who Pym is. Finally, if we 
take into account Mr. Poe’s own identity as a fictional character of a de facto author, 
Edgar Allan Poe, the self-referentiality of the sentence and that of Pym’s own (authorial) 
existence becomes far more pointless.44 Given all these clues at the opening of Pym, 
                                                 
44
 Quite predictably, many critics have apprehended Mr. Poe as Poe’s textual double. 
John P. Hussey, presupposing that Pym has “two narrators, Pym and ‘Poe,’ both of them 
fictional,” analyzes how Mr. Poe refines the entirety—not just part—of Pym’s factual yet 
crude writing (30). In Hussey’s view, Mr. Poe, with a transformative power of “a true 
poet,” endows Pym’s narrative with “a unity and harmonized pattern which it would not 
otherwise possess,” and re-organizes Pym’s facts as “related and functioning elements” 
(31, 32). Kennedy proposes that Mr. Poe functions to confuse “the issue of truth” in the 
novel: “the true author fictionalizes himself to enforce the impression that his narrator is 
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readers instantly get ready to see what Pym the author cannot in his own narrative: the 
substitution for the author as absolute truth by the author as fiction. 
The main text of Pym manifests the contingence of Pym’s authorship upon a 
readership that thwarts his repeated endeavors to solidify his authoritarian and 
autonomous authorial status.45 Such contingency, or the readerly background of Pym’s 
authorship, is initially observed in his relationship with a close friend Augustus Barnard. 
It is told that when he was still at school, Pym went out for a sail with Augustus, both 
drunken, on a boat Ariel one stormy night, and almost got shipwrecked. The incident, 
however, does not kill Pym’s longing for the sea adventure thanks to Augustus, who 
                                                                                                                                                
an actual, living personage” and to make fun of the public’s inability to “distinguish 
between fact and fable” (“On Poe” 172, 173). Hussey’s argument cannot be proven since, 
as I have pointed out, it is impossible to tell the difference between Mr. Poe’s and Pym’s 
writing styles and thus determine whether Pym’s original narrative has been really 
improved thanks to Mr. Poe. Kennedy makes an obvious error of identifying authors and 
their fictional characters, which comes from the eighteenth-century idea of the text as the 
replica of its author’s personality.   
45
 Pahl also takes notice of Pym’s pursuit of ultimate authorial authority in his narrative. 
He notes that “Pym’s whole adventure story ... doubles (but also splits from) the outer 
frame [i. e. Pym’s writing about his adventure story] by becoming itself something of a 
quest for authority, for an originating voice” (“Framing” 5). On the one hand, Pahl goes 
on, “Like Pym the writer, who wishes to become the author and origin of his narrative, 
the adventurer Pym in the story (or the ‘written’ Pym, as Irwin calls him) desires to make 
a journey toward origins”; on the other hand, “Just as writer-Pym struggles to attain 
authorship, adventurer-Pym wants to become the author(ity) of his ship, master of his 
own destiny, origin of himself” (“Framing” 6). But Pahl, in his attempt to read Pym in a 
double frame, fails to see that “Pym the writer” cannot be severed from “Pym the 
adventurer” insofar as Pym “struggles to record the ‘truth’ of his adventures by 
translating remembered scenes into verbal signs” (Kennedy, “On Poe” 171, emphasis 
added). “Pym the adventurer,” in a word, is essentially (re)created and (re)written by 
“Pym the writer” looking backward. What is more, Pahl, like most Pym critics, does not 
catch that Pym has claimed to have an authorial authority in the “Preface” as I have 
already shown. That is, Pym is not searching for his authority that is not in his hands, but 
trying to maintain and strengthen his already owned authority in the course of writing his 
narrative.    
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“had a manner of relating his stories of the ocean (more than one half of which I now 
suspect to have been sheer fabrications) well adapted to have weight with one of my 
enthusiastic temperament, and somewhat gloomy, although glowing imagination” (18). 
Augustus’s stories are so appealing and convincing that Pym feels as if “Augustus 
thoroughly entered into my state of mind” and “our intimate communion had resulted in 
a partial interchange of character” (19). Many critics reckon Pym’s remark to suggest the 
“interchangeability” between Pym’s and Augustus’s “characters.” But rather than 
arguing for the doubling or identity between Pym and Augustus—since we do not see 
any visible resemblance in those two throughout the narrative—I would contend that the 
“interchange” takes place between more “partial” or particular “characters” of Pym and 
Augustus, that is, between Pym the listener and Augustus the storyteller in their 
relationship. That is, Pym has his readerly office interchanged with Augustus’s authorial 
one and becomes an author himself. Inspired by Augustus’s sea-adventure tales, Pym 
soon stows away on a brig Grampus (in so doing, Pym is once again aided by 
Augustus’s authorial ability to forge a letter under the name of a friend of his family’s 
and cover up his plan). And through the voyage, Pym would undergo various incidents 
that he is currently narrating/writing about in retrospect in Pym. In this sense, it can be 
said that Pym’s authorship arises from, and is built upon, his readerly experience of 
Augustus’s authorial act.  
To an author who hankers after autocratic authority like Pym, however, such an 
interchangeable linkage between authorship and readership that dismantles the fixed 
division between an authorial and a readerly identities is too dangerous to admit. So Pym 
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deliberately represses, through his narration, any pointers to Augustus’s author-ness that 
may put him back into the readerly place. Pym, sneaking into the Grampus, has to hide 
himself in the hold for the time being under the care of Augustus, who is aboard the brig 
as a son of its captain, Captain Barnard. Yet there occurs a mutiny on the Grampus, and 
desperate to convey the news, Augustus writes a letter, ties it on the back of Pym’s dog 
Tiger, and sends him in to Pym. Augustus’s letter threatens Pym’s authorship because, 
by relating how he receives and deciphers the letter, he should act as Augustus’s reader. 
Aware of this reader-izing effect of Augustus’s letter, Pym makes use of his narratorial 
power to minimize the effect by rendering the letter unreadable. According to the 
narrative, Pym at first thinks that the letter is “a dreary and unsatisfactory blank” and 
tears it up into pieces (37). Here, even though he ascribes it to the darkness of the hold, 
Pym’s description of the letter as total blank is not very plausible because Augustus later 
confesses that he writes it on “the back of a letter—a duplicate of the forged letter” 
which he wrote earlier for Pym’s voyage plan (56). Rather than believing Pym’s words 
about the emptiness of the letter, therefore, we may have a suspicion that he intends to 
empty any significance out of what Augustus authors—both the forged letter and the 
letter about the mutiny. Of course, Pym afterwards tries to read the letter by retrieving 
and recombining some of its pieces. But what he gets after all the labor (to recompose 
Augustus’s text in his own way) is just an incomprehensible and “fragmentary 
warning”—“blood—your life depends upon lying close” (39)—that only enhances the 
unreadability of the letter and, by extension, of its author, Augustus.46 And Pym later 
                                                 
46
 Kennedy interprets Pym’s misreading of Augustus’s letter as an allegory of writing 
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recounts Augustus’s death, noticeably caused by the “mortification” of his wounded 
right arm (125), when the Grampus is adrift after being attacked by the storm, and thus 
“confirm[s] [Augustus’s] further uselessness in any project of writing” (Kennedy, “On 
Poe” 188).       
Whereas Pym tries to unlink his authorship from its readerly genesis, his 
narrative continues to betray its reader-related constitution. For instance, Pym’s 
encounter with his grandfather right before stowing away on the Grampus suggests how 
Pym’s authorial character as a former sailor is in essence accredited by his audience. On 
the encounter, Pym is temporarily wearing “a thick seaman’s cloak ... so that my person 
might not be easily recognized,” but the grandfather identifies him and asks, “why, 
why—whose dirty cloak is that you have on?” (21). At this moment, let us heed, Pym 
does not think of himself as a sailor yet, using the “seaman’s cloak” only for self-
concealment. It is by the grandfather’s question, with a quick shift of its focus from 
“why” to “who(se),” that Pym is compelled to decide “who” he should be between a 
naïve young schoolboy and an experienced rough seaman. And Pym chooses to be the 
latter, “assuming ... an air of offended surprise, and talking in the gruffest of all 
imaginable tones,” and answering that “sir! you are a sum’mat mistaken—my name, in 
the first place, bee’nt nothing at all like Goddin, and I’d want you for to know better, 
                                                                                                                                                
and reading: the episode signifies that “meaning is invariably hostage to the vagaries of 
reading,” and that “writing and reading prove to be ineluctably separate activities, each 
the function of a subjectivity operating under the different pressures at different times, 
struggling with an arbitrary and imperfect system of signs” (“On Poe” 175, 176). Yet 
Kennedy fails to consider the possibility of Pym’s abuse/misuse of his narratorial 
authority in his basically first-person narration.    
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you blackguard, than to call my new overcoat a darty one!” (21). Pym’s assumption of 
the seaman’s identity, however, does not make him one by itself. What does so is his 
audience’s endorsement of that assumption, that is, his grandfather’s reaction to him as if 
he is a real seaman: the grandfather “started back two or three steps, turned first pale and 
then excessively red,” and goes away, mumbling that “Won’t do—new glasses—thought 
it was Gordon—d__d good-for-nothing salt water Long Tom” (21). By this reaction Pym 
in effect becomes the seaman, even before he actually goes to the sea. As such, Pym’s 
encounter with his grandfather epitomizes the operation of the reader’s credence on the 
formation of his authorial character.47 
Pym, of course, does not realize the implications of the encounter: he only 
recollects it, in a pompous tone, that “For my life I could hardly refrain from screaming 
with laughter at the odd manner in which the old gentleman received this handsome 
rebuke” (21). In Pym’s view, the encounter simply attests to his own representational 
talent. Yet Pym’s assurance of such a talent is challenged by one peculiar character: Dirk 
Peters, a line-manager of the Grampus and one of the mutineers. Peters’s peculiarity lies 
in his appearance, which is a grotesque composite of diverse human and non-human 
physical traits that “makes [him] occupy a middle-ground between a predatory and 
cannibalistic nature, white civilization, and indigenous cultures—between beasts, whites, 
                                                 
47
 Josie P. Campbell and Domhnall Mitchell reckon this episode to dramatize Pym’s 
resistance to and subversion of authority. Campbell opines that “Pym acts out in 
miniature a mutiny against his grandfather, a representative of order and of social values 
in life, the man who is the successful lawyer and from whom Pym is to inherit property” 
(208). Mitchell regards Pym’s decision to stow away as his “rebellion against parental 
authority”: “he only just manages to evade a representative of that authority, in the shape 
of his grandfather, Mr. Peterson, by impersonating a drunken sailor” (103). 
  
103 
blacks, and Indians” (Achilles 263). Accordingly, Pym’s description of Peters’s looks is 
very minute and comprehensive as if trying to get complete hold of this gothic “hybrid” 
(57 and passim). But that physiognomic minuteness and comprehensiveness itself 
evinces difficulties Pym has in representing who Peters is in any definitive way. The 
more peculiar hybridity of Peters that repels Pym’s ability to represent, however, comes 
from the multiple representability of Peters’s character: “Of this singular being many 
anecdotes were prevalent among the seafaring men of Nantucket. These anecdotes went 
to prove his prodigious strength when under excitement, and some of them had given 
rise to a doubt of his sanity” (50). What should be noted here is that the “anecdotes” of 
Peters are the result of collaborative readership: those who behold Peters’s unusually 
frightful appearance produce diverse speculations on and stories of his character, which 
altogether work to render him “a folk legend” (Kamaluddin 125). Such a reader-directed 
mode of representation is incompatible with Pym’s autarchic authorial principles, so that 
he shortly overrules those popular images of Peters by saying that “But on board the 
Grampus, it seems, he was regarded at the time of the mutiny with feelings more of 
derision than of anything else,” and pushes readers to move on by adding that “I shall 
have frequent occasion to mention him hereafter in the course of my narrative” (50). 
And Pym does “mention” Peters a few more times in the rest of the narrative, but only to 
re-present him at will: Peters’s role would be limited to that of a subordinate to Pym 
throughout the sea adventure, while his physical presence would become more and more 
obscure to the point that he is later said to be “white” (188) notwithstanding his 
characteristically “dark” appearance earlier. In this manner, Pym seeks to eventually 
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homogenize Peters’s reader-induced heterogeneity by (ab)using his narratorial authority 
to represent.48   
Yet even before witnessing Pym’s intentional misrepresentation of Peters, we can 
see Pym’s move to corroborate his authorial mastery of representation when he discusses 
a “proper stowage” of a ship (63) and when he disguises himself as a ghost to defeat the 
mutiny on the Grampus. These two scenes seem irrelevant at first glance, but, examined 
together, come to display Pym’s author-centered authorial performance. After being 
rescued by Augustus out of the hold that is full of a jumbled heap of cargoes, Pym 
deliberates on the problematic stowage of the Grampus. He opines that “the manner in 
which this most important duty had been performed on board the Grampus was a most 
shameful piece of neglect on the part of Captain Barnard, who was by no means as 
careful or as experienced a seaman as the hazardous nature of the service on which he 
was employed would seem necessarily to demand,” and who should have known that “A 
proper stowage cannot be accomplished in a careless manner, and [that] many most 
disastrous accidents, even within the limits of my own experience, have arisen from 
neglect or ignorance in this particular” (63). A captain is supposed “to allow no 
possibility of the cargo or ballast’s shifting position even in the most violent rollings of 
                                                 
48
 As for the increasing invisibility and silence of Peters in the latter half of Pym, Sydney 
P. Moss ascribes it to Poe’s goal of writing a hoax as “represented by the ‘pseudo-
voyage’ of the second yarn, facts, or purported facts” in the Jane Guy portion (303), 
whereas Lisa Gitelman assigns it to the convention of nineteenth-century American 
exploration literature that, unlike white characters, “non-whites and women ... are never 
permitted to tell their own stories” (358). Sabiha Kamaluddin presents the most relevant 
opinion to mine when she asserts that “Peters is denied speech” owing to “the inability 
of the narrator to control more than one narrative voice” (125). 
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the vessel,” to which “great attention must be paid, not only to the bulk taken in, but to 
the nature of the bulk, and whether there be a full or only a partial cargo” (63). And Pym 
proffers the best ways of stowing cargoes, and concludes by repeating that the stowage 
of the Grampus is “most clumsily done” (66). This passage is analyzed by several critics 
as talking about the narrative’s own status as a textual stowage, consisting of episodes, 
characters, and techniques. Evelyn J. Hinz neatly outlines such an analysis. She observes 
that “stowage is a metaphor for literary composition, ballast for verisimilitude, sea for 
audience, and wind for favor or reception,” and insists that the passage, which 
underscores the difficulties in accomplishing the good stowage, is “an extended 
comment on the problems of the writer in general and on the technical features of [Pym] 
in particular” (391). If the passage is about “the problems of the writer,” however, it 
does not refer to the difficulties of “the literary composition” as Hinz claims, for what 
the passage is stressing is not the laboriousness of the proper stowage but the adroitness 
of a captain’s care of the stowage. Pym is strongly imputing the problems of the stowage 
of the Grampus to Captain Barnard’s “performance” of “this most important duty” with 
“a most shameful piece of neglect.” Pym’s vehement blaming of Captain Barnard in turn 
tells us how much weight he lays on a captain’s ability to keep firm hold on the contents 
of the ship. And if we extend Hinz’s metaphorical reading and deem a captain who 
handles the stowage to be an author who directs the composition, Pym’s entire remark 
on the stowage becomes at once his prioritization of the author’s role in the construction 
and management of the text over other relevant elements including “ballast-
verisimilitude,” “sea-audience,” and “wind-reception,” and his advocacy of the self-
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governing and controlling author who would “allow no possibility” of the disturbance of 
what he writes “even in the most violent rollings” caused by readers’ whimsical and 
unpredictable responses.49  
In this light, Pym’s stowage speech explains why he soon resolves to “regain 
possession of the brig” from the mutineers (67): Pym intends to prove himself as a 
masterful captain/author who is in full charge of his ship/writing and in full control of 
readers. To do so, Pym relates in detail how he represents a ghost of a dead crewman, 
Hartman Rogers, and shocks and subdues the mutineers. With the help of Peters, who is 
now on Pym and Augustus’s side against the mutineers and performing his duty of 
protecting them like a tamed wild dog, Pym puts on Rogers’ clothes and colors his face 
in white and red. And looking at himself in the mirror, he is immediately filled with “a 
sense of vague awe at my appearance, and at the recollection of the terrific reality which 
I was thus representing,” so that “I was seized with a violent tremour, and could scarcely 
summon resolution to go on with my part” (80). Pym, from a reader’s perspective, is 
underwriting how his own (re)creation of dead Rogers would “awe” and dismay the 
audience and put them under the “seize” of his authorial power. Then Pym proceeds to 
detail his performance of the ghost of Rogers in front of the mutineers, especially 
focusing on how his careful staging of the performance successfully produces “The 
                                                 
49
 Gitelman, believing that the passage emblematizes the textual stowage, or “disunity,” 
of both the narrative of Pym and the contents of nineteenth-century American magazines 
for which Poe worked as an editor and contributor, demonstrates how those textual 
products by Poe, “despite any reader’s accusations of disunity and sloppy stowage, 
manage to float in the same way that a voyage account … manages to float fairly well, 
buoyed by the expectations of readers accustomed to the conventions of sloppy stowage 
in the period’s habitually eclectic magazines and exploration literature” (356).  
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intense effect” on them (83). Pym notes that as usually there is doubt “in the mind of the 
spectator” at the vision of a ghost, so “the appalling horror [of the ghost] is to be 
attributed ... more to a kind of anticipative horror, lest the apparition might possibly be 
real, than to an unwavering belief in its reality” (83). Nonetheless, Pym states, “in the 
minds of the mutineers there was not even the shadow of a basis upon which to rest a 
doubt that the apparition of Rogers was indeed a revivification of his disgusting corpse, 
or at least its spiritual image,” because he takes care of all the elements necessary to 
represent the ghost believably, including “The isolated situation of the brig,” “the awe-
inspiring nature of the tempest,” the “deep impression” of Rogers’s body already left on 
the mutineers, “the excellence of the imitation in my person,” and even “the uncertain 
and wavering light in which they beheld me” (83, 84).  
Pym’s account of his acting the ghost, implying how his exceptional authorial 
faculty for representation produces a powerfully terrifying effect on the mutineers and 
enables his group to become “masters of the brig” (85), reminds us of Poe’s unity of 
effect that he frequently uses for his gothic stories. As such, it seems to sanction critics’ 
argument for it as designed for authors’ total mastery over readers and substantiate the 
efficacy of Pym’s regulatory authorial disposition. Yet the same account actually does 
the opposite. When he ponders upon “the mind of the spectator” above, Pym purposes to 
underline how his skillful representation of Rogers’s ghost vanquishes its tendency to 
suspicion. But what becomes salient is the power of “the mind of the spectator” to 
originate a horrifying effect of a ghost. Regardless of spectators’ usual doubt about its 
reality, a ghost would be still horrible owing to their “anticipation” that it “might 
  
108 
possibly be real”; it does not really matter if the ghost is real or not, for it is the 
spectators’ minds that imagine and make the ghost real. If so, Pym as the ghost could 
have a terrifying effect on the mutineers inasmuch as they mentally and emotionally 
conceive and—unlike what Pym alleges—believe in it to be terrifying for real. In this 
respect, Pym’s account, in addition to illuminating the reader-originated nature of Poe’s 
unity of effect,50 becomes his ironic designation of the mutineer-audience as the main 
factor in his successful achievement of mastership/authorship, and re-defines his truthful 
representation of the ghost into the mutineer-audience’s truthful representation of him as 
the ghost.51  
                                                 
50
 George E. Haggerty, in Gothic Fiction / Gothic Form (1989), discusses how Poe fully 
understands and makes use of the gothic’s affective, and thus reader-reliant nature. Yet 
Haggerty concludes that Poe ultimately aims to “manipulate his audience so closely” and 
make sure that “our involvement is total” (85, 92), and remains in line with the 
mainstream Poe criticism. My analysis of how Pym performs Rogers’s ghost following 
Poe’s unity of effect refutes Haggerty (and most Poe critics), as it shows how readers are 
not being passively effected and captured by authors but actively participate in the 
production and operation of a certain effect along with authors.  
51
 Bezanson, Josie P. Campbell, and Paul John Eakin altogether interpret Pym’s disguise 
as the ghost as his re-birth. Bezanson alleges that Pym, looking at his disguised self in 
the mirror, “has looked upon his own corpse, as it were, risen from the grave of the hold” 
(162). Campbell says that “It is noteworthy that Pym relinquishes his identity as he 
severs his connections with the land and with his family in the person of his 
grandfather. ... The self that is born of the deception of Pym’s grandfather is buried in the 
hold of the ship Grampus only to be reborn in a far more distorted form than Pym could 
ever have imagined” (208). In Eakin’s opinion, Pym, in his disguise as the dead, “act[s] 
out literally what is, symbolically, his role in each experience first and last, that of 
Lazarus-Valdemar” (19). Recently, Kennedy and Marita Nadal re-interpret the disguise 
as a metaphor for Pym’s ambivalent state of being. According to Kennedy, “Pym’s 
impersonation of a corpse places him in the singular position of being both a living 
subject and a dead object; for a moment (when seized by the ‘violent tremour’) he 
experiences the alienation of the self from itself which—as Kafka figuratively suggests 
in ‘The Metamorphosis’—belongs to the phenomenology of dying” (“On Poe” 184). 
Nadal argues that “Through his impersonation of Rogers’s corpse and the contemplation 
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As Pym’s authorial act turns out to be in no way self-substantiating and self-
sustaining, so his newly achieved mastership of the Grampus, founded on his lack of 
concern about the audience, quickly collapses. The brig is attacked by a storm and 
broken into pieces—a situation in which, using Hinz’s symbolism of sea and wind as 
“audience,” Pym’s authorship is overpowered by readership—and Pym and his followers 
go through a series of indescribably dreadful and discouraging incidents: they encounter 
a ship full of dead, rotten bodies; they have to practice cannibalism in order to live; and 
they have to watch Augustus putrefy and die. So when finally rescued by another brig, 
the Jane Guy, Pym quickly resolves to re-solidify his author-ity by adopting a new 
authorial persona. Such a resolution is well indicated in Pym’s following comment: “On 
board the Jane Guy ... we began to remember what had passed rather as a frightful dream 
from which we had been happily awakened, than as events which had taken place in 
sober and naked reality” (135). Pym is denying the “reality” of his former experiences as 
a whole by simply calling them a “dream” and negating their detrimental impact on his 
authorial being, so that he can pave the way for realizing his authorship anew. 
Accordingly, Pym after the rescue becomes more straightforwardly directive toward 
readers.52 As Sidney P. Moss correctly points out, Pym becomes “suddenly quite 
                                                                                                                                                
of ‘I’ as Other in the mirror, Pym experiences the fascination and repulsion of the abject” 
(380). To me, these readings are too I-centered, not considering the fact that the disguise 
is essentially designed to be “performed” for others.  
52
 A number of critics have tried to elucidate Pym’s sudden change in the latter half of 
Pym. Cecil counts it as a token of the two distinctive stories and thus the two distinctive 
narrators in the novel: “the narrator of the Jane Guy story does not identity himself, 
either by recalling events of the past or expressing hopes for the future, with the young 
Nantucketer who originally set out on the adventure,” because the Jane Guy portion is 
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informed not only about the typography, geography, and history of the South Sea and 
Pacific Islands, not to mention their flora and fauna, but about the great historic efforts to 
penetrate to the Pole” (301-302).53 Pym’s sudden transformation like this, I would add, 
is closely related to his yearning for ultimate authority that would make him superior to 
both other authors in the field of oceanography and his readers. For instance, when he 
narrates about rookeries, he notes that “These rookeries have been often described, but, 
as my readers may not all have seen these descriptions, and as I shall have occasion 
hereafter to speak of the penguin and albatross, it will not be amiss to say something 
here of their mode of building and living” (140). Also, starting to narrate the Jane Guy’s 
sailing toward the South Pole, Pym says that “Before entering upon this portion of my 
narrative, it may be as well, for the information of those readers who have paid little 
attention to the progress of discovery in these regions, to give some brief account of the 
                                                                                                                                                
“detached from the Grampus story” and “independent and artistically complete” on its 
own (236, 239). Ridgely and Haverstick contend that Poe, unable to finish “a verisimilar 
voyage narrative” in the Grampus portion, “tried to transmute his protagonist into an 
older and self-effacing reporter of incredible but actual discoveries,” so that the novel is 
“thrown wildly off balance,” with “much of the earlier material ... rendered irrelevant in 
terms of preparation for the final scenes” (79-80). Kamaluddin extends Cecil’s and 
Ridgely and Haverstick’s arguments when she divides Pym into “three almost 
unconnected adventures” respectively on board the Ariel, the Grampus, and the Jane 
Guy, and points at the absence of any resemblances or “cross references” in the third 
portion to the earlier two (122, 123). These critical perspectives, in synch with W. H. 
Auden’s characterization of Pym as “purely passive” (211) and Daniel Hoffman’s 
emphasis on Poe’s “struggle to master the uncontrollable” as the theme of the novel 
(261), do not take into account Pym’s own reasons for and agency in his transformation 
(being the narrator and author of the narrative).   
53
 Robert L. Carringer also characterizes Pym after his rescue as a “natural historian, 
describing in detail the flora and fauna of the nearby islands” (513). See more, Carringer, 
“Circumscription of Space and the Form of Poe’s Arthur Gordon Pym,” PMLA 89. 3 
(1974): 513-514. 
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very few attempts at reaching the southern pole which have hitherto been made”; and, 
after summing up the existing discourses on the Pole, he concludes that “My own 
experience will be found to testify most directly to the falsity of the conclusion arrived at 
by the society” (150, 155). On both occasions, Pym is simultaneously boasting to his 
readers about his uncommon knowledge of the sea and the polar areas, and invalidating 
other authorities’ knowledge of the same issues by means of his own exclusively valid—
because first-hand—experience and observation.54 Hence, Pym in effect puts forward his 
text and authorial self as the one and only authoritative source, upon which readers must 
depend without any questions.    
Pym’s desire to be an author with utmost power is exhibited most clearly when 
he recites the indentations or “indentures” on the wall of a chasm under the ground of a 
primitive island of Tsalal, where everyone and everything is black. The Jane Guy crew 
stays on the island for a while for the purpose of recruitment and commerce; but the 
natives, unlike their friendly look, ferociously bury the entire crew alive in the gorge so 
as to pillage the brig. Only Pym and Peters manage to survive the burial; and, seeking 
their way out of the gorge, they find out that there are several “most singular-looking” 
chasms and that one of them has equally “singular-looking indentures” on its wall (199, 
202). These chasms and indentures cause a serious crisis in Pym’s authorial authority 
                                                 
54
 Pym’s pretension to authority on the basis of his first-hand experience and observation 
of the polar areas might be also explained through Irwin’s idea of “the first man”: “The 
notion of ‘the first man’ to reach the South Pole or the first civilized man to cross the 
Rockies means, of course, the first to make the discovery and return to tell the tale 
(either in person or in a written narrative, if he is physically unable to return), the first to 
inscribe the discovery in the written narrative of history. It is writing, then, that 
constitutes the originality of the first man to enter an unknown region” (70-71). 
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since their figuration is totally incomprehensible to him: whereas he has, since rescued 
by the Jane Guy, provided readers with proficient analyses of whatever comes under his 
eyes, Pym now only remarks that “we could scarcely bring ourselves to believe [them] 
altogether the work of nature” (199). Pym’s remark registers his sense of frustration, 
from a narrator’s and reader’s viewpoint, in construing and mastering what is made by 
“nature,” or, by an ultimate author of the universe: God. As if aware of that crisis, 
however, Pym attempts to assume that authorial position of God, which baffles and 
nullifies readerly approaches to his work, by incorporating the unreadable signs of the 
chasms and indentures into his narrative and (re)writing them in his own words. He 
quickly presents his pictorial depiction of the “precise formation of the chasm[s]” and 
“accurate copy of the whole” set of the indentures (200, 202), and even adds his 
circumstantial verbal description of them. Then Pym goes on to secure his usurped god-
like authorship of those chasms and indentures by urging their ungraspability. When 
Pym and Peters are surveying the indentures, Peters, who has up to now been muted and 
rendered almost nonexistent by Pym, suddenly expresses his willingness to decipher 
them as a combination of a human figure and alphabetic letters. Faced with Peters’s wish 
for commentary, which betokens the unpredictability of an readerly act, Pym promptly 
dismisses it as “idle opinion” though he himself, for a minute, deems such an 
interpretation possible (202). Then Pym “convinced [Peters] of his errors” by showing 
the pieces of the stone flakes on the floor and “thus proving [the indentures] to have 
been the work of nature” (202) or the product of the unfathomable godly workmanship 
that he has just preempted. In this way, Pym successfully dissuades Peters’s and other 
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possible readerly interpretations of those indentures, and finally consolidates his 
authorship with the most sovereign authorial identity of the Author-God.55  
Pym’s acquisition of the godly status, however, does not make up for the self-
insufficiency of Pym’s authorial being. Soon afterwards, Pym and Peters try to get out of 
the gorge of Tsalal by descending a steep declivity. Peters easily succeeds in doing so, 
but Pym, suddenly flooded by a fear of death and an impulse to fall, feels dizzy, loses 
                                                 
55
 Some critics claim the resemblance between the contours of the chasms and indentures 
in Pym’s drawing and the initials of Edgar Allan Poe. Daniel A. Wells initially 
exemplifies the claim: “The shape of the chasm ... spells out in longhand the letters of 
Poe’s last name, reversed of course. This communication is between Poe and his special 
readership, who must connect the figures in written script before the meaning emerges. ... 
When the connection is made ... the aesthetic distance between author and work 
disappears; … It is his handwriting, these are his walls, and he has written with an 
invisible finger his signature in the Tsalalian hills” (14). Pahl, in his 1987 article on Pym, 
echoes Well’s point: “we might see in the strange designs of the chasms ... the creator’s 
initials, ‘e a p’; or in the designs of the indentures, the author’s last name spelled out in 
reverse, ‘E O P.’ Here, the whole notion of authorship/authority is suddenly made ironic, 
as the real Poe becomes inscribed in his own narrative—the author graven and in his 
grave” (60). This way of reading the chasms and indentures not only overinterprets those 
non-letters but also exemplifies, once again, the prevalence of the eighteenth-century 
conventions of interpreting the text by looking for the author’s marks on it. See how Pahl 
later revisits and revokes his own earlier argument:  
As some critics have done, we could read into these strange designs, these  
scratchings on the walls of the text, either Poe’s own initials or even his last  
name spelled out backwards (see Irwin, 228; Pahl, 56). Such readings would  
at first glance seem to suggest the possibility of a final author(ity), a final  
frame or framing-self that would at last bring closure to the text. But given  
the ironic nature of Poe’s writing, we would perhaps do well to understand  
that nothing could be further from the truth. (“Framing” 9) 
Then he adds that “Of course to bring any reading at all to these inscrutable chasm 
designs, even if it is to read into them the ‘death of the author,’ is at once to imprint upon 
the page one’s own markings, one’s own special designs. It is to fill in the gaps, the holes 
of the text with one’s own inventive writing, and so in effect create the author (or even 
his death). ... And it is precisely this that Poe’s writing warns against” (“Framing” 10). 
As for the other analysis, see Eakin: “Poe establishes the figures in the text itself as 
symbols of the shape of Pym’s experience, the configuration made by the path of the 
embattled self as it moves tortuously through a threatening nature” (17).            
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control, and tumbles into the arms of Peters, “a dusky, fiendish, and filmy figure” (206). 
In contrast to his peremptory manner toward Peters, Pym in this scene has to count on 
Peters for his life, lacking the power to command himself. This sudden change in the 
power relationship between Pym and Peters bespeaks an author’s inability to stand on 
his own feet and his mandatory dependence for his existence on the reader. What is more, 
now Peters somehow restores his former peculiarity—that “dusky, fiendish, and filmy 
[because he rejects any determinate representation]” appearance—to which Pym has 
purposefully turned a blind eye so far. Peters’s self-restoration, regardless of Pym’s will, 
thus further highlights the limitation of Pym’s single-handed authorial regulation.56  
It is the ending of Pym’s narrative, however, that registers most conspicuously 
the impossibility of Pym’s self-contained authorship. Pym and Peters, after their narrow 
escape from Tsalal with a native captive Nu-Nu, arrive at the South Pole where 
whiteness predominates—with the white powders falling from the sky, and the white 
vapor, in the form of “a limitless cataract” or “gigantic curtain,” arising from the horizon 
(216-217). Then Pym, looking at the emergence of “a shrouded human figure” in front 
of his boat (217) and rushing into the vapor-cataract, abruptly puts an end to his 
narrative. This enigmatic ending of Pym has generated numerous critical opinions, most 
of which are guided by Ricardou’s pronouncement that “No text is more complete than 
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 The declivity episode has been frequently discussed in terms of Pym’s experience of a 
perverse desire to fall and die, and thus suggested as prefiguring Poe’s later gothic tale, 
“The Imp of the Perverse” (1845). Yet still the episode has much to do with the 
problematic of Pym’s controlling authorship, in that Pym is said to lose his control 
because he is consumed by his “imagination growing terribly excited by thoughts of the 
vast depth yet to be descended” (205): he cannot even control his own authorial creative 
faculty.  
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The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, for the fiction it presents points to the end of 
every text, the ultimate establishment of ‘blank page defended by whiteness’” (4), and 
by Irwin’s comprehension of the white human figure as “Pym’s own shadow, which he 
does not recognize” (205).57 I agree with the conclusiveness of Pym’s ostensibly 
inconclusive narrative, but I would argue that it is conclusive from Pym’s authorial point 
of view, not from the novel’s or Poe’s as Ricardou intimates. Also, while I concur with 
the idea of the human figure as Pym’s self-image, I would add that it is neither his 
unrecognized and unintended nor hieroglyphic and intricate image as Irwin points out, 
but the very image Pym consciously designs to finish his text. To be more accurate, Pym 
is concluding his narrative by impressing the image of his authorial self on it and thus 
ultimately declaring his authorship of it. In so doing, Pym portrays the image in a highly 
mystified tone: according to him, the human figure appears in front of the endlessly 
stretched white vapor-cataract, and looks “very far larger in its proportions than any 
dweller among men” (217). Pym’s delineation of his projected self-image—which, 
                                                 
57
 For instance, Shawn Rosenheim explicates that “recuperating the fragmentation of 
Pym’s ending depends largely upon the ability to decipher the ‘hieroglyphs’ Pym has 
transcribed on his adventures” and that “The ‘white figure’ of the novel’s end is revealed 
as an image of the self projected on the fog—a pictograph of Pym’s identity, cast upon 
the world” (378). Cynthia Miecznikowski pinpoints that “the image which author [i. e. 
Poe] and character [i. e. Pym] confront at the end of Pym symbolizes the culmination of 
every reading of every text in the abrupt vacancy of the white page” (60). Mitchell 
likewise insists that “The narrative itself ends by literally dissolving in front of us, as 
Poe removes the curtain of writing to reveal the white page underneath” (106). Kennedy, 
in wrapping up his discussion of Pym’s death as a biographical self and re-birth into a 
textual one through writing, considers “Pym’s final voyage” to be “a movement toward 
figurality itself, toward a trope of writing and textual closure” (“On Poe” 189). Most 
recently, Nadal alleges that “Pym disappears as a narratorial presence: as narrator he has 
reached the bottom/whiteness of the page, the end of [his narratorial] journey” (385).  
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bestowing on the image the overwhelming mysteriousness and colossality, reifies the 
divine authorial persona that he has taken on at the chasm of Tsalal—in turn projects his 
pretension to the awe-inspiring authorial presence that no mere “dweller” or audience 
would dare to doubt or challenge its supremacy. Yet the same delineation also impairs 
Pym’s final self-authorization by producing the effect of his consistent disregard and 
repression of readers’ role in the constitution of his author-ity. The human figure is 
Pym’s own projected image, yet it does not indicate anything characteristic of him; 
instead, it has “the perfect whiteness of the snow” (217), or the utter blankness. This 
absence of Pym’s character in his own projected image exposes the deficiency of self-
defining, self-characterizing, and self-sanctioning power of his authorial identity, which 
calls for others’/readers’ partaking in defining, characterizing, and sanctioning that 
identity and points to his necessary interaction with his readers to be an author.  
Indeed, the very last scene of Pym’s narrative stresses that Pym’s inability to 
have an interactive relationship with readers deactivates his self-proclaimed authorship. 
The gigantic human figure arises in the way of Pym’s rush into the vapor-cataract,58 
which seems to wait to embrace him with the “flitting and indistinct images” in it (217). 
Here, Pym’s situation should be understood as less threatening than beneficial to his 
(authorial) being. The scene describes how his magnified self-image is hindering his way 
to ultimate survival as an author even after writing comes to an end, a survival 
obtainable by merging with those multiple “images” that could be produced by readers’ 
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 Of course, at this moment, Pym is with Peters and Nu-Nu on the boat. But Peters is 
silenced again since the chasm episode, while Nu-Nu, another silenced presence, is dead, 
so that the ending, as it were, concerns Pym only.  
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constructions on his narrative and thus fill up his essentially vacant authorial self. This 
description, in turn, directs our attention to the following segment of Pym, the “Note,” 
which is “The actual ending of Poe’s story” (Zanger 279) and which serves to exorcise 
the baneful image of Pym’s self-confined authorship and re-open his hindered pathway 
to interrelation with readers.  
The “Note,” written by an anonymous editor, performs such a service in two 
steps. First, it prevents any more one-man authorial attempts at Pym’s narrative that may 
channel or suppress again readers’ linkage to it. The editor informs us of “the late 
sudden and distressing death of Mr. Pym,” who has finished “the few remaining chapters 
which were to have completed his narrative” in its revised edition, yet “irrecoverably 
lost through the accident by which he perished himself” (219). What this information 
tells us is, of course, the death of Pym the author as a sole creator, owner, controller, and 
completer of his text. The editor continues to report on the unavailability of other 
authorial substitutes for Pym: Mr. Poe “has declined the task—this for satisfactory 
reasons connected with the general inaccuracy of the details afforded him, and his 
disbelief in the entire truth of the latter portions of the narration,” and Peters, though 
“still alive” and residing in Illinois, “cannot be met with at present” (219). Consequently, 
Pym’s narrative remains authorless, unauthorized, and uncredited.  
Next, the editor invites readers to the empty place of an author and gives them an 
opportunity to authorize and credit Pym’s narrative. Saying that “it would afford the 
writer of this appendix much pleasure if what he may here observe should have a 
tendency to throw credit, in any degree, upon the very singular pages now published,” 
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the editor addresses readers back “to the chasms found in the island of Tsalal, and to the 
whole of the figures” or indentures (219). The editor’s re-directing of readers’ attention 
to the chasm scene truly works for his expectation of their “credit,” because that scene is 
the only part throughout the narrative where Pym does not impose any specific meaning: 
Pym, let us recall, in defense of his god-like authorship of those chasms and indentures, 
has insisted on their inscrutability and thus left them uninterpreted. By bringing readers 
back to this point of no author-intended meaning, then, the editor entitles readers to 
signify those unsignified signs in whichever ways they believe.59 To do so, he criticizes 
that Pym’s assertion of incomprehensibility is “made in a manner so simple, and 
sustained by a species of demonstration so conclusive (viz., the fitting of the projections 
of the fragments found among the dust into the indentures upon the wall), that we are 
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 Eakin, Irwin, and Pahl also ponder upon why the editor leads readers back precisely to 
the chasm scene. Eakin states that “as if ‘to fill the vacuum’ left by the ‘missing’ 
chapters and their account, presumably, of the world ‘beyond the veil,’ the note proceeds 
to decipher the mysterious ‘indentures’” (16). Irwin observes that “the note returns the 
reader to the chasm episode, presumably to retrace the narrative line to the final break in 
the text, and then on to the note which sends him back to the chasm episode, and so on” 
and that “This skewed circularizing of the narrative line points to the only kind of 
immortality that writing can confer on the author’s self: not an endless persistence of the 
self-as-image in the infinite void beyond death, but an indefinite repetition of the 
author’s inscribed self through the act of (re)reading” (196-197). Pahl opines that “this 
apparent limit of the narrative, this seeming endpoint, serves only to send us back into 
the pages of Pym to reinvestigate the chasm designs—designs that are, according to the 
postscript’s explanation, fragments of Ethiopian and Arabic characters. Thus from one 
fragment marking the ‘end’ of the tale, we are led into further fragments, consisting not 
of nature’s landscape but of, as it were, the landscape of writing, of language” 
(“Framing” 9). It is exactly my intention in this chapter both to show some other mode 
of authors’ “immortality” or life after death than Irwin’s, which would confine authors 
eternally within a single version of their “inscribed self” in the texts, and to propose to 
look beyond the point of the author’s death by the text’s fragmenting effect, a point that 
Barthesian critics like Pahl have repeated for too long.    
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forced to believe the writer in earnest” (219-220). And, as if resisting such a “forced” 
view, he expounds the shapes of the chasms and indentures as a combination of the 
words from the Ethiopian, Arabic, and Egyptian roots that mean “To be shady,” “to be 
white,” and “The region of the south,” and an image of “a human form” with its “arm ... 
outstretched towards the south” (220). Interestingly, therefore, the editor comes to 
“afford strong confirmation of Peters’s idea” (220) that has been rejected by Pym. Yet, 
more important, the editor does not confirm the analysis in any way; rather, he moves on 
to incite readers to perform their own analyses, saying that “Conclusions such as [his and 
Peters’s] open a wide field for speculation and exciting conjecture” (220). Then he leads 
readers to interpret not just the chasms and indentures but Pym’s narrative as a whole, by 
remarking that the conclusions “should be regarded, perhaps, in connexion with some of 
the most faintly-detailed incidents of the narrative; although in no visible manner is this 
chain of connexion complete” (220). With this remark, readers are empowered to re-read 
Pym’s narrative focusing on the “incidents” that are “most faintly detailed” or distorted 
by Pym, to re-make any kinds of “connexion”—since no one “connexion” would be 
more “complete” than others—between those “incidents,” and to re-write it in 
unlimitedly diverse ways.60 By extension, readers’ boundless recomposition of Pym’s 
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 The editor has been often misrepresented as authoritarian. Eakin construes that “For 
Pym’s ‘editor,’ stationed as he is at a privileged, indeed ‘angelic,’ vantage point looking 
down on the chasms from above, the figures have a meaning, they spell out a message” 
(20). Rosenzweig characterizes the editor as “hardly either neutral or objective” 
insomuch as “his note has one continual thrust—a search for meaning” (147). Sam 
Worley argues for “The ambiguous results of the endnote’s assertion of interpretive 
authority over both glyphs and text” (241). And Kennedy opines that “As if to seal the 
narrative in an enveloping contradiction which would insure the book’s unreadability, 
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first-person narrative would bring about the equally boundless number of characters for 
his narratorial self, and finally enable Pym to go beyond his own gigantic but hollow 
authorial image standing in his way, receive the embrace of the “limitless cataract,” and 
continue to exist through the “flitting and indistinct”—that is, ghostly, indeterminate, 
incomplete, and thus ever-re-creatable—“images” in it.61 
                                                                                                                                                
Poe, in the editorial appendix, not only disposes of his narrator but undermines his 
credibility,” and that the editor, by pointing out what Pym and Mr. Poe fail to perceive in 
Pym’s narrative, “leaves the whole matter of authority unclear” (195, 196). All these 
depictions of the editor coincide with the eighteenth-century notion of writing in 
establishing one decisive meaning and point of view, which is clearly not the editor’s 
writerly intent as I have shown.  
61
 The “Note” ends with an italicized biblical quotation: “I have graven it within the hills, 
and my vengeance upon the dust within the rock” (221). Critics like Ricardou, Wells, 
and Irwin try to find its significance. Ricardou, based on his symbolism that substitutes 
“paper” for “the white travelers” and “writing instruments” for “the blacks” in Tsalal, 
speculates that “Covering the whites (paper) with the black dust of the cataclysm (ink) 
and thus transforming the contour of the deep gorges of the island, ... the islanders, 
without realizing it, are setting new windings of the script in place,” and concludes that 
“The enigmatic sentence that concludes the appendix ... can be read, then, as words 
formed by the deadly ravine after the attempt upon the lives of the whites (a 
dramatization of the antagonism between ink and paper): ‘I have written it on the page, 
and the ink has engulfed the paper’” (5). Wells says that “Engraved in the hills is Poe’s 
name, undercutting the claims to authenticity of the landscape of the characters. 
Therefore, Poe’s ‘vengeance,’ an example, perhaps, of his need to prove his intellectual 
superiority, is on the majority of his readers, who, in failing to conjoin geography and 
philosophy, chasm and creativity, are forever blind to the ingenuity which lies before 
their eyes, but beyond their vision” (15). Irwin agrees with Wells when he asserts as 
follows:   
A writer—who wills fictive worlds into existence, who creates himself in the  
act of writing and endows that written self with the power to survive death— 
is particularly subject to [the] presentiments of immortality. Perhaps that is  
the deepest meaning of the quotation that ends Pym, for though the quotation  
sounds like the word of God ..., Poe’s readers, familiar as they were with  
Scripture, would have known that these words are not from the Bible. And  
Poe would have known that his readers would immediately register that fact.  
Certainly, the question we are meant to ask is, who is the author of these  
godlike words? Not the Creator of the physical universe, but the creator of the  
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By virtue of the “Note,” Pym uncovers the fictive core of the eighteenth-century 
author-figure that necessitates readers’ belief in its validity and their configuration of its 
characters based on their own signification of the text. Poe’s participation in revealing 
the reader-oriented foundation of the author, however, is not just observable in his 
literary composition. He himself serves as a proof of how an author can exist by agency 
of readers’ myriad (re)interpretation of his texts and (re)characterization of his authorial 
self. Right after his death in 1849, which was as “sudden and distressing” as Pym’s 
death,62 Poe, or his “character” to be more exact, became an object of widespread 
                                                                                                                                                
written world of Pym. (227) 
Hence, the quotation is “an encrypted signature—the author’s signature for the whole 
work” (227-228).  
However, in view of the editor’s function to endorse readers’ rights to (re)write 
Pym the author’s text in his stead, other critics’ arguments for the meaninglessness of the 
quotation would make more sense. To Ridgely and Haverstick, “a pseudo-biblical 
quotation” is “full of impressive sound but signifying nothing”; “Pym thus comes to a 
lame anticlimax, in which the author himself invites us to doubt the seriousness of his 
conclusion” (79). Rosenzweig objects to Irwin’s too author-centered perspective by 
taking into account a reader’s standpoint to the quote: “the final, italicized warning ... 
seems to be derived from the Bible ... but it is only a parody of the Bible. Its language, 
seeming to carry a clear meaning, is finally not poetic but garbled and unclear. … If this 
is to be taken literally, it hints at a final paradigm for the novel itself” in that it “only 
adds further mystery” (149). And that paradigm is the reader’s realization that “he holds 
nothing certain—the rock, hollow, hiding within it only the dust of disintegrating 
meaning. Nothing is certain in the world of the Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, not 
even the certainty that nothing is” (149). Shaindy Rudoff debunks more fully the biblical 
aura of the quotation as “only ‘near’ references”: “in Pym, the biblical allusions turn out 
not to be quite right. Poe doesn’t use the Bible. He uses biblical inflection. It is this 
almostness, this ‘sounds-like-the-Bible’ which Poe plays with throughout” (74). Then 
Rudoff adds that “In an act of biblical mimicry, Poe transcribes the fraud: what sounds 
and looks like a biblically authoritative verse is actually manmade” (79). I would extend 
Rudoff’s observation by arguing that Poe inserts the quotation in order to highlight for 
the last time the inner void of Pym’s godly authorship that calls for readers to fill it with 
meanings.  
62
 It is reported that Poe, during his trip to Richmond for his lecture on poetry and visit to 
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controversy among his contemporaries.63 The controversy was spurred by Poe’s literary 
executor, biographer, and well-known foe Rufus Wilmot Griswold, whose series of 
newspaper and magazine articles on Poe delineate his character as, in sum, an immoral 
alcoholic with a perverted imagination.64 This controversy needs to be examined in 
terms of Poe’s authorship in that it basically concerns who Poe was and how he should 
be recognized as an authorial individual rather than a biographical individual: the 
arguments about Poe’s character are mostly based on the arguers’ readings of his works. 
Griswold’s “Edgar Poe,” published in Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine in April 1852, gives a 
useful paradigm for the underlying rhetoric of the controversy: 
                                                                                                                                                
his then fiancée, Mrs. Shelton, was found semiconscious in the streets of Baltimore on 
October 7, 1849, and died at a hospital on the same day. A large amount of conjectures 
have been made on why and how he came to die there, but the truth of his death still 
remains what Beidler aptly terms “Poe’s last gothic tale of terror” and “detection” (253). 
63
 William A. Pannapacker examines Poe’s character reflected and signified in his 
daguerreotypes, in relation to the explosion of the biographical interest in him in 
America toward the end of the nineteenth century. See Pannapacker, “A Question of 
‘Character’: Visual Images and the Nineteenth-Century Construction of Edgar Allan 
Poe,” Harvard Library Bulletin 7. 3 (1996): 9-24.   
64
 About how Griswold, notwithstanding his animosity against Poe, became responsible 
for Poe’s posthumous collected editions and biographical accounts, critics cast doubt on 
Poe’s mother-in-law Mrs. Clemm’s claim that Poe himself recommended Griswold for 
those tasks while he was alive, due to the lack of supporting records. Yet Peeple takes an 
interesting exception: “Poe may or may not have requested Griswold as his literary 
executor, but one thing is certain: both Poe and Griswold would have wanted his 
collected works to sell. ... While it still seems unlikely that Poe would have actually 
wanted Griswold to malign him when he died, he might have appreciated his rival’s 
cunning” as an experienced editor (4). As to the detail of Griswold’s distortion of the 
facts about Poe’s life and work, see Killis Campbell, “The Poe-Griswold Controversy,” 
PMLA 34. 3 (1919): 436-464. Campbell tries to measure objectively the extent of 
Griswold’s responsibility for denigrating Poe by, for example, comparing the original of 
some of Poe’s letters with Griswold’s edited version of them. Campbell concludes that 
“It was as biographer, not as editor, that Griswold sinned against Poe” (464). For 
Griswold’s forgeries, see also A. H. Quinn, Edgar Allan Poe: A Critical Biography (New 
York: D. Appleton-Century, 1941). 
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The writings of Edgar Poe, whether poems or tales, are quite as remarkable  
and incongruous as his character. They evidence an imagination the most fervid 
and daring; and in most of his tales this imagination is brought to bear on 
abstruse phenomena in nature and science, with results which are rendered more 
astounding to the reader by the apparently strict adherence to fact and scientific 
detail. ... To be able to produce such an effect is proof of great power; to use that 
power in a manner so outré is at first sight proof of a diseased mind, or, to use a 
cant expression, of a naturally “morbid imagination.” (233-234) 
Here and in his other articles on Poe, Griswold similarly forges Poe’s authorial character 
out of his interpretation of Poe’s writing. The ensuing debates for and against Griswold’s 
readerly (re)characterization of Poe altogether conjoin the (re)reading of Poe’s works 
and the (re)creation of Poe the author as well.65 Take for example the following quote 
from “Poe and His Biographer, Griswold” by George Washington Eveleth, one of Poe’s 
defenders:  
As it is, we claim for Eureka [i. e. Poe’s last poetic work published in 1848] a  
place among the noblest productions of modern times; and we enter now the  
name of its author, Edgar Allan Poe, upon our fame-roll as that of the greatest  
genius to whom America has given birth—as that of a critic, a philosopher,  
and a poet, in the true sense of those most shamefully misapplied terms; and,  
                                                 
65
 Many critics trace the entire controversy over Poe’s character back to the two major 
figures: Griswold, and a poet and Poe’s one-time fiancée Sarah Helen Whitman. For the 
information of Whitman’s role in defending Poe against Griswold, see Pannapacker 9-11, 
and Richards, “Lyric Telegraphy: Women Poets, Spiritualist Poetics, and the ‘Phantom 
Voice’ of Poe,” The Yale Journal of Criticism 12. 2 (1999): 269-294. 
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besides, as that of a real gentleman; the Reverend Rufus Wilmot Griswold,  
his traducing biographer, and his clique to the contrary notwithstanding. (354) 
Here, Eveleth counters Griswold’s portrayal of Poe by offering his evaluation of Poe’s 
Eureka and applying that textual evaluation to his re-assessment and re-definition of 
Poe’s authorial persona. Then, the entire controversy over Poe’s character after his death, 
which had not been fully resolved until the mid-twentieth century when the critical 
imposition of the controlling Poe began, would have in effect revived dead Poe and re-
embodied his ghostly presence on and on through a variety of his authorial images 
engendered by his readers.66 In this sense, Poe’s authorship as a whole should be 
understood as heteronomous and self-dispossessing rather than autonomous and self-
preserving. This understanding, at last, calls for a significant re-consideration and 
modification of current critical discourses on Poe, which only prematurely put his un-
dead body within a coffin made in the eighteenth century and bury him alive.  
It might be said, then, that Poe becomes a ghost writer whose authorship is 
incessantly made present in his absence by and through readers. Yet, of course, such a 
never-ending reader-initiated effect of presence is not just exercised in the case of 
physically dead authors. Around the time when Poe passed away, the American literary 
world began to be haunted by whole new kinds of the living dead. Fugitive slave writers 
and women writers were producing the period’s most popular works, but their authorship, 
                                                 
66
 Peeple describes this reviving effect of the Poe controversy that Poe “resembles his 
own Smith [i. e. the General John A. B. C. Smith in “The Man That Was Used Up” 
(1839)] (whose name playfully means ‘maker’) in that he too was used up—and then 
rebuilt into an ever-more-fascinating public figure” (25). 
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and often their existence per se, were not fully recognized by contemporary white- and 
male-dominant society. Aware of their social, cultural, and political spectrality, these 
writers contrived various ways to materialize and legitimate their authorship in 
cooperation with readers. In the next chapter, we will meet two of these ghostly writers 
and see their resurrection into reader-made ghost writers: Frederick Douglass and Louisa 
May Alcott.  
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CHAPTER IV  
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHOR:  
THE CASES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND LOUISA MAY ALCOTT 
 
American literature around the mid-nineteenth century might be above all 
characterized by the popularity of abolitionist literature and popular magazine literature. 
These two phenomena contributed to one remarkable change in the American literary 
domain: the emergence of traditionally marginalized groups, namely, slaves and women, 
at the central stage of literary production. The cases of Frederick Douglass and Louisa 
May Alcott in particular show how the assumption of the writing subject’s position by 
the powerless, or the sociopolitical living dead, destabilizes the conventional Youngian 
notion of the author and realizes the idea of the ghost writer. According to scholars, 
Douglass and Alcott seem to have chosen different ways to cope with their existential 
liminality in their writing; the former wrote first-person slave narratives apparently so as 
to prove his real-life presence and authorial capabilities, whereas Alcott composed 
sensation stories anonymously and pseudonymously in order to acquire financial 
security while supposedly concealing her participation in the unwomanly genre. Yet 
these two seemingly disparate scholarly paradigms of authorship are in fact built upon a 
common ground: the Romantic conception of the author as the only essence and source 
of the text. This essentialist conception isolates Douglass and Alcott from their readers 
who, in reality, were indispensable for their success and survival as writers. Drawing on 
this observation, this chapter aims to rejoin Douglass and Alcott to their readers by 
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shedding light on their ontological reader-consciousness. In the first section, I will read 
Douglass’s best-known autobiographical account of his life as a slave, Narrative of the 
Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written By Himself (1845), as a gothic 
text where his selfless self-story at once dramatizes his actual social identity as a ghost 
and induces his readers to flesh it out as a legitimate authorial being. The next section 
will read Alcott’s most acclaimed gothic novella, “Behind a Mask; or, A Woman’s 
Power” (1866), which pictures a mysterious governess Jean Muir who eventually 
transforms into an aristocratic Lady Coventry with the aid of the Coventry family’s 
readerly imagination, and demonstrate how the novella features in Jean Muir an author-
figure that has no inner, essential self but is only made of a surface or mask and 
converted by readers into a substantial authorial being. In the process, I will contend that 
Jean Muir’s reader-initiated substantiation of her flimsy existence parallels Alcott’s 
reader-intended authorization of her pseudonymous writerly identity, or “mask,” for that 
novella, “A. M. Barnard.” In this way, we will witness how not only the physically dead 
or absent author as in Poe’s case in Chapter II but also the figuratively dead or absent 
author becomes resuscitated by readers, and how the notion of the ghost writer 
sufficiently accounts for authors’ dependence on readers in every dimension. Although I 
do not directly compare Douglass and Alcott, their similarities as the spectral Other in 
nineteenth-century America who could return to life and become real, renowned writers 
by means of readers, will become clear.      
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1. Self-Story Without Self: Douglass’s Narrative 
The gothic perspective on slave narratives has been by and large manifest 
through scholars’ sporadic—like an unpredictable pattern of a haunting ghost in a gothic 
novel—comments on their picturing of the horror of slavery.67 Yet those comments, 
examined altogether, exhibit a noteworthy change in tone. Until the 1980s, it seems that 
the commentary had been usually disparaging. Mary Ellen Doyle, categorizing slave 
narratives into those with “the interest of a good story of horror or adventure” and those 
with “the interest of the issue of enslavement and freedom, of the psychology of those 
who pass or fail to pass, legally or spiritually,” evaluates the former group as inferior 
(83). Those narratives are inferior because, Doyle specifies, being in nature none other 
than “horror stories” as well as “adventure stories,” they “focus on the situation of 
slavery itself or on some aspect of it” and are “not much concerned with the personality 
of the narrator or the meaning of his experiences, but only with what he has seen of the 
‘peculiar institution’ or by what astonishing means he got free of it” (84). These “strictly 
episodic and sensational” narratives, Doyle goes on, merely comprise a “catalogue of 
bloody lashings and brutal rapes, bleeding flesh and tear-filled eyes, desperate pleas and 
bitter curses, all rendered with the pressuring, emotive diction in which nineteenth-
century gothic writers specialized” (84).68 The same “strictly episodic and sensational” 
                                                 
67
 It seems that there have been a few “gothic” criticisms on African-American literary 
works as early as the 1970s. See, for example, Robert Hemenway, “Gothic Sociology: 
Charles Chesnutt and the Gothic Mode,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 7 (1974): 
101-119. 
68
 Doyle counts Douglass’s Narrative as “the most important thematic narrative” (85) 
and thus dissociates it from the “horror stories,” which evinces again her depreciatory 
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depiction of slavery, however, came to receive much more favorable attention beginning 
in the 1990s, when New Historicism hit the field of American literature. Eric J. 
Sundquist offers a good example of this change: “The literature of American slavery 
transplants the language of oppression and liberation from the romantic and gothic 
traditions, where it had been a particular spur to Britain’s successfully antislavery 
movement, into a new national setting where it is bound together with the language of 
American Revolutionary sentiment” (11). Here the gothicity of slave narratives loses its 
earlier shallowness and puts on profundity and seriousness as connected first to 
European literary “traditions” and then to American historical contexts, namely, the 
American Revolution. And all these new connections qualify slave narratives for 
Sundquist’s unhesitating, respectable designation of “the literature of American slavery” 
(emphasis added).69 
 Since Sundquist’s historicizing note on “gothic” slave narratives, literary 
scholars have frequently referred to those gory records as exposing America’s 
inconvenient past. By the mid-1990s, Betty Ann Bergland could simply say that “slave 
narratives expose the institution’s brutality in the land of the free” (87), while Leonard 
                                                                                                                                                
attitude toward the gothic.  
69
 One anonymous British reviewer of 1845 noted the connection between horror and 
slavery in Narrative: “Frederick deals a little in atrocities, though he admits them to be 
exceptions; but they do not make the greatest impression on the reader as to the horrors 
of slavery. This appears rather in the brutish degradation to which the mind of the slave 
is reduced, the destruction of all family ties which is systematically aimed at, and the 
reaction of the ‘institution’ upon the whites themselves, lowering their character, and 
often, according to Douglass, wringing their affections in the case of their Coloured 
children” (qtd. in Douglass, Narrative 86). But to the reviewer the connection was just 
what makes Narrative “singular,” “curious as a picture of slavery,” and “worth reading” 
(qtd. in Douglass, Narrative 87, 88).  
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Cassuto, opining that “Broadly speaking, the history of the slave narrative is the history 
of the development of literary strategies for representing the racial grotesque and the 
slaves’ corresponding strategies for fighting it” (234, emphasis added), makes the gothic 
historicity of slave narratives almost a truism. But it is Teresa A. Goddu’s Gothic 
America (1997) that sublimates these passing remarks into a substantial historico-literary 
discussion. Her book is intended to explore how “the gothic registers its culture’s 
contradictions, presenting a distorted, not a disengaged, version of reality” in American 
history, and its concluding chapter is particularly devoted to discussing how slavery 
“produced gothic narratives during the antebellum period and how these narratives 
reproduced the scene of slavery” (2-3, 132). To Goddu, the gothic is indispensable to 
slave narratives in that, as several African-American historical studies have already 
indicated,70 “the African-American experience, written as a realist text, resembles a 
gothic narrative” (131). Furthermore, Goddu continues, gothic literary conventions 
provide slave writers with a formal and affective means of communicating their 
unspoken and unspeakable experience of slavery to a mostly white audience with no 
such experience,71 thus “unveiling slavery’s horror” (132). There is yet a “catch” for 
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 Goddu especially mentions such works as Theodore Weld’s American Slavery as It Is; 
Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses (1839), Trudier Harris’s Exorcising Blackness: 
Historical and Literary Lynching and Burning Rituals (1984), Neil McMillen’s Dark 
Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow (1989), and Toni Morrison’s 
Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (1992).  
71
 Goddu’s “audience” or readership does not tell the difference between white common 
readers and white abolitionist sponsors, and neither will mine in this chapter. As to slave 
writers’ relationship with the sponsors per se, scholars commonly view it as that of 
another enslavement. See Tyrone Tillery, “The Inevitability of the Douglass-Garrison 
Conflict,” Phylon 37. 2 (1976): 137-149; William L. Andrews, “The First Fifty Years of 
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slave writers. Using gothic codes and modes surely enables them to articulate their 
horrifying experience effectively to readers, but its very effectiveness may as well 
disable them from conveying that experience fully. The strong gothic feeling of horror 
aroused in readers’ minds can deprive the narrative of “the source of its effect”—the 
reality of slavery—and turns that specifically historical writing into “a legend,” or a 
story that, transcending time and space, would be only “imagined instead of 
experienced” (134). To prevent this relocation of “the horror of slavery from the slave’s 
experience to the white viewer’s response,” Goddu claims, “The slave narrative must 
rewrite the conventions of gothic fiction for its own factual ends” (134, 137).   
 In spite of its successful attestation of slave narratives’ inherent affinity with the 
gothic, Goddu’s paradigm of their use of and operation as the gothic begs our question. 
The paradigm states that the gothicity of slave narratives should serve to display the 
writers’ life in slavery as it was, but not inciting too much readers’ imaginative re-
creation of that life. After all, Goddu implies, it is slave writers who have first-hand 
experience and, therefore, who should tell the story of what they saw, heard, and had to 
do and enlighten inexperienced and ignorant readers; if readers, or outsiders, are 
encouraged to envision the life inside slavery on their own, they would “departicularize” 
                                                                                                                                                
the Slave Narrative, 1760-1810,” The Art of Slave Narrative, eds. John Sekora and 
Darwin T. Turner (Macomb: Western Illinois UP, 1982) 6-24; Lucinda H. MacKethan, 
“Metaphors of Mastery in the Slave Narratives”; Raymond Hedin, “Strategies of Form in 
the American Slave Narrative,” The Art of Slave Narrative, 25-35; Sekora, “The 
Dilemma of Frederick Douglass: The Slave Narrative as Literary Institution,” Essays in 
Literature 10. 2 (1983): 219-226, and “Black Message/White Envelope: Genre, 
Authenticity, and Authority in the Antebellum Slave Narrative,” Callaloo 32 (1987): 
482-515; and James Olney, “‘I Was Born.’”    
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that very particular mode of life (135). In other words, Goddu’s paradigm, privileging 
slave writers’ authentic interiority and discrediting their readers’ sympathetic capabilities, 
works in essentialist and dualistic ways. In so doing, it upholds slave writers’ exclusive 
control of the form and content of their narratives, to the point that it renders the 
narratives altogether the Youngian duplication of the writers’ personality.72   
                                                 
72
 To be just, Goddu’s way of reading slave narratives is not unique. Many scholars of 
slave narratives take notice of the writers’ inevitable compromise of their essential 
blackness in writing for the white audience. Stephen T. Butterfield identifies the “black 
experience and the white models” as the “sources of influence on the slave 
autobiographer’s style,” and specifies that those “models” include “the Bible and other 
Christian literature, sermons, editorials in abolitionist newspapers, Websterian and 
Garrisonian oratory, and the antithetical prose style inherited from eighteenth-century 
England” (72). All these models, Butterfield adds, along with an explicitly political 
purpose, work to “reduce experience to a single dimension” (73), but the writers 
managed to counter such circumscription by adopting irony, parody, and satire in 
narration. Raymond Hedin discerns the tension between self-restraint and self-
expression innate in slave narratives, and ascribes it to the complex demands of their 
multifaceted readership: “if southern critics and northern editors moved the narrators 
toward truth as verifiable fact, and toward a correspondingly controlled and understated 
voice in the interests of appearing reliable and safe, the extreme nature of the slaves’ 
experience, the intensity of their own emotional response to that experience, and the 
tastes and expectations of their audience moved them toward truth as emotion, toward 
the extremes of literary romance rather than toward the even-toned middle of restrained 
realism” (“Voices” 134-135). And Carla L. Peterson situates the issue within the broader 
context of nineteenth-century commercialization of American markets: “Slave narrators 
thus discovered that the autobiographical act, far from freeing them from 
commodification, tended to reinforce their status as commodities. In writing their lives, 
they often found that they had created alienated images of themselves. And, in agreeing 
to sell their life experiences on the marketplace, they further exposed themselves to the 
gaze of an alien audience, whether well-intentioned abolitionists, prurient readers 
seeking titillation in the accounts of slave nudity or whippings, or simply those eager to 
consume private lives” (562). Although these readings are not gothic, they share 
Goddu’s perception of slave writers’ authorial consciousness in that they altogether 
assume slave writers’ own experience of slavery to be the essential source of their 
narratives and their conflict with white readers to be ineluctable. Such essentialist 
approaches to slave narratives still pervade, as illustrated by Jon D. Cruz recently: “The 
slave narratives … contain the beginnings of a modern conceptualization of interpreted 
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Another problem with Goddu’s paradigm is that, emphasizing the importance of 
the particular facticity of what slave writers wrote, it fails to account for the conditions 
in which the writers wrote. Strictly speaking, the majority of slave writers, though 
already escaped from the physical circumscription of slavery, were not completely free. 
As scholars including Lynn A. Casmier-Paz correctly point out, the writers were 
officially still fugitives, and “can be found, kidnapped, and returned to slavery” because 
“there was no legal protection for the escaped slave who sought refuge in the North—
even among powerful and influential white abolitionists” (221, 224, fn. 4). Moreover, 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Casmier-Paz adds, “made it a federal offense to help or 
harbor fugitives, and slave owners had the help of federal law enforcement in the capture 
and return of their fugitive ‘property’” (224, fn. 4).73 Finally, slave writers had to deal 
with ongoing racial prejudices even in the free North; Leon F. Litwack reports that 
“Although fundamental differences existed between a condition of legal servitude and 
freedom, municipal, state, and federal statues relegated northern Negroes to a position of 
legal inferiority, while custom and prejudice reduced them to a subservient economic 
and social status. Disfranchised in nearly every state, denied the right to settle in some, 
confined to a diminishing list of menial employments, northern Negroes found 
themselves systematically separated from the white community” (50).74 All these 
                                                                                                                                                
culture that is rooted in (or to be excavated from) the process of proposing a fathomable 
psychocultural interiority,” so they “reveal the inner world of the author, and, by 
extension, of slaves in general” (306, 307).  
73
 The 1850 Act was technically an elaboration of the provisions of the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793. It was the 1793 Act that gave rise to the Underground Railroad. 
74
 Litwack, in the same essay, further focuses on racial prejudices among white 
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historical contexts indicate that, from society’s viewpoint, slave writers were not very 
different from slaves; if, as María del Mar Gallego Durán perceives, slaves are “the 
absence in every single sense of the term” (122) due to their total lack of social, political, 
and legal rights, so are slave writers. But what distinguishes the latter from the former is 
that the writers are, at the same time, the presence, in that they give their testimonies at 
abolitionist meetings and, more important, publish their narratives to the general 
public.75 So slave writers are characterized by a curious type of liminality; they are there, 
audible and legible, but they are also not there, ineffective and unrecognized. Or, the 
same peculiar liminality takes a more distinctly gothic hue if we look at it by using 
Orlando Patterson’s famous definition of a slave as “a socially dead person” (5).76 Then 
slave writers would be ones who are dead but not completely dead, as well as absent yet 
                                                                                                                                                
abolitionists: “abolitionist literature contributed its share to the popular conception of the 
Negro, frequently referring to his meek, servile, comical, minstrel-like qualities” (60). 
75
 For their gothic, or sensational and sentimental story line and images, slave narratives 
were enormously popular, appealing to not just politically driven readers but also 
entertainment-seeking ones. See Charles H. Nichols, “Who Read the Slave Narratives?” 
The Phylon Quarterly 20. 2 (1959): 149-162. Such immense popularity makes it 
reasonable to presume that the writers gained more “presence” with their narratives than 
with their speeches.  
76
 Patterson historicizes that definition in the European context: “in France, Spain, 
England, and the Netherlands a severe form of enslavement of Europeans by Europeans 
was to develop and flourish from the middle of the fifteenth century to well into the 
nineteenth. This was penal slavery, beginning with galley slavery and continuing with its 
replacement by the Bagnes, or penal slavery in public works. … They developed as 
substitutes for the death penalty at a time when there was not a prison system in Europe 
to accommodate the huge number of persons found guilty of capital offenses” (44). It 
seems that such substitution eventually came over to America, as Joan Dayan, talking 
about nineteenth-century American slaves, similarly observes that “The materiality of 
the slave, analogous to that of the civilly dead felon, links both in their status as 
unredeemed corporeality” (417). 
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present. And this (non)dead-ness of slave writers, combined with absent presence, makes 
them analogous to one of the most gothic characters: ghosts.77   
Regarding slave writers as ghosts foregrounds their recourse to and interaction 
with—rather than struggle against—readers. Whereas they write about their life from the 
first-person perspective, the writers could not claim to be the “particular” origin and 
organizer of what they write simply because, as Goddu postulates, they are insiders; it is 
precisely their insider-ness that disqualifies them for such a claim in the outside world. 
By extension, the writers could not verify their own narrative and assert themselves as an 
authoritative author as numerous others have argued78; such traditionally creatorial 
individual agency is fundamentally denied to them since they do not exist as individuals, 
both socially and legally, in the first place. Considering this “particular” condition of 
slave writers, where their writerly selves and words are devoid of autonomy, I propose 
that they write not to author-ize themselves but to be author-ized by readers, who have—
being mostly white—legitimate social identity and legal capacity and thus do exist for 
                                                 
77
 Cassuto explains slave writers’ gothic liminality as the non/human: “Left suspended 
between the categories of person and object, slaves enter a liminal space. As partially 
transformed human/things, they become grotesque. … The slave narrator essentially 
wants to reclaim his or her humanity from those who are trying to take it away” (231). 
78
 To Martha K. Cobb, slave writers’ first-person narration originates in the particular 
“existential reality of [their] black personhood,” and gives them merits of “projecting 
[their] image, ordering [their] experiences, and presenting [their] thoughts in the context 
of [their] own understanding of black reality as it has worked itself out in [their] own 
life” (36, 38). Goddu, together with Craig V. Smith, believes the slave writers, “Born 
into an existential vacuum,” use their narratives for “vocally and textually asserting 
[their] status” in society (824). Nancy Clasby finds a mythical heroic quality in slave 
writers’ self-presentation, where “The author construes personal experience and 
articulates a pattern of crises on a journey from anonymity, to singularity, to archetypal 
significance” (347).  
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real, and whose sympathetic, self-identifying reading can in turn legitimate their 
narratives and concretize their authorial entity. To be exact, Casmier-Paz makes a 
similar point when she sees slave writers as the textual absence that is made present by 
readers. Believing that the narratives constitute a site where “The newly emergent, 
racified body is possible through the inscribed death of the illiterate, ahistorical 
African,” she ascribes that possibility to readers: “slave narratives function as 
representations, or artful ruse, to the extent that readers bring to slave narrative discourse 
their own beliefs and historical needs, which the discourse may then attend, refute, or 
resist” (218, 223). Slave writers, in a word, overcome their social death and obtain 
distinctive sociohistorical attributes by means of imaginative readers with distinctive 
sociohistorical backgrounds. However, in Casmier-Paz’s view, such a relationship 
between the absent writers and present readers is not necessarily an inter-relationship, 
since, being still fugitives, “the ‘resurrection’ of an ongoing identity would be a fatal 
effect” for the former; hence the writers “cannot be found in the writing, but [their] 
absence forces readers to misread, misapprehend, misinterpret, and misplace the writing 
traces left behind” (218, emphasis added). Casmier-Paz’s configuration of readers as 
hunters from whom the writers should run away for their survival as from their former 
owners, echoing Goddu’s dualistic formulation of slave writers and readers, not only 
overshadows her valuable interpolation that “slave narratives prefigure post-
modernism’s trace of the lost subject” (215) but threatens to annihilate our “readerly” 
discussions of slave narratives in general. This chapter aims to disprove that kind of 
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futilely antithetic schematization79 by putting forward the writers’ dependence on and 
dynamic with readers. This aim does put me in line with Casmier-Paz insofar as it shares 
her disagreement with the scholarly ideation of the writers’ association with readers as 
their subjection or enslavement to the “white” language and culture. But the aim 
simultaneously differentiates me from her in a sense that it treats that association as a 
productive means for the writers to not just rise from their historical and ontological 
spectrality through readers but realize a different type of authorship along with readers.80 
With this goal in mind, I now turn to Douglass whose Narrative, undoubtedly the most 
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 Recently we have a modified version of this binary oppositional positioning of slave 
writers and readers. Both Michael Newbury and Sterling Lecater Bland, Jr., point out 
how antebellum audience’s voracious literary appetites and curiosities, as well as rapidly 
expanding literary markets, threatened to consume and (re)enslave celebrity (slave) 
writers symbolically. See Newbury, “Eaten Alive: Slavery and Celebrity in Antebellum 
America,” Figuring Authorship in Antebellum America (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997) 
79-118, and Bland, Epilogue, Voices of the Fugitives: Runaway Slave Stories and Their 
Fictions of Self-Creation (Westport: Greenwood, 2000) 159-163.  
80
 Many scholars contend that slave writers, using the white language for a white 
audience, inevitably end up embracing a white-American version of selfhood. The best 
known among them is probably Houston A. Baker, Jr., who, in his discussion of 
Douglass in The Journey Back (1980), maintains that “Had there been a separate, written 
black language available, Douglass might have fared better,” but “the nature of the 
autobiographer’s situation seemed to force him to move to a public version of the self—
one molded by the values of white America” (39). Baker, Jr.’s words, once again, 
betoken the persistence of essentialist assumptions within ethnic studies, which, of 
course, may trace back to W. E. B. Du Bois’s well-known formulation of “double-
consciousness” in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). See also Annette Niemtzow’s 
evaluation of Douglass: “By choosing to write, at a time when most blacks, still slaves in 
America, were not literate, he has offered a move of assent toward structuring a self for 
white readers,” that is, he “has adopted a white definition of selfhood, and tries to attain 
it” (101).  
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representative nineteenth-century American slave narrative,81 would make an equally 
representative example of such an authorship.   
In accordance with the reputation of his masterpiece, Douglass himself has been 
respectfully called “The Representative Colored Man of the United States” (Gates, Jr., 
99). And, not surprisingly, his authorship has been frequently imbued with self-
construction, self-empowerment, and self-endorsement.82 Cassuto makes prominent this 
scholarly attitude: “Although he knows that he has been objectified in the eyes of others, 
Douglass does not see himself as (socially) dead—and so the reader does not see him 
that way, either. … Because Douglass is a person, and because he is telling his own story 
from his own vantage point, the rhetorical power given by his own perspective makes 
the decisive difference in his fight to be perceived as human” (238). Cassuto’s words, it 
should be noted, portray Douglass as a charismatic self-made author by distinguishing 
him from the majority of “socially dead” slave writers of the time. This distinction, 
which betokens the prevalence of the Youngian conception of sovereign authorship in 
the discourse on nineteenth-century American literary canons,83 de-historicizes 
                                                 
81
 Even though Douglass published three autobiographical accounts in his life time, 
scholars seem to generally take sides with Peter Ripley, who calls Narrative “perhaps the 
most influential and best received exslave autobiography of the antebellum era” (14). 
82
 Robert B. Stepto praises Douglass’s Narrative as “offer[ing] what is unquestionably 
our best portrait in Afro-American letters of the requisite act of assuming authorial 
control” (26). Olney and George P. Cunningham, respectively, assess the work as 
Douglass’s “declaration of independence” (“Fathers” 6) and as a record of his “self-
induced metamorphosis from object to subject” (109). Goddu, along with Smith., 
succinctly proclaims that “When Douglass writes his Narrative in 1845, he authorizes 
himself” (825), which Carole A. Raybourn later restates that Douglass “wrote himself 
into being” (34). 
83
 As another indication of this prevalence, Douglass has been very often compared to 
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Douglass’s literary performance and misrepresents his “representative” quality as a 
nineteenth-century American slave writer. Not unlike his contemporaries, Douglass, 
around the time of the publication of Narrative, was a fugitive slave who was “writing 
‘illegally’ according to state laws” (Goddu and Smith 840). Also, not unlike those 
contemporaries, his words had no innate force or effect in that his several, warmly 
received abolitionist lectures for the public did not spare him from writing the narrative 
to ascertain that he was a real person and that he had been a real slave.84 Lastly, not 
unlike a number of the period’s slave writers, Douglass was a mulatto, whose social 
position might have been more ambiguous and more disturbing than that of a “black.”85 
                                                                                                                                                
the prototypical “self-made” author-figure of American literary tradition: Benjamin 
Franklin. See Andrew Levy; and Rafia Zafar, “Franklinian Douglass: The Afro-
American as Representative Man,” Frederick Douglass: New Literary and Historical 
Essays, 99-117. Stephen Matterson makes clear the canonization of Douglass implicated 
in this scholarly perspective: “his narrative is an already familiar, even canonical one, a 
form of conversion narrative or a success narrative of becoming and self-fulfilment [sic] 
akin to the Autobiography of Benjamin Frankln” (84).    
84
 Many critics concur with Gregory S. Jay’s account that “the success, inventiveness, 
confidence, linguistic power, and complexity of his speeches … prompted doubts about 
Douglass’s claim to being an ex-slave, a suspicion that finally motivated the writing of 
the Narrative” (231-232). Purported to prove Douglass’s exceptional rhetorical power 
and literacy, this account ironically testifies to the ineffectuality of slave writers’ words 
(Douglass’s verbal words were not easily accepted by the public). Indeed, Albert E. 
Stone informs us that “Douglass’s Narrative was labeled a fraud soon after publication” 
(198). Note as well Douglass’s own words about the legal force of a slave’s testimony in 
“The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro” (1852): “His own testimony is nothing” 
(199). 
85
 It is intriguing to see that Douglass as a mulatto has been seldom pinpointed; he has 
been, rather, usually known as an “African-American” or “black” writer. Whereas it is 
possible to say that both blacks and mulattoes were altogether outsiders to nineteenth-
century American white-centered society, I suspect that this collective neglect or silence 
might also symptomize a scholarly disposition to “de-particularize” Douglass so as to 
typify him further as a “representative” figure. In this light, Gates, Jr.’s above expression, 
“Colored Man,” seems to be more observant.   
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All these facts add up to Douglass’s ontological uncertainty and liminality shared with 
his fellow slave writers, and hint at another “representative” dimension in his writing of 
Narrative. And it is that dimension that my ensuing analysis of Narrative will make 
patent, by demonstrating how an allegedly incompetent and incapable “slave writer” 
achieves authorship by virtue of readers’ construction of his authorial identity based on 
their reading of his account of his life (and this is my counterpoint to Cassuto’s above 
comment on Douglass “telling his own story from his own vantage point”). In the course 
of my analysis, the narrative will turn out to be a self-story without a self, which means, 
an abnormal autobiographical story86 where an autobiographical subject talks about itself 
without imposing on readers any single version of itself, and where that simultaneously 
present and absent, or ghostly personal subject is re-born as a publicly recognized, real 
being in cooperation with readers.87 
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 Some point out the lack of the autobiographical selfhood in Narrative as well as slave 
narratives. William W. Nichols says that Douglass’s autobiographical narratives do not 
register “the sovereignty of the individual will,” unlike most American autobiographies 
(158). Baker, Jr., in both “Problem” and Journey Back, insists on slave writers’ lack of 
an a priori self, the very element that makes autobiography possible at all. To Niemtzow, 
the slave narrative, “recapturing a self that the slave wishes to cast off, and … in a search 
for a self capable of blooming into an admirable adult,” cannot but violate the typical 
autobiographical assumption of “an implicit identity between the writer and the 
protagonist” (96, 97). Sekora perceives the absence in ideologically intended slave 
narratives of the autobiographical “creation of a self” by writing, and labels Narrative 
“the first comprehensive, personal history of American slavery” (“Comprehending” 159, 
169). And Casmier-Paz discusses how slave narrators with multiple names complicate 
what Philippe Lejeune calls the “autobiographical pact,” or the presumed equation of the 
authorial name on the cover of a book to that of the real author.   
87
 By saying this, I disagree with the critical reading of Narrative as depicting a tension 
between Douglass’s private and public selves, which is, again, essentialistically binary 
oppositional. To me, as slave writers’ achievement of any social reality starts with their 
transaction with readers in their autobiographical narratives, so their private and personal 
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Narrative directs our attention to Douglass’s cooperative association with readers 
quite early on, as it makes clear the presence of its readers even before its main text 
begins. Narrative is prefixed with the Preface by illustrious abolitionist and Douglass’s 
mentor William Lloyd Garrison and a letter from another famed abolitionist Wendell 
Phillips. These preliminaries by two well-known public figures are, following the 
convention of slave narratives,88 intended to give “suitable assurances to the audience 
before permitting an Afro-American to address them” (Matlack 18). To that end 
Garrison and Phillips present a description of Douglass’s personality, which is, 
significantly, relevant to their reading of the manuscript of Narrative. Garrison’s 
insistence on Douglass’s “true manliness of character” as well as “gentleness and 
meekness” is buttressed by his evaluation of Douglass’s narrative that “it is essentially 
true in all its statements; that nothing has been set down in malice, nothing exaggerated, 
                                                                                                                                                
selves are inseparable. See Baker, Jr., who, in both “Problem” and Journey Back, 
contends that, by using the white language, Douglass lost his authentic black selfhood 
and became a public, white being; John Burt, who propounds that Douglass intends to 
build up his “citizenship” rather than his “selfhood” in “Learning to Write: The Narrative 
of Frederick Douglass,” Western Humanities Review 42 (1988): 330-344; and Donald B. 
Gibson, who finds Douglass trying “to sustain balance between the public and private 
focus” in the narrative (553).  
Those who give attention to Douglass’s absence in Narrative as well take it 
mostly as a sign of his authority. See Lindon Barrett, who regards Douglass’s increasing 
disembodiment as his “rendition of himself as the shaping agent and intellect of the text” 
(433) and bestows him with a Foucauldian invisible power. 
88
 For studies of the formal conventions of slave narratives, see Barbara Foley, “History, 
Fiction, and the Ground Between: The Uses of the Documentary Mode in Black 
Literature,” PMLA 95. 3 (1980): 389-403; Eugene Terry, “Black Autobiography—
Discernible Forms,” Okike: An African Journal of New Writing 19 (1981): 6-10; and 
Marva J. Furman, “The Slave Narrative: Prototype of the Early Afro-American Novel,” 
The Art of Slave Narrative, 120-126 
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nothing drawn from the imagination” (5, 7).89 And Phillips’s “most entire confidence in 
[Douglass’s] truth, candor, and sincerity” results from not just having known Douglass 
personally but having finished the manuscript and come to believe that “every one who 
reads your book will feel, persuaded that you give them a fair specimen of the whole 
truth” (10-11). As such, Garrison’s and Phillips’s Narrative-based representations of 
who Douglass is foreshadow how readers should help form an authorial character of the 
powerless and ghostlike Douglass by their reading of his narrative.90   
Yet Garrison’s and Phillip’s representations likewise serve as negative cases of 
such a reading act, for the way those two readers create Douglass’s persona hampers 
other readers’ creative attempts. Garrison pinpoints specific episodes of his choice, 
including Douglass’s soliloquy on the Chesapeake Bay and merciless murders of slaves 
by a white master and a white overseer, and attaches specifically abolitionist 
connotations to them. And Phillips, though less specific than Garrison, plays the same 
tune with the use of overtly Christian metaphors like “the most neglected of God’s 
children” for slaves (10). In so doing, Garrison and Phillips alike obscure Douglass’s 
personal historical particularity and compose his image as an ahistorical, universal 
abolitionist and Christian hero.91 Then, backed up by their reputation as leading political 
                                                 
89
 Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, 
Written by Himself, eds. William L. Andrews and William S. McFeely (New York: 
Norton, 1997). All references to this source will be from this edition.  
90
 Stone also observes “a dramatic presentation of himself by another” in the Preface and 
the letter, but finds its “advantage” in “dealing at once with the reader’s possible 
imputation of vanity” (199). 
91
 David Leverenz also observes Garrison’s delineation of Douglass as “the type of the 
Christ-like, tormented slave, bonded to his fellow sufferers rather than to his readers” 
  
143 
activists, they put forth that image as a definite one while annulling any other images of 
Douglass as (politically) incorrect. Consequently, Garrison’s and Phillip’s readings of 
Narrative restrict a possibly wider range of readers’ imaginative invention of Douglass.     
Again, in accordance with the generic code of nineteenth-century American slave 
narratives, Garrison and Phillip’s creative yet restrictive readership92 was requisite to 
Douglass’s first public appearance as a slave writer. Facing that dilemma, Douglass, in 
his own portion of writing in Narrative, attempts at once to lessen the restrictive effect of 
the two initial readers and to enhance their creative side so as to foster a larger number 
of readers’ involvement in the making of his authorial being. More specifically, 
Douglass recounts his experience with utmost particularity, so that although readers, as 
outsiders of the system of slavery, have not actually undergone what he did as an insider, 
they can still vicariously do so. As the main text of Narrative begins, we see Douglass 
telling that he knows only where he was born but not how old he is or who his father is. 
Critics have normally understood his relation as marking his ontological void as a slave: 
to Cunningham, “Frederick Douglass could not begin his story with the assumption that 
he was always already a subject,” so “Instead, he opens with negation” (112); and Durán 
discerns in the relation “the lack of any literate documentation of his existence” (123). 
                                                                                                                                                
(355).  
92
 Saying this, I differ from the critical focus on Garrison’s (but not Phillips’s) de-
individualization of Douglass in the Preface. See Leverenz, who says that “Garrison’s 
expectations give Douglass little room for complex individuality, and almost no room for 
aggressiveness or imagination” (356), and Goddu and Smith, who claim that “His 
‘Preface,’ addressed to the reader, … does strive for discursive authority” as it “tries to 
determine our reading of the Narrative—and indeed our vision of Douglass—by 
preempting him” (831). It should be noted as well that neither Leverenz nor Goddu and 
Smith mention the creative aspect of Garrison’s and Phillips’s writings about Douglass. 
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Whereas I agree with Cunningham and Durán’s point that Douglass starts his writing 
with and upon his existential vacuum, I would go a step further and contend that 
Douglass is inviting readers into that vacuum to write it out for him. At the opening, 
Douglass gives us very concise yet detailed information of his birthplace: “I was born in 
Tuckahoe, near Hillsborough, and about twelve miles from Easton, in Talbot county, 
Maryland” (12). Thanks to this geographical and factual information, the void of the 
opening section does not remain meaningless emptiness but gets framed by actual 
contexts that makes signification possible. Hence, when readers set out to read 
Douglass’s first-person account of his self, they are furnished with a historical ground 
for their interpretation of it. And, Douglass expects, readers’ historically grounded 
interpretations would generate a historically delineated identity for his current flimsy, 
spectral one.93       
Douglass puts into practice this expectation in his recounting of the whipping of 
Aunt Hester. He tells us that Captain Anthony, his first master, got jealous of his slave 
Aunt Hester’s secret rendezvous with another male slave and whipped her harshly, and 
that he watched the whole scene while hiding in a closet, afraid of being the next victim. 
Many critics have designated the episode as the most gothic moment of Narrative, in that 
                                                 
93
 Stone detects Douglass’s pursuit of historical selfhood out of a self-directing motive: 
“The process from first to last is the creation of an historical self. ‘I was born in 
Tuckahoe …’ So begins his story … Under slavery, man possesses no such historic 
identity as name, date, place of birth or residence usually provide. Douglass has 
achieved these hallmarks of historicity, has attached himself to time, place, society” 
(201). Lillie Butler Jugurtha discerns Douglass’s gesture of “moving the story slightly 
away from [himself], by describing a place” at the opening of Narrative, but explains it 
as his gesture of recounting his “exemplary” story of slavery (110-111). 
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its gruesome content strongly appeals to readers’ sense of horror and stimulates their 
emotional identification with Douglass, who is “so terrified and horror-stricken” at the 
sight he has never seen before (15). As Stephen Matterson states, the episode serves for 
“both [Douglass’s] and the reader’s introduction to the cruel treatment of individual 
slaves” (83-84, emphasis added). However, Douglass also promotes in this gothic scene 
more than readers’ horror-driven empathy with him. He refers to the scene as “a most 
terrible spectacle” that makes it impossible for him to “commit to paper the feelings with 
which I beheld it” (15). Yet he proceeds and delineates that scene in detail, to the point 
that he can recollect in a calm tone how “the warm, red blood (amid heart-rending 
shrieks from her, and horrid oaths from him) came dripping to the floor” (15).94 Here, 
Douglass’s minutely descriptive delineation of the whipping while being mute about his 
“feelings” renders him a mere reporter of his own experience and distances him from his 
own text. As a result, Douglass’s narratorial stance becomes, paradoxically, non-
participant as well as participant, or absent as well as present. Douglass’s paradoxical 
                                                 
94
 Some critics have discussed this mixture of a strong sentiment of terror and a poised 
manner of narration in terms of Douglass’s endeavor to expose the horror of slavery 
realistically and sharably. Hedin regards the mixture as a sign of “heightened realism,” 
which was “the best solution the slave narrators found to the problem of conveying 
strong emotion without drawing too much attention to themselves” (“Voices” 137). So 
the narrators, Hedin goes on, could “keep their narratives socially acceptable” and 
“achieve real power by their very indirection—but at considerable cost to the instinctive 
expression of human emotion and to the development of their own literary voice” 
(“Voices” 137). Terry Martin, finding that “Douglass simply lingers long enough in his 
description to register such horrors fully before passing on to others,” analogizes 
Douglass’s narrative viewpoint to “that of a naturalistic novel in which no resurrection is 
possible and the universe remains flatly indifferent to human suffering” (2). To Goddu, 
Douglass emphasizes how “Aunt Hester is ‘literally’ covered with blood” for he is 
“rewrit[ing] the gothic as actual horror instead of stage effect” (139).   
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stance, easily overlapping with his ghostlike liminal state of being in society, in turn 
works to allow readers to step into his narrative and play the normative narratorial role in 
his stead. Because readers have been already emotionally identified with Douglass due 
to the gothic, horror-evoking effect of the whipping scene, they can fill up the emotional 
blank in his narration made by his inability to “commit to paper the feelings.” In so 
doing, Douglass’s minutely descriptive delineation of the scene would only enhance the 
reality and particularity of readers’ narratorial re-presentation of his “feelings.”  
Such writerly identification of readers with Douglass—or outsiders-readers’ 
entrance into the empirical domain of the insider-slave writer—does not, as Goddu 
maintains, “abstract the horror by turning it into a timeless trope of terror” (138), thanks 
to the particularity of Douglass’s narration. To begin with, the incident happens between 
the two particular personages—Captain Anthony, who got that title “by sailing a craft on 
the Chesapeake Bay,” and Aunt Hester, who was “a woman of noble form, and of 
graceful proportions” and who was seeing Ned Roberts, a slave of a superior of Captain 
Anthony, Colonel Lloyd (14, 15)—not between some master and some slave. And it is 
described by another particular figure, Douglass, who has been already firmly situated 
within certain geo-historical backgrounds at the beginning of the narrative. Finally, the 
incident is described through Douglass’s particularly defined narratorial vision. In his 
recollection, Douglass is concealing himself in the closet and watching the bloody 
transaction by way of some sort of chasm, like a crack in the closet door, with a 
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voyeuristic concentration as well as an appalling shock.95 This heightened focus, 
captivating and fixating readers’ gaze on what Douglass is watching, helps readers feel 
as if they were Douglass’s autobiographical self, situated at the very moment when 
Captain Anthony was whipping Aunt Hester. As such, Douglass’s narration of the 
Hester episode enables readers to form a sufficiently particular authorial identity for him 
through their emotional and (virtually) physical identification with his otherwise barely 
existing, ghostly autobiographical self even from the outside.    
Douglass underscores more strongly the importance of outsiders-readers’ 
signification and legitimation of his inside, self-insufficient experience when he 
contemplates slave songs. He recalls how those slaves who were chosen to run errands to 
the Great House Farm—the headquarters of Colonel Lloyd’s plantation empire—used to 
“compose and sing” songs about their enslaved life on their way through the woods (18). 
The songs would contain “words which to many would seem unmeaning jargon, but 
which, nevertheless, were full of meaning to themselves” (19). Douglass “did not, when 
a slave, understand the deep meaning of those rude and apparently incoherent songs,” 
since he was too young, and, furthermore, resided “within the circle” where he “neither 
saw nor heard as those without might see and hear” (19). But now he can “trace my first 
glimmering conception of the dehumanizing character of slavery” to those songs, and 
express his utter astonishment, drawing on “my experience,” “to find persons who could 
                                                 
95
 Some critics like Ben Slote configure this image as that of a peeping Tom, and take it 
as betokening “Douglass’s own, voyeuristic exploitation of the violence” to “mark his 
own narrative progress—‘the blood-stained gate … through which’ he is passing” (30). 
As Slote’s emphasis on “he” marks, this way of imagining Douglass does not take into 
account the reader-incorporating effect of his relation of the Hester episode. 
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speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their contentment and happiness” (19). 
Quite predictably, several critics have construed this reminiscence in a dichotomous 
manner. James Matlack takes it as illustrating a “spirit of double-entendre,” which refers 
to an African-American cultural characteristic that “Outward contentment and surface 
meanings, perennially misread by whites, have often been contradicted by deeper 
feelings and private symbolism” (19), and insinuates Douglass’s interpretive authority in 
revealing that spirit within slave songs for white “mis”-readers. Jon D. Cruz, amplifying 
Matlack’s insinuation, maintains that Douglass counters contemporary whites’ 
observations, or “meanings imposed from the outside,” on the black culture by 
“open[ing] up the interior sensibility of slaves” hidden in the songs and telling “his 
readers just how to conduct the analysis” (308, 310). In sum, Cruz concludes, “He pulled 
back the veil of slave culture” (314). To concur with Matlack and Cruz, however, we see 
the division between Douglass the insider and his white readers the outsiders too 
explicitly complicated in Douglass’s narration. That complication is initially found in the 
fact that he, being “within the circle,” could not comprehend slave songs “as those 
without” would do and obviously gives much credit to the outside for getting hold of the 
life inside slavery. Of course, one might agree with Steven Mailloux, who says that by 
“those without” Douglass means escaped slaves like himself who come to acquire a 
physical and perceptive distance necessary to make sense of the past in autobiographical 
slave narratives, and that he is therefore confirming his authorial “authority … not 
simply because he was a slave but because he is now an escaped slave” (10). But such an 
argument soon turns out to be defective as Douglass does nothing to register his 
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authority of that sort. As Daniel J. Royer correctly points out, Douglass, in his relation of 
slave songs, “never does offer an interpretation to substitute for the experience itself” 
(371). Instead, Douglass promptly moves on to say that “If any one wishes to be 
impressed with the soul-killing effects of slavery, let him go to Colonel Lloyd’s 
plantation, and … place himself in the deep pine woods, and there let him, in silence, 
analyze the sounds” of the songs (19, emphasis added). Saying this, Douglass is at once 
refusing to give the purely internal account for the songs and asking readers to take the 
position of his autobiographical and narratorial self and come up with accounts of their 
own for him.96 By the same token, his earlier formulation of “those without” comes to 
mean his readers outside “the circle” of slavery and to call for their imaginative re-
presentation of his experience.  
Douglass’s call for his readers continues even when he registers his astonishment 
at the idea that the songs signify slaves’ jolliness. Though mentioning his “experience” 
that he used to sing for sadness, he does not expand the mention any further; rather, he 
proceeds and finalizes his point by analogizing slaves’ singing to “The singing of a man 
cast away upon a desolate island” (19). This de-racialized analogy, itself being an 
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 Though Royer, like I do, views Douglass’s reader-incorporating gesture here as “a 
creative response to the need to recontextualize himself upon his emergence from 
slavery” (371), his view is ultimately subsumed under his larger argument that Douglass 
tries to re-connect himself with his black community in Narrative. See Barrett for 
another way of arguing how Douglass’s reader-invitation in the song episode conduces 
to the blurring of racial boundaries: “the odd address to his readers compromises any 
apparent immediacy to racial blackness,” for “Where one is led to expect pure racial 
blackness, one finds appeals to whiteness, so that the stark racial distinction paramount 
to the narrative and to the cultural and political intrigue the narrative report emerges, in 
these textual moments, as troublingly imprecise and unreliable” (“Experiences” 32-33). 
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example of reading the inner realm of slavery from the outside standpoint, de-stresses 
Douglass’s essential “experience” as an insider and de-privileges a dichotomous 
approach to slaves’ life stories. In this manner, Douglass boosts readers’ interpretive 
participation in his narrative and sympathetic reenactment of his ghostly self in it.   
Aptly enough, the two most frequently discussed parts of Narrative center around 
the same kind of participation and reenactment by readers. The first one is the episode of 
Douglass’s fight with Edward Covey, a notorious “nigger-breaker” (42). After having 
lived with Hugh Auld’s family at Baltimore for years, Douglass came into the 
possession of Thomas Auld at St. Michael’s to be a field hand for the first time in his life. 
To make him suitable for that use, Thomas Auld sends him to Covey, whose beastly 
treatment almost breaks him physically and spiritually. But Douglass’s bold 
confrontation with and defeat of Covey turns the table, and he would not have to endure 
any more abuse from Covey afterwards. To numerous critics, this incident signifies 
Douglass’s single-handed self-transformation into a self-confident subject and his 
yearning for autonomous authority. And they usually find themselves supported by 
Douglass’s own declarative statement that opens his recital of the fight: “You have seen 
how a man was made a slave; you shall see how a slave was made a man” (47). For 
example, Albert E. Stone believes that the statement encapsulates Douglass’s re-
fashioning of himself as a free man and works as both “the turning-point of his life” and 
“a microcosm of the whole Narrative” (208). James Olney similarly deems the statement 
to imply that “Through the power of his narrative, as through his resistance to Covey’s 
‘nigger-breaking’ tactics, Douglass calls himself from nonexistence into existence, the 
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‘onlie begetter’ of his own manhood” (“Fathers” 5). Yet these critical opinions do not 
take into consideration one notable aspect about Douglass’s portrayal of the fight. As 
Donald B. Gibson properly takes notice and fully analyzes, Douglass hardly gives us 
either “reference to his emotional response” and “description of the pain,” or the detail 
of “what [he] was doing or thinking during the beating” (564, emphasis added); he 
chiefly talks about how he subdues “puffing and blowing” Covey by seizing and kicking 
him hard, and how he comes to feel “a sense of my own manhood” and “a determination 
to be free” after the fight (50). “The reader is,” Gibson continues, “thus invited to supply 
from the resources of his own imagination the missing currents of thought and feeling” 
during that critical incident (564).97 If so, I would add that Douglass’s invitation of 
readers into his storytelling is precisely what is inscribed in his key sentence that “You 
have seen how a man was made a slave; you shall see how a slave was made a man.” 
Not to mention “Douglass’s use of direct address to a reading audience” as in “You have 
seen” and “you shall see” (MacKethan 65),98 the sentence is grammatically characterized 
with passivity: “how a man was made a slave” and “how a slave was made a man” 
(emphasis added). Combining these two characteristics together, we now have a new, 
reader-centered meaning of the sentence, which is that Douglass wants his readers, not 
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 To Gibson, however, Douglass’s reader-inviting narration is only to show that “The 
true climax of the autobiography is the private, psychological one, explicitly revealing 
the formation on Douglass’ part of a new consciousness, a different awareness and sense 
of self, and a firm resolve for the future” (554). 
98
 But MacKethan goes further and says that “The transformation is a linguistic event, 
accomplished by language in a territory that demands and so invokes readers to witness 
and thus confirm the transaction” (65, emphasis added), and that thus upholds 
Douglass’s authoritarian disposition.  
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himself, to be active agencies for him by “seeing” or reading his narrative and “making” 
him “a man” out of “a slave.” If so, again, we can see how readers’ “reading” and 
“making” of Douglass becomes the real “microcosm of the whole Narrative.” 
The other part where Douglass incorporates readers into Narrative is the account 
of his long-desired escape from slavery. As it is, this part occupies the climax of the 
narrative, yet not in a typical sense.99 The atypicality comes from Douglass’s reticence 
about exactly how he escaped, which he justifies by saying that “I would keep the 
merciless slaveholder profoundly ignorant of the means of flight adopted by the slave” 
(66). Not satisfied with his justification, critics have dwelled on his reticence per se100 
and reached the consensus that, borrowing Lucinda H. MacKethan’s words, the reticence 
bespeaks Douglass’s “sheer exercise of mastery” over his text (“Metaphors” 59). John 
Sekora extends MacKethan’s point by claiming that Douglass’s silence is “an assertion 
of personal control within a mandated form” of slave narratives because “Only he can 
write this section, not Garrison or Phillips; only he knows what is being withheld” 
(“Comprehending” 167).101 And Lindon Barrett modifies Sekora by considering 
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 Matlack differs: “By giving no details of what otherwise would be the climax of the 
story, more emphasis is thrown back on the consequences of Douglass’ fight with Covey 
and the mental attitudes required for such a flight” (22-23). 
100
 To be sure, as Doyle reports, it seems that in lots of nineteenth-century American 
slave narratives “the escape at the end is recounted briefly so as not to obscure the focus 
on slavery but only to sharpen it by contrast to the joy of freedom” (84). But still “the 
escape portion of a slave narrative would have been eagerly awaited as the most 
suspenseful and thrilling segment” (MacKethan, “Metaphors” 59), and was “an element 
of the narrative that had made it one of the most popular literary forms in American in 
the 1840s” (Sekora, “Comprehending” 166-167). In this respect, Douglass’s total silence 
about the detail sets Narrative apart from those narratives and demands our attention. 
101
 About the fact that Douglass eventually gave the detail of his escape in his later two 
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Douglass’s readership and maintaining that “Douglass denies the expected climax of his 
narrative in order to announce and display his mastery over his readers … as master and 
withholder of important information” (433). While I share these critics’ belief in the 
significance of Douglass’s silence, I reject their assumption (which especially becomes 
clear in Barrett’s account) of his antipathy toward his readers. And, in truth, so does 
Douglass. He does not merely persist in his silence but attaches the following remark, 
which Douglass critics have neglected to mention in their promotion of the masterful 
Douglass:  
It was a most painful situation; and, to understand it, one must needs  
experience it, or imagine himself in similar circumstances. Let him be a  
fugitive slave in a strange land—a land given up to be the hunting-ground for  
slaveholders— … I say, let him place himself in my situation—without home  
or friends—without money or credit— … I say, let him be placed in this most  
trying situation,--the situation in which I was placed—then, and not till then,  
will he fully appreciate the hardships of, and know how to sympathize with,  
the toil-worn and whip-scarred fugitive slave. (69-70)    
Owing to this passage, where Douglass plainly and repetitively speaks his intent to “let” 
others “imagine” and “place” themselves “in [his] situation” that he depicts in detail, his 
silence about how he ran away from slavery converts to his most persuasive exhortation 
of, and strongest trust in, outsiders-readers’ sympathetic, self-identifying reading of his 
                                                                                                                                                
autobiographical writings, Sekora maintains that “Only he can decide the proper time for 
its release” (“Comprehending” 167). 
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inside self-story. In this light, the silence denotes Douglass’s practically voiceless and 
absent-present, or spectral existence as a fugitive slave writer that should come into a 
free authorial being with voice and presence with the aid of his readers.102  
Yet the reader-dependent foundation of Douglass’s author-ity becomes most 
evident in his relation of how he got his current name, “Frederick Douglass.” Before that 
name, Douglass tells us, he had had various other names from “Frederick Augustus 
Washington Bailey,” which his mother had given him, to “Frederick Johnson,” under 
which he got married in New York after his escape. But on his arrival at abolitionist 
Nathan Johnson’s in New Bedford in search of further safety, Douglass felt that he 
should need another name as “there were so many Johnsons” in that city, including the 
host, and “it was already quite difficult to distinguish between them” (71-72). He “gave 
Mr. Johnson the privilege of choosing me a name” but on one condition: “Frederick” 
must stay, so that he could “preserve a sense of my identity” (72). And Mr. Johnson, 
based on that condition and his reading of Sir Walter Scott’s The Lady of the Lake 
(1810), which features Lord James of Douglas as its protagonist, came up with 
“Frederick Douglass” (72). This anecdote, recording that “the moment when freedom is 
finally felt to be irrecoverable coincides precisely with a ceremonious exchange of slave 
surname for an agnomen designating a literally liberated ‘self’” (Benston 3), has 
                                                 
102
 In another opinions on Douglass’s silence, Keith Byerman pays more heed to 
Douglass’s justification and interprets his silence as “the source of black magical effects 
on the slaveholder” and the token of his essential blackness (75). To Ann Kibbey, the 
silence “declares the invisible and unspoken presence of the enslaved; for rhetorically it 
represents the presence of the human being concealed in the language of slavery” (180). 
Goddu and Smith concur with Kibbey when they take Douglass’s silence as his creation 
of “a ‘protection’ for future slaves who will follow him” (834). 
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engendered a considerable amount of critical commentary. And most critics meet at the 
common point that “Frederick Douglass,” though he has not created the name, still 
marks Douglass’s ability and authority to identify himself inasmuch as he has “chosen” 
the name. Kimberly W. Benston adds that “Social and economic freedom—a truly new 
self—was incomplete if not authenticated by self-designation” (3). MacKethan infers 
that Douglass was “perhaps finding a compliment in its reference to such a manly hero” 
as Douglas, “a noble Scottish chieftain exiled in the Highlands” (67). After all, 
MacKethan goes on, “The power to take a name, any name, for himself was surely what 
mattered most. That the name was an allusive one extending into a heroic text would 
only increase its value” (67). David Leverenz elaborates on MacKethan as well as 
Benston: “he chose Douglass [sic] … a paragon of unflinching fortitude in adversity. 
Leaving behind his mother’s name of Bailey, just as he left slavery behind, he renames 
himself from a manly text. The literariness of his choice itself bespeaks an upwardly 
mobile self-reliance severing his identity from social bonds” (362). And to Cunningham, 
“The name, ‘Frederick Douglass,’ is the symbol of its possessor’s struggle toward 
subjectivity, and the Narrative of 1845 establishes Douglass’s claim of a right to that 
name and of a right to name” (129).103   
                                                 
103
 Unlike these critics, Niemtzow perceives that Douglass being named by “a white man 
and a poem by a white man” confirms how “all definitions of self are defined by whites” 
(102). But, not unlike these critics, she underlines Douglass’s autonomy by saying that 
“To acquire a self, he sacrifices his tie to a past which does not provide access to the 
white world” and that “Douglass invents (in the Renaissance sense) a self recognizable 
to himself and to his white readers by the end of the tale” (102).  
 Among those who focus on Douglass’s various names, Daneen Wardrop at first 
observes that “His multiplicity of names demonstrates the difficulty of negotiating a 
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Just as in their reading of Douglass’s reticence, however, critics’ reading of his 
name overlooks a very crucial point in favor of his individual agency. According to 
Douglass, he did not instantly “choose” the name when Mr. Johnson suggested it. Rather, 
he reports, “From that time [of Mr. Johnson’s suggestion] until now I have been called 
‘Frederick Douglass’; and as I am more widely known by that name than by either of the 
others, I shall continue to use it as my own” (72). In other words, Douglass has 
eventually accepted the name “as his own” primarily because he has been accepted—
“called” and “known”—to others by that name.104 And, as implied in the phrase, “more 
widely known by that name than by either of the others,” the name was basically other 
people’s “choice” among his various names. Besides, if those people, as their knowledge 
of Douglass’s earlier names hints, would have made their choice according to their 
knowledge of his story as a fugitive slave, we can say that their choice of “Frederick 
                                                                                                                                                
racist logos,” but ultimately argues that “Douglass finds his way, at least partially, 
through such a labyrinth, by renaming himself” (656, 657).  
104
 Casmier-Paz similarly views “Frederick Douglass” as “a creation that merges his 
given name—the name given him by his mother—with another name, which is likewise 
‘given’ to him by someone else,” but soon places emphasis on how “Throughout the 
narrative Frederick Douglass discards old identities and old names as easily as he could 
discard old clothes, and fashions new identities and new names which signal his 
independence from the chains of a slave owner’s patronymic and its hold upon the 
former slave” (220, 221, emphasis added). Matterson shows the same attention to 
Douglass’s “acceptance” of the name, which “seems to strike a neat balance between his 
sense of established identity and his willingness to assimilate”: “The figure after whom 
Douglass is named, Lord James of Douglas, is a rebel, an outlaw who comes eventually 
to be reconciled with the king. Symbolically, then, the name is that of the outlaw who is 
reformed and who accepts the imposition of outside authority” (87-88). However, he 
ultimately considers Douglass as one of the African-American “apologists for 
themselves as deviants from the standards of nineteenth-century white middle-class 
American society,” who, “In seeking to justify their behavior … are, though in different 
ways, entreating a form of acceptance from the reader” (88). 
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Douglass” epitomizes and foreshadows how Douglass would be named and affirmed as 
“Frederick Douglass,” the author of Narrative, by his readers. (This reader-naming and 
reader-affirmation of Douglass may have already commenced with Mr. Johnson, whose 
primal choice of the name originated in his “reading” act.) If so, Douglass’s insistence 
on “Frederick”—a symbol of his past—in his new name comes to advocate the fact that 
his writerly identity as “Frederick Douglass” is indeed the co-product of Douglass, who 
remembers and writes about his past, and readers, who read his reminiscent narrative and 
find a suitable, substantial personality of him to replace his ghostlike nonexistence in the 
present.      
  It is in light of this reader-determined constitution of “Frederick Douglass” that 
we should comprehend Douglass’s very last words in Narrative: “I subscribe myself, / 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS. / LYNN, Mass., April 28, 1845” (80). Now that we know 
how the name was originally selected for Douglass by his readers, those words cannot be 
his conclusive self-subscription and assertion as the author of Narrative as critics 
including Olney, Goddu and Smith, and William W. Cook see.105 Rather, they signify 
                                                 
105
 To Olney, that “I subscribe myself” means that “I write my self down in letters, I 
underwrite my identity and my very being, as indeed I have done in and all through the 
foregoing narrative that has brought me to this place, this moment, this state of being” 
(54). Goddu and Smith contend that Douglass finally “can declare his name, the date and 
place of signing it—just as validly, in fact, as Garrison and Phillips” or any other “actual 
person” (829). Note as well their additional analysis of the word “subscribe” in terms of 
Douglass’s ideological subjugation to Garrison (829-830). Cook observes that “What he 
does own, if not a name, is the power of naming, and he chooses to exercise this power 
and become Frederick Douglass, the product of his own nomination and subscription” 
(16). See also Lacan-inspired Wardrop: “The ironic, punning gesture of ‘sub-scribe’ 
indicates his name beneath as well as his once marginal positioning within the 
logocentric system of signifiers. He shows with this pun, clearly, that he has become 
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that Douglass is subscribing his ghostly, impotent self “to,” or “scribing” it “under,” that 
reader-given name and thus announcing his contingence on readers’ construction of his 
nominal authorship. If there is anything self-assertive about Douglass at the moment, it 
would be his contextualization of that announcement within the very particular place 
(Lynn, Massachusetts) and very particular time (April 28, 1845), so that he can make 
sure—as he has been throughout Narrative—that his authorship as “Frederick Douglass” 
should be historical and tangible. As such, Douglass is, like his Narrative, in a real sense 
“Written by Himself” and “Authored by His Readers.”106  
 And so it was. After its publication in 1845, Narrative made a huge success in 
both America and Europe, and the name “Frederick Douglass” gained currency and 
reputation as one of the ablest and most popular slave writers during the period.107 
                                                                                                                                                
actively positioned. He has the last word; he is the last word. … Douglass gives us the 
name we must accept in order to read all of the foregoing” (658).  
 For other opinions, see Casmier-Paz’s suggestion that as “The slave’s signature 
… is neither a contract nor ‘the simple truth,’” so “‘Frederick Douglass’ is the sign of an 
elusive, fragile new representation—still likely to be a lie, or to disappear” (222). 
106
 As to the title of Narrative, Stone reads it too simply autobiographically: “Douglass’s 
title asserts the identity and responsibility of its black author” (199). So does Olney, 
particularly regarding the phrase, “Written by Himself”: “it is literally a part of the 
narrative, becoming an important thematic element in the retelling of the life wherein 
literacy, identity, and a sense of freedom are all acquired simultaneously” (54). He later 
restates himself: “‘Written by Himself’ certifies that Douglass has authored his own 
existence in much the same way that naming his own postslavery name as the last words 
of the text certifies his identity against any and all who might threaten it” (“Fathers” 5-6). 
David Van Leer seems close to my point when he comments that “Written by Himself” 
“marks the extent to which it is not written ‘for’ himself,” but he ends up saying that “the 
slave narrator is allowed no comparably selfish motives, but writes to inform and reform 
others” (132).  
107
 Stone reports that by 1849 “The Narrative had already gone through seven editions” 
(193), and Ripley recounts that “The Narrative sold thirty thousand copies in five years, 
was translated into French, German, and Swedish, and went through several editions in 
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Significantly, his popularity, or his great appeal to readers, finally got him actual 
freedom that he could not have obtained by himself: in December 1846 a number of his 
British supporters (who, of course, got to know of and sympathize with him through 
Narrative), using their funds of $711.66, purchased his manumission from Hugh Auld, 
his then-lawful owner.108 His readers, then, would have enabled him to achieve legal 
capacity, social legitimacy, and the valid authorship of Narrative as “Frederick 
Douglass.”109 They also endowed that authorial identity with nominal effect. After 
emancipation, Douglass kept writing actively and profusely under the name of 
“Frederick Douglass.” In 1847, he purchased a printing press with the fund of $2,174 
that his British and Irish friends raised for him, and established an abolitionist weekly 
newspaper, The North Star, and served as its co-editor along with journalist Martin R. 
Delany. Hence the readers of Narrative, once again, aided Douglass in becoming “the 
first black man to publish a newspaper in the United States” and “reaching out to a more 
                                                                                                                                                
the British Isles alone” (5).  
108
 Ripley tells us how Douglass’s tour to British Isles itself was made possible by his 
readers there: “Douglass landed in England without specific plans except to elude 
American slave-catchers. Yet, on his arrival in August 1845, he found that The Narrative 
[sic] and his reputation had preceded him. … The Narrative blended with the tour, one 
contributing to the success of the other. By providing advance publicity, the book helped 
launch Douglass’s tour of the British Isles, and its sales sustained him while there (‘I 
realize enough from it to meet my expenses…’)” (10-11).  
109
 Some scholars place more weight on Douglass’s own literacy as a factor to his 
emancipation. Matlack underscores the effect of Narrative on the emancipation: “The 
popularity of Douglass’ Narrative … verified his origins in slavery and raised the threat 
of renewed bondage became the means for achieving his permanent freedom” (16). Levy 
demonstrates how scholars can distort the same fact about Douglass’s emancipation in 
support of his autonomous authorship: “And Douglass, in 1847, purchased himself … 
using funds received from supporters on a lecture tour of Britain: taking control of his 
life-story, he exchanged it for his life” (748, emphasis added).  
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broad-based reading public” (Leverenz 354).110 And their aid eventually made him an 
undeniably recognizable public author-figure when, four years later, he renamed the 
newspaper Frederick Douglass’ Paper and his name emerged as an influential discourse 
producer and distributor. Such a publicity in turn led Douglass to write two more 
autobiographical narratives, My Bondage and My Freedom (1855) and Life and Times 
of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself (1881; revised in 1882 and 1892). Though 
they came out after he became a free man, the contents of those two narratives are for 
the most part rooted in and added to that of Narrative with initially untold details about 
and changes in his life after emancipation, and thus more or less re-present the Douglass 
in Narrative.111 Then we can say that Douglass’s later narratives substantiate and 
consolidate “Frederick Douglass,” the author of Narrative, as an authoritative version of 
his personal and public self.112 Yet that version is not necessarily authoritarian. 
                                                 
110
 Yet Leverenz leads his point into the author-centered direction by arguing that 
“Douglass fashions a self to please and appease this wider audience” (354). For the 
similar stance, see Sundquist, “Frederick Douglass: Literacy and Paternalism,” Raritan: 
A Quarterly Review 6 (1986): 112-113. 
111
 Slote explains in detail of this relationship between Narrative and Douglass’s later 
narratives: “From the start, Douglass’s second autobiography tells us that it is less an 
extension than an expansive revision of the first. Only two of its twenty-five chapters 
address themselves to the years after 1845” (23); “roughly the first third of [Life and 
Times] … uses [My Bondage] nearly verbatim, not expanding that material but 
compressing it by eliding those passages from My Bondage which (by basic but not 
wholly consistent narrative standards) seem unessential” (33, fn. 7). Drawing on this 
relationship, a number of critics assess Douglass’s two later narratives as inferior to 
Narrative. See Stone 212-213; Baker, Jr., “Problem” 27; and Matlack 15. This 
assessment basically regards Douglass’s narratives as Youngian textual records of his 
own literary and artistic genius.     
112
 Olney makes an interestingly relevant observation: unlike Narrative, “Neither 
Bondage and Freedom nor Life and Times starts with the existential assertion. … It is as 
if by 1855 and even more by 1881 Frederick Douglass’ existence and his identity were 
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Douglass’s writing of those narratives was prompted by his social capacity, legitimacy, 
and influence that he could earn by virtue of the readers of Narrative. What is more, the 
“Frederick Douglass” of Narrative is, as we have seen, the reader-made author. In this 
respect, Douglass the social ghost in antebellum America comes back to life as a ghost 
writer whose author-ity is established through the media of the sympathetic hearts and 
palpable (social) bodies of his readers.  
 In the following section, we will meet another writer, Louisa May Alcott, who 
goes from being a ghost to a ghost writer by the help of readers in postbellum America. 
This time Alcott the social ghost will appear wearing the mask of A. M. Barnard, the 
pseudonymous writer of Alcott’s most celebrated gothic novella, “Behind a Mask.” It is 
not to hide herself, let me clarify, but to manifest her virtual nonexistence as a woman 
writer in a highly gendered culture more explicitly, or on the surface. Yet, more 
importantly, Alcott’s pseudonymous appearance as A. M. Barnard is to instigate her 
readers to turn her nonexistence into existence by turning the virtually blank surface of 
her pseudonymous mask into a socially recognizable face of an author. We will get to 
see such a dynamic between Alcott/A. M. Barnard and her readers more clearly by 
looking at the interaction between Jean Muir, the heroine of “Behind a Mask,” and the 
Coventry family, her employers/readers.   
                                                                                                                                                
secure enough and sufficiently well known that he no longer felt the necessity of the first 
and basic assertion” (68, fn. 5).  
    Leverenz insists on the self-authorizing effect of Douglass’s autobiographical 
works: “Much as Emerson strives to represent an emerging cultural elite in his notion of 
manhood, Douglass presents his own self-made manhood as the epitome of his race’s 
potential” (363). Sundquist likewise characterizes Douglass’s works as “carefully drawn 
portraits of himself by Douglass the public figure” (5). 
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2. Mask That Matters: Alcott’s “Behind a Mask” 
By now, considering Alcott as a gothic writer seems to be no longer an issue of 
debate. It has been already over six decades since an antique bookseller Leona 
Rostenberg and her business partner Madeleine Stern first discovered that our 
“Children’s Friend” had her hand, more often than not, in stories of deception, betrayal, 
revenge, and murder. In the early 1940s, Rostenberg and Stern located a number of 
letters to Alcott from James R. Elliott, a publisher of a postbellum miscellaneous weekly 
magazine, The Flag of Our Union, at the Houghton Library at Harvard University. Those 
letters, showing that Alcott wrote blood-and-thunder stories for that magazine under the 
pseudonym of A. M. Barnard, confirmed her participation in popular sensational literary 
culture.113 Rostenberg soon officialized her and Stern’s finding by issuing an article, 
“Some Anonymous and Pseudonymous Thrillers of Louisa M. Alcott,” in the Papers of 
the Bibliographical Society of America in 1943. But it is Stern’s publications of Alcott’s 
anonymous and pseudonymous thrillers114 that spurred scholars’ active revision of 
Alcott’s literary legacy as a whole. Starting with Behind a Mask: The Unknown Thrillers 
of Louisa May Alcott in 1975, Stern edited and put into print four more major 
                                                 
113
 It seems that there has been a constant suspicion of Alcott’s secret production of the 
gothic. Stern and Rostenberg embarked on their quest for the gothic Alcott thanks to one 
Alcott collector Carroll Atwood Wilson, who first tipped them to that suspicion (Stern, 
Behind xxiv-xxv). Gail K. Smith notes that “While Ednah D. Cheney [i.e. Alcott’s first 
biographer] had mentioned the stories in passing in her 1889 biography of Alcott, both 
the titles and Alcott’s pseudonym were as yet unknown. No manuscripts existed, and it 
was uncertain where Alcott had published the stories” (45-46). Catherine J. Golden 
further informs us that Alcott’s thrillers were even “suspected during her lifetime” (12). 
114
 Stern also wrote several articles on Alcott’s thrillers since the 1940s. But in terms of 
the scholarly impact, they are not comparable to her book publications.   
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collections, including Plots and Counterplots: More Unknown Thrillers of Louisa May 
Alcott (1976), A Double Life: Newly Discovered Thrillers of Louisa May Alcott (1988), 
The Lost Stories of Louisa May Alcott (1993), and Louisa May Alcott Unmasked: 
Collected Thrillers (1995). As a result of Stern’s continuing efforts to make known the 
gothic Alcott to the world, Alcott’s authorial image gradually and positively shifted from 
a popular yet sentimental-didactic and second-rate woman writer to a popular, 
multifarious, and exceptionally gifted one.115 So while Alcott was not mentioned at all in 
Mary Kelley’s influential 1984 study on nineteenth-century women writers, Private 
Woman, Public Stage,116 she has since been frequently discussed as one of the period’s 
representative American writers and with diverse academic orientations in such weighty 
books as Elaine Showalter’s Sister’s Choice (1991), Richard H. Brodhead’s Cultures of 
Letters (1993), and Goddu’s Gothic America. And on account of this remarkably 
beneficial contribution to Alcott’s scholarly reputation, Stern has won the honorary title 
                                                 
115
 Although Little Women has been consistently popular since its first appearance in 
1868, Alcott’s status as its author has never been fully secured within American literary 
studies “because of the scant attention critics gave to novels for juveniles” (Ross 911). 
For the earliest depiction of Alcott the author of Little Women, see Louise Chandler 
Moulton, “Louisa May Alcott,” Our Famous Women (Hartford: A. D. Worthington & 
Co., 1885) 29-52; Louisa May Alcott: Her Life, Letters, and Journals, ed. Ednah D. 
Cheney (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1889); Maria S. Porter, “Recollections of Louisa 
May Alcott,” The New England Magazine 6. 1 (1892): 2-19; Gamaliel Bradford, 
“Portrait of Louisa May Alcott,” The North American Review 209 (1919): 391-403; and 
Marion Talbot. All these sources portray Alcott as a little woman herself, with a strong 
sense of moral, familial, and filial duty.   
116
 Mary Kelley’s exclusion of Alcott was counteracted even in 1984, by the publication 
of Critical Essays on Louisa May Alcott, ed. Madeleine Stern (Boston: G. K. Hall), 
which might be the first scholarly attempt to establish Alcott criticism that embraces the 
sensational Alcott.  
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of “the dean of Alcott scholarship, a meticulous scholar who almost single-handedly 
gave birth to modern Alcott studies” (Shealy 162).  
There is, however, another contribution of Stern that is equally remarkable yet 
not necessarily beneficial. In her introduction to Behind a Mask, Stern speculates on why 
Alcott would have composed her gothic tales incognito. On the one hand, Stern explains, 
the never-resolved financial difficulties of Alcott’s family compelled her to make money 
by teaching, serving as a companion and a domestic, and writing; and she frequently felt 
humiliated and exasperated as a woman working in an androcentric culture. On the other, 
her naturally imaginative and “lurid” disposition (Behind xii) led her to pursue the 
theater and enjoy gothic novels. These biographical facts mean to Stern that Alcott must 
have found ways in lucrative sensational magazine markets to solve the money problem, 
vent her frustration as a working woman, and satisfy her artistic penchant. In so doing, 
Stern goes on, Alcott was well aware of the impropriety of her engagement in those 
markets as a woman. Therefore, she dove into “the whole clandestine procedure 
involved in producing thrillers from ‘behind a mask,’” that is, by hiding her self and 
motivations under anonymity and pseudonymity (Behind xxiv). Then Stern suggests that 
her exposé of Alcott’s sub-rosa creation of the gothic would be “The unmasking of 
Louisa May Alcott” (Behind xxiv).  
Stern’s use of a trope of un/masking to explicate Alcott’s secretive 
manufacturing of sensational literature immediately set the tone of modern Alcott studies. 
Scholars came to characterize Alcott’s authorship as self-concealment and began 
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searching for the hidden, real Alcott “behind a mask.”117 Jeanne F. Bedell, who entitles 
her article “A Necessary Mask: The Sensation Fiction of Louisa May Alcott” (emphasis 
added), betokens the burgeoning currency of Stern’s trope around 1980. Eight years later, 
Elaine Showalter, borrowing Stern’s approach to re-appraise Alcott from a gender-
studies standpoint in her introduction to Alternative Alcott, a collection of Alcott’s 
miscellanies, defines her editorial purpose as a revelation of “a woman very different 
from [Alcott’s] celebrated image as either the kindly ‘Aunt Jo’ who preached self-
sacrifice, or the self-styled ‘Ancient Lu’ who practiced it in endless support of her 
family,” and closer to “a passionate spinner of feminist plots and counterplots” (x).118 In 
1997, Goddu configures Alcott’s overall authorial character as a masterful “veiled lady.” 
Taking notice of Alcott’s eventual transition from secretive sensational fiction to 
nominal sentimental domestic fiction, Goddu regards it as the result of Alcott’s first-
hand knowledge that “like many female writers of the period, she had to disguise her 
mercenary motives under the pretense of disseminating the feminine values of the 
private sphere”; this is why “she could publish her domestic fiction under her own 
name,” whereas “her gothic tales, which often reveal the ‘true’ woman to be a fraud” 
through deceitful heroines with virtuous appearances, “had to circulate masked” (118). 
Consequently, Goddu argues, Alcott emerges anew as “the grand magician 
masquerading as the sentimental writer, exploiting the market for profit even as she 
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 Stern herself repetitively uses the trope of the mask in her introductions to the 
ensuing Alcott collections. 
118
 Showalter, also like Stern, delineates the “alternative Alcott” biographically, as a 
result of “a power struggle between the two parents for psychological dominance and 
authority over their children and for the children’s loyalty” (x, xii). 
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participates in veiling its illusions” (119). With Goddu’s argument, the shrewd and 
furtive Alcott becomes her unfeigned self lurking under the façade of an exemplary 
Victorian lady, while Stern’s methodology of uncovering Alcott becomes the elementary 
principle of Alcott scholarship. And in 2003, Catherine J. Golden’s entry on Alcott in 
Writers of the American Renaissance, a bio-bibliographical reference book for a general 
audience as well as an academic readership, addresses freely “The masked sides of 
Alcott’s literary life” (12).  
The trope of un/masking is often sanctioned by Alcott’s own gothic novella, 
“Behind a Mask,” for chiefly two reasons in my opinion. This title story of Stern’s first 
and pathbreaking collection of Alcott’s thrillers, Behind a Mask, is written under the 
name of A. M. Barnard, which is the first sensation-literature pen name of Alcott that 
Stern and Rostenberg identified in the Alcott-Elliott letters, and thus the most famous 
mask of the gothic Alcott in modern times. And it is the story where Alcott presents a 
heroine who, in critics’ view, performs most apparently the same masquerade as her own 
by means of A. M. Barnard or other masks. According to the critical consensus, Jean 
Muir, the heroine, covers up her real self as a divorced thirty-year-old ex-actress with the 
mask of a proper and womanly nineteen-year-old governess, and successfully deceives 
her aristocratic yet naïve employers, the Coventry family, seduces the male members, 
manipulates the family head, Sir John, to marry her, and finally becomes a Lady 
Coventry; and her skillful self-camouflage designates her as a fictional double and an 
unequivocal endorsement of the self-masking Alcott. Stern again plays a major role here, 
as she initially singles out “Behind a Mask” as Alcott’s best thriller in that it is “per se a 
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suspenseful story recounted in a masterly manner,” and “a Gothic roman à clef, a fast-
moving narrative whose episodes unlock the past not only of the heroine Jean Muir but 
of the writer Louisa Alcott” (Behind xvii, xviii). Hence Jean Muir serves as “a dark but 
revealing portrait” of Alcott (Behind xviii). Bedell takes a hint from Stern and equates 
Jean Muir specifically with Alcott/A. M. Barnard: “Like Jean Muir, her creator wore a 
mask. Behind the pseudonym of A. M. Barnard, author of lurid sensation fiction in 
which madness, drug addiction, and sexual passion are staple subjects, is concealed 
Louisa May Alcott, ‘the children’s friend,’ whose juvenile stories emphasize self-
sacrifice and devotion to duty” (8). Judith Fetterley adds to Bedell by comparing Jean 
Muir to Alcott the author of Little Women. Jean Muir, who “adopts the mask of 
femininity and impersonates the character of a ‘little woman’” for economic survival, 
epitomizes Alcott’s “frighteningly prophetic vision of the act she will eventually 
perform” as a moralistic woman writer without visible pecuniary motives (1).119 And 
Elizabeth Lennox Keyser synthesizes Bedell’s and Fetterley’s views into one finalizing 
contention that “Behind a Mask” is “doubly self-referential, for in it Alcott not only 
                                                 
119
 Fetterley corroborates her point biographically: Alcott wrote the novella right after an 
Europe tour as a companion only to face more family debts waiting for her; ergo, 
“Produced to fill the ever-yawning maw of Alcott need, … Behind A Mask identifies the 
source of the desperation and forecasts Alcott’s final solution to it,” which is, the 
donning of the mask of a domestic woman writer (2). Martha Saxton offers another 
biographical justification of the Jean Muir-Alcott equation, as she claims that the former 
“represents Alcott’s view of herself as good on the surface, but bad, angry, and 
unforgiving underneath,” a view that Alcott developed out of her love-hate relationship 
with her affectionate yet strict father, Bronson Alcott (256-257). Later, Mary Elliott adds 
that “The condescending treatment which Jean Muir first received from the Coventrys 
… originated, at least in spirit, with an American family, for whom Alcott became a 
domestic at the age of nineteen” (304). 
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writes again from ‘behind the mask’ of her pseudonym A. M. Barnard but, more 
important, anticipates the direction her career is about to take,” insomuch as Jean Muir’s 
change into Lady Coventry prefigures “Alcott’s rejection of pseudonymity” and “change 
in genre” from sensational fiction to domestic fiction (47, 57).  
But critics’ recourse to Jean Muir in “Behind a Mask” for an approval of their 
unmasking of Alcott/A. M. Barnard et al. has one serious defect: the novella does not 
express that kind of approval. More specifically, it does not focus on Jean Muir’s 
masquerade, or how she keeps her real self inside and pretends to be someone else 
outside. Even though we do not get the detail of her intention with the Coventry family 
until the very end, we could nonetheless have enough suspicion as we take a look at Jean 
Muir’s real person quite early in the novella. Toward the end of chapter 1, we see Jean 
Muir, after her first meeting with the Coventry family as a new governess, retire to her 
room and swear violently that “I’ll not fail again if there is power in a woman’s wit and 
will!” (11).120 Then pouring herself some liquor, she removes wigs, makeup, teeth, and a 
dress, and stands as “a haggard, worn, and moody woman of thirty at least” with “the 
scar of a newly healed wound” on her breast (12). Moreover, throughout the novella, we 
often witness Jean Muir’s duality: during the meeting with the Coventry household, Jean 
Muir faints, and when she recovers her consciousness, Gerald Coventry, the first son and 
heir, sarcastically remarks, “Scene first, very well done”; at this, Jean Muir “looked over 
her shoulders with a gesture like Rachel” and replies, “Thanks. The last scene shall be 
                                                 
120
 Louisa May Alcott, Behind a Mask: The Unknown Thrillers of Louisa May Alcott, ed. 
Madeleine Stern (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1975). All references to 
“Behind a Mask” will be from this edition. 
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still better” (7). So when it transpires in the concluding chapter that Jean is not who she 
has seemed to be, we are not much surprised. Rather, the thrill of the novella comes from 
our observation of how Jean Muir gets along and survives at the Coventry, that is, how 
she interacts with the family members, how their interactions entail conjectures on who 
she is, and how their conjectures conduce to her transmutation into Lady Coventry. Put 
another way, “Behind a Mask” has us not look for who Jean Muir really is behind the 
mask of the governess, but attend to who Jean Muir is and how she becomes a person as 
shown on the surface of that mask through her transaction with the Coventrys.    
Critics’ persistent reading of “Behind a Mask” as a story of what is behind Jean 
Muir’s mask as the governess and Alcott’s mask as A. M. Barnard or other noms de 
plume, despite the novella’s quite direct emphasis on what is on the mask, enlighteningly 
resonates with what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in her momentous criticism of gothic 
conventions in The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (1980), points out as gothic 
critics’ conventional interpretation of the gothic “imagery of the surface.” According to 
Sedgwick, modern gothic critics have been analyzing masks, veils, or walls in gothic 
texts as “spatial metaphors of interiority” (140). That analysis, in Sedgwick’s opinion, 
mainly derives from critics’ “eagerness to write about content” or their “intent on 
grasping the essence of the Gothic novel” normally characterized with superficiality 
(140). Their “eagerness” or “intent,” in turn, stems from the Freudian psychoanalytic 
model of the self as a being whose true nature resides in the inner, repressed, and 
unconscious (140-141). In accordance with this model, then, critics would take the veil 
“only as a cloak for something deeper and thus more primal” (143). But Sedgwick’s own 
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reading of the gothic tells us otherwise. She could “Note … how much the veil is like the 
veiled” as the whiteness of a nun’s veil is like the chastity of her body under the veil 
(144). She could see as well that “the [blood-]suffused veil very often hides Nothing, or 
death, or, in particular, some cheat that means absence and substitution” (146, emphasis 
added). Sedgwick’s reading, as she herself concludes, negates the typical interiority of 
the gothic surface by making it clear that “The self expressed or explored by these 
conventions is all surface, but its perimeter is neither fixed nor obvious” (154). And that 
conclusion finally illuminates how the gothic “self is at least potentially social, since its 
‘character’ seems to be impressed on it from outside,” and does not originate from inside 
(155, emphasis added).  
Sedgwick’s point that critics regard the gothic surface essentialistically due to 
their analytical desire for profundity significantly applies to the Stern-inspired scholarly 
notion of the “unmasking of the gothic Alcott” and Jean Muir. Stern and Rostenberg’s 
discovery of Alcott’s anonymous and pseudonymous sensation writing shattered the 
myth of the domestic Alcott and opened up a huge void in the scholarly discourse on 
Alcott’s authorship. Endeavoring to fill up that void, scholars have been mostly 
concerned with deciphering the inner, secret, and serious purposes for Alcott’s 
anonymous and pseudonymous masks; in that way, they believe, they can restore the 
entirety of Alcott’s authorial identity, certify her creatorship and proprietorship of newly 
excavated tales in the Youngian manner, and, most important, secure her hard-won 
reputation within American literary studies. In so doing, however, they have neglected to 
ask other valid questions, including what Alcott would have wanted to do with her very 
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own masks and what those masks themselves may tell us about Alcott’s 
conceptualization of authorship. And that neglect has resulted in the fallacious reading of 
Jean Muir’s story “on” the mask. 
Taking a cue from Sedgwick’s revisionary critique of the gothic critical 
convention, which purports to “point the reader’s attention back to surfaces” (141), I 
proffer to revise the current scholarly formulation of the Alcott-Jean Muir equation and 
custom of “unmasking” Alcott’s gothic authorship by shifting stress from behind the 
mask to the mask per se. Jean Muir is Alcott’s fictional double for she illustrates that 
there is no inner, true authorial identity of Alcott behind her mask, but the mask itself is 
her very identity.121 As what claims our attention in “Behind a Mask” is the outer 
appearance of Jean Muir, so what should matter in Alcott’s secretive authorial 
                                                 
121
 This remark may remind one of the similar fate of the Reverend Hooper in Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s “The Minister’s Black Veil” (1836). In that tale, Hooper all of a sudden 
starts wearing a black veil over his face and makes himself look “ghost-like from head to 
foot” (189); the townspeople at first get shocked and vehemently debate on why he 
would do so (which is the reading effect of the unsignified veil also found in “Behind a 
Mask”), but eventually take his veil as part of who he is. Yet, of course, there is a critical 
difference between Hooper’s veil and Jean Muir’s mask. Hooper ultimately remains “a 
bugbear” (195) or an object of dread to the townspeople, and, though not trying anything 
to change such impressions, he himself does not seem so happy about his situation 
either; on the contrary, as will be shown in this section, Jean Muir not only appeals to the 
Coventry family as an object of curiosity and attraction, but also becomes a lady of the 
house and anticipates the family’s full acceptance in the near future. This difference in 
how the viewers/readers react to the blank surface may translate into the difference in 
Hawthorne’s and Alcott’s authorial attitude toward contemporary readers’ growing 
power to determine an authorial image: Hawthorne would be more self-defensive and 
hostile toward that power while Alcott would be more open and embracing toward it. As 
for the discussion of such a difference between Hawthorne and Alcott in terms of a 
character of a veiled lady, see Goddu, “(Un)Veiling the Marketplace: Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, Louisa May Alcott, and the Female Gothic,” Gothic America (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1997) 94-130. 
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performance would be her mask—especially the one for the novella proper, A. M. 
Barnard.122 Furthermore, Jean Muir is Alcott’s fictional alter ego since she shows that 
Alcott’s mask is not her own device as Alcott scholars have generally seen, but a 
construct of her readers. As Jean Muir’s surface image comes to be defined as a result of 
the Coventrys’ imaginative creation of her person, so Alcott’s mask as A. M. Barnard 
would be determined through readers’ construction of its identity as an author based on 
their reading of “Behind a Mask.”123  
Considering the reader-definition of Jean Muir’s mask equivalent to the reader-
author-ization of Alcott’s pseudonymous mask A. M. Barnard can be indeed a valid way 
of understanding Alcott’s view of authorship, if we take into account the oddly 
oxymoronic status of postbellum women writers. First of all, the contemporary gender-
discriminating atmosphere did not completely admit women writers’ careers. Melissa J. 
                                                 
122
 Alcott wrote some other thrillers under the name of A. M. Barnard, including “A 
Marble Woman: or, The Mysterious Model” (1865) and “The Abbot’s Ghost: or, Maurice 
Treherne’s Temptation” (1867). “V. V.: or, Plots and Counterplots,” originally published 
anonymously in 1865, was later reprinted under the name of A. M. Barnard. For details, 
see the conclusion of this section.  
123
 G. K. Smith similarly criticizes the scholarly obsession with what is behind the mask 
of A. M. Barnard, by observing that “the image of the mask … is more complex in 
Alcott’s hands than a simple distinction between reality and assumed identity,” for her 
stories “consciously manipulate fictional conventions about identity, character, and the 
task of the author” (46-47). But Smith still clings to the division of the inside and outside 
of a mask following the feminist critical view that Alcott’s masking of herself and her 
heroines reflect how women must lie in order to survive: “Nowhere is Alcott’s skillful 
reworking of gender and identity more apparent than in her stories of women who gain 
the trust and devotion of their willing victims in order to outwit them and gain what they 
desire. Stories like ‘V.V., Or, Plots and Counterplots,’ Behind a Mask, Or, A Woman’s 
Power, and ‘Pauline’s Passion and Punishment’ revise the male tradition of the 
confidence story. In fact, Alcott writes story after story featuring what we might call a 
‘confidence woman’” (47). 
  
173 
Homestead, in her American Women Authors and Literary Property (2005), informs us 
that, though nineteenth-century America, with the passage of the Copyright Act in 1831 
and the International Copyright Act in 1891, was slowly yet surely moving toward 
protecting and advocating writers’ textual ownership, women writers were not part of 
that movement for the reason of women’s general lack of rights to property. “Copyright 
grants literary texts legal status as property,” Homestead explains, so “laws regulating 
the ownership and control of property more broadly applied to copyrights, and under 
broader property law principles, women (and especially married women) had a 
profoundly different relationship to property than that enjoyed by their male peers” (3). 
Indeed, when Alcott, still early in her writing career, accidentally signed her name for 
one of her magazine publications as “Louisa M. Alcott” instead of the usual one, “L. M. 
Alcott,” the publisher sent her a considerably smaller payment, saying that “his payment 
was always less for women” (Talbot 736). This anecdote clearly conveys women 
writers’ unwarranted, unstable, and unauthorized standing within nineteenth-century 
American literary markets.  
Whereas women writers could not be textual proprietors/authors in a legal sense, 
they could nevertheless retain their writerly standing solidly within the markets. As 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s well-known complaint, “the d—d mob of scribbling women,” 
suggests, the period’s American literary realm was for the greatest part revolving around 
sentimental domestic fiction, dime novels, and sensational magazine stories, and thus 
virtually dominated by women writers, their main producers. Susan Coultrap-McQuin 
reports on that reality in detail: “Before 1830 about one-third of those who published 
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fiction in the United States were women. During the antebellum years, almost 40 percent 
of the novels reviewed in journals and newspapers were by women, which suggests that 
an equally high percentage were being published. Best-seller lists reveal that by the 
1850s women were authors of almost half of the popular literary works. … By 1872 
women wrote nearly three-quarters of all of the novels published” (3). Such an immense 
popularity, Coultrap-McQuin further remarks, characterizes women writers’ existence as 
highly “paradoxical: they had a place in the literary world, yet that world often rendered 
them invisible” (7).124 In other words, I would add, if postbellum women writers were 
socially and legally “invisible” and incompetent, they could become visible and 
competent via their readers whose avid interest in and consumption of their works made 
them keep writing and holding their writerly position within the markets. If so, we can 
say that, just as in the case of Douglass, contemporary popular-literature women writers 
including Alcott were like ghosts, who populated the House of Fiction only as 
unrecognized or absent beings, and who could be recognized and proven as present 
solely by their readers.125  
                                                 
124
 Kelley earlier designates nineteenth-century women writers as “hybrids,” who were 
supposed to remain “invisible” in the private sphere yet made commercial success in the 
public sphere (111). But her designation rather means the emergence of “a new breed,” 
which was an “accident” (111, 112).  
125
 Interestingly, Homestead, in a manner that reminds us of Patterson in the Douglass 
section, analogizes death and the legal incapacity of nineteenth-century American 
women: “Both in the nineteenth century and in modern scholarship, the effects of 
marriage for women under the common law have been labeled a kind of ‘civil death.’ 
That is, on entering the state of coverture, a woman so thoroughly loses her ability to act 
as a legal subject in the civil sphere that she is essentially dead to that world” (257). This 
resemblance in Homestead and Patterson re-confirms the shared spectrality of Douglass 
and Alcott.  
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Alcott would have certainly known of her reader-empowered writerly condition. 
After the unpleasant and unjust incident in the above anecdote, she rapidly grew up in 
the 1860s as one of the most sought-after contributors to popular magazines, like the 
Saturday Evening Gazette, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, The Flag of Our Union, 
and Frank Leslie’s Chimney Corner. Meanwhile, she came across the same publisher 
who this time offered a good sum of money for her writing, and she could delightfully 
and decisively turn him down (Talbot 736). That is, Alcott has experienced the 
ascendancy of her writerly status thanks to readers’ ever-growing demand for her blood-
and-thunder tales. Such an experience of Alcott, then, encourages us to heed A. M. 
Barnard, a noticeably “successful contributor to penny dreadfuls” among many 
pseudonyms for her gothic work (Rostenberg 139),126 as an especially useful example of 
her ghostlike writerly mask that does not autonomously exist as a socially recognizable 
and legally capable author but counts on readers for its existence and author-ity. And 
how Alcott’s writerly mask of A. M. Barnard comes into an authorial being by readers 
will be demonstrated in how Jean Muir’s initially unregistered, ghostly mask forms into 
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 To many scholars, A. M. Barnard is indeed Alcott’s representative gothic pseudonym. 
See Stern’s account of Alcott’s composition of a gothic novel, A Modern 
Mephistopheles: “When in 1877 her publishers had proposed that the author of Little 
Women provide an anonymous book for their ‘No Name Series,’ Louisa Alcott had 
dipped her pen into A. M. Barnard’s lurid ink and written a novel dreamed by A. M. 
Barnard’s ghost” (Plots 23). James W. Tuttleton, when questioning the validity of 
Alcott’s current (feminists-initiated) scholarly fame, comments that “Miss Alcott had 
authored a great deal of trash under the masculine pseudonym A. M. Barnard” (18).  
 Alcott also used in her thrillers such pseudonyms as Flora Fairfield (“The Rival 
Prima Donnas,” 1854), L. M. A. (“Perilous Play,” 1869), and L. M. Alcott (“Enigmas,” 
1864; “The Mysterious Key, and What It Opened,” 1867; and “The Skeleton in the 
Closet,” 1867). 
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a socially legitimate and acceptable identity of Lady Coventry by the Coventrys in 
“Behind a Mask.”  
The novella begins by drawing our attention to Jean Muir’s mask, or her reader-
inscribable exteriority. We first observe the Coventry family—Mrs. Coventry, her sons 
Gerald and Edward, her daughter Bella, and her niece and Gerald’s fiancée Lucia127—
gathering in the living room and talking about the soon-to-be-arrived new governess. 
And their conversation reveals that they know practically nothing about whom they are 
expecting: Lady Sydney, the family friend and the previous employer of the governess, 
has recommended her to them with a note—“a quiet, accomplished, amiable girl, who 
needed a home, and would be a help” to little Bella—but it is rather a typical and “very 
brief” one (4, 5) and has not enlightened them much as to her character. All the 
Coventrys can do is idly conjecture on whether the governess would be bearable and 
whether she would be on time (although Gerald, owing to his usual languidness, has 
forgotten to send a carriage for her). This lack of knowledge about Jean Muir, anterior to 
her personal appearance, indicates the lack of pre-determined definition of who she is 
and gives more emphasis to who she would be or how she would look.    
Yet there is likewise a certain lack in her actual appearance. When she arrives 
and meets the Coventrys’ scrutiny, Jean Muir, unlike critics’ principal assumption that 
                                                 
127
 As mentioned earlier in the section, Sir John is currently the head of the Coventry 
household, but he is not a husband of Mrs. Coventry. He lives in a separate residence of 
his own nearby, and calls Gerald and Edward his “nephews.” So we can guess that Sir 
John would be the older brother of the father of Gerald, Edward, and Bella. Sir John is 
called Lucia’s “uncle” as well, but it is not clear whether he is related to her father or 
mother.  
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she disguises herself “as” a governess, does not particularly look like one. Instead, she 
strikes the Coventrys as, above all, “pale-faced” and “Small, thin, and colorless” (6). 
Thus if she is wearing a mask of the governess, that mask seems, recalling Sedgwick, to 
correspond to her innate undefinedness, manifest it on the outside, deprive her of 
distinctive properties, and render her almost blank.128 At the same time, however, the 
near blank of Jean Muir’s mask does not stay that way; she also appeals to the Coventrys 
as having “very expressive features” (6). This ostensible contradiction—the coexistence 
of absence and full presence—is soon explained through a peculiar manner in which 
Jean Muir’s appearance affects the Coventrys. During the interview with this “pale-
faced” and “colorless” girl, “everyone looked at her … and all felt a touch of pity” (6); 
when she, in the midst of singing for the family, suddenly faints and comes to looking 
“as white and rigid as if struck with death,” Mrs. Coventry feels “quite touched” while 
Bella becomes “full of pity and remorse” (7); and Edward, “eager to feed the pale 
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 Elliott and Melanie Dawson exemplify the reading of Jean Muir “as” a governess. 
Elliott does so when underlining the class difference in Jean Muir’s relationship with the 
Coventrys: “As a governess, Jean Muir enters the Coventry household as a laborer, albeit 
a relatively high-ranking one. Though at first the Coventrys cannot see her or regard her 
as fully human, since they have been conditioned to obliterate the laboring body from 
sight, she distinguishes herself and becomes transformed into a spiritual entity, a radiant, 
virtuous presence reminiscent of the ‘selfhood’ of More’s domestic ideology, and is 
transformed from laboring body into aristocratic spirit. Much of Behind a Mask is 
preoccupied with establishing and then reversing these class distinctions, and it is these 
reversals which eventually establish Muir as an individual and empower her to execute 
her plans” (304). Dawson, picturing Jean Muir as “the socially ambiguous governess 
who possesses superior skills in reading others,” and whose “skills allow her an upward 
social movement,” enlarges on Elliott’s point by saying that “she plays on the 
sympathies and interests of her employers, the Coventry family,” and “attempts to 
counter class prejudice by evoking sympathy” (23). Dawson even labels “Behind a 
Mask” “Alcott’s governess story” (27). 
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governess, was awkwardly trying to make the tea” (8). In a word, Jean Muir’s ghostly 
pallid and vacant visage has—borrowing the words from the subtitle of the novella—a 
“power” of “an” unspecified woman to stimulate the Coventrys’ sentiment, so that she 
comes to look “expressive” to the family when, in fact, they become “expressive” 
watching her.129 In this way the virtual emptiness of her mask gets impregnated with her 
viewers’ emotions and feelings in reaction to the sight of her.130   
The reader-reactive effect of Jean Muir’s visage or mask on the Coventrys, 
however, does not just work in an affective dimension. Whenever she is asked about 
herself, Jean Muir tends to give a very scanty answer. And her incomplete self-account, 
coinciding with and enhancing the indeterminacy of her mask, gives rise to a series of 
the Coventrys’ speculations or “fancies” about her identity.131 When Mrs. Coventry asks 
                                                 
129
 By saying this, I differ from the critical consensus that the full subtitle of the novella, 
“A Woman’s Power,” alludes to Jean Muir’s “ability to act” (Fetterley 12) or to control 
the Coventrys as she wants.    
130
 The novella continuously demonstrates this process, especially through Gerald’s 
emotional reaction to Jean Muir’s whitish, expressionless face. Taking a glance at the 
“very pale” face of Jean Muir when she asks him to deliver a letter to Lady Sydney on 
his trip to London, Gerald, despite his notorious aristocratic aloofness, “found it 
impossible to forget the almost tragical expression of the girl’s face” (29). Later, Gerald, 
looking into a scene of Jean Muir’s book reading for Sir John, notices the “absent 
expression” in her eyes and her “perfectly expressionless face” and senses “an air of 
patient weariness” (47).   
131
 Fetterley, without mentioning the actual word, “fancy,” makes a similar observation: 
“Indeed, Jean’s success in playing the part, even temporarily, depends on a level of 
fantasy. … Jean is, as Alcott would like to have been, the woman who can do it all, who 
can be all things to all people, the woman who could meet the demands Alcott felt were 
placed on her [by her ever-dependent family] … . Obviously, the successful ‘little 
woman’ is a superwoman. Thus fantasy reveals fantasy. Further, since the role clearly 
requires an extraordinary level of consciousness, any illusion about its being the natural 
expression of essential femininity is also exploded. Thus Behind A Mask defines men’s 
belief in the reality of ‘little women’ as comically stupid” (3). As will be shown, I 
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about her background, Jean Muir only describes herself as a nineteen-year-old Scotch 
girl with no blood relations, while throwing a hint at the connection between her 
premature departure from Lady Sydney’s and her certain transaction with the son. 
Catching that hint, Gerald says that “I have a fancy that she is at the bottom of Sydney’s 
mystery. He’s not been himself lately, and now he is gone without a word” (9). Mrs. 
Coventry takes the hint as bespeaking Jean Muir’s sensible reticence, and “has taken a 
fancy to her” as a “Quite prudent and proper” governess (9, 10). Edward, moved by Jean 
Muir’s youth and orphaned state, thinks that “Poor little woman! She has had a hard life. 
We will try and make it easier while she is here” (11). Even little Bella comes to form an 
idea that “I’ve imagined such a nice little romance about her, and someday I shall tell her, 
for I’m sure she has had a love trouble” (21). Sir John joins this fancy-making about 
Jean Muir likewise. After a short encounter at his garden with Jean Muir, who introduces 
herself as “only Miss Coventry’s governess” and expresses high respect for his noble 
character, he “felt redoubled curiosity to learn who she was” and “wonder[s] where Mrs. 
Coventry found such a piquant little governess” (14, 15). And later, getting a glimpse at 
Jean Muir’s lively reading of a history book to Bella, and her sudden burst of tears when 
left alone, Sir John “all that night … puzzled his brains with conjectures about his 
niece’s interesting young governess, quite unconscious that she intended he should do 
so” (24).    
In fact, most critics have seen the Coventrys’ fanciful responses to Jean Muir as 
the result of her calculated “intention” towards or plan upon them. Ann Douglas 
                                                                                                                                                
disagree with Fetterley’s biographical and gender-divided standpoint. 
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observes that “Jean Muir makes everyone fall in love with her … by her ability to be all 
things to all people” (62). Bedell calls Jean Muir a “plotter” and a “stage manager” who 
“sets herself precise goals” and pursues them deliberately (9). To Keyser, Jean, like the 
dualistic Alcott, possesses an “ability to play Lady Tartuffe” and “styles herself, for the 
purpose of achieving worldly success” (47). Gail K. Smith further develops Keyser’s 
view to the point that Jean Muir represents both Alcott’s gothic heroines and Alcott 
herself who, “Using the language of the dramatic director and the author,” “consciously 
manipulate their victims’ [and readers’] access to knowledge, their emotions, their 
gendered perceptions, and their assumptions about gender in others,” and who “in doing 
so … ‘write’ the confidence tale we read” (50). And Melanie Dawson completes 
Keyser’s and Smith’s investment into Jean Muir of purposeful and masterly authorship 
by arguing that “‘Behind a Mask’ depicts protagonist Jean Muir’s uses of a dramatic 
literacy, focusing most obviously on her employment of extreme emotive and physical 
displays,” and her “abilities to create carefully crafted impressions on other characters” 
by “carefully reading and catering to the interests and actions of the household” (22, 23). 
And this knowledge and these abilities, Dawson adds, empower Jean Muir “to outwit her 
employers” (23). These critical opinions, however, misunderstand the nature of Jean 
Muir’s authorial “intention” and disposition in “Behind a Mask.” According to the 
novella, after his glimpse at alternately spirited and tearful Jean Muir, Sir John occupies 
himself with “conjecturing” about her character, and “she intended he should do so.” 
Here, her “intention” is to make him “do” the “conjecturing,” but not to prescribe 
exactly “what kinds” of conjectures he is supposed to arrive at. That is, her purpose lies 
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in making him get interested in and surmise who she is, but not in channeling his interest 
and surmise into certain pre-determined ways. Jean Muir lets Sir John look at how she 
behaves at Bella’s study without her account of why she behaves so, and such a lack of 
the account, which matches her existence only as a mask, instigates him to account for 
her external behavior on his own.132  
Such is also true in the cases of other (especially male) Coventrys. Talking with 
Jean Muir the next morning after her arrival, Edward notices her surprise at the fact that 
he is not the heir, and asks her, “Whom did you take my brother for last night?” (16). 
She answers: “For some guest who admired Miss Beaufort [i.e. Lucia]. I did not hear his 
name, nor observe him enough to discover who he was. I saw only your kind mother, 
your charming little sister, and—” (16). Jean Muir’s inconclusive answer, followed by 
her “half-shy, half-grateful,” and thus equally inconclusive “look,” motivates Edward to 
believe voluntarily, with “a little color … into his brown cheek,” that her “look” has 
“finished the sentence better than any words” (17). Afterwards, Edward, even though 
Jean Muir “does not flirt” or do anything explicitly provocative but simply “treats him 
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 The same misunderstanding appears even in a more reader-concerned discussion of 
Jean Muir. Goddu points out Jean Muir’s “fluid persona” that “can change according to 
circumstances or the viewer,” but puts emphasis on her own agency as “the veiled lady, 
the economic witch behind the sentimental woman” (123). Isabell Klaiber, employing 
Judith Butler’s notion of the performitivity of gender, argues for Jean Muir’s other-
dependent performance of who she is. But Klaiber underlines a performer’s agency and 
clings to the idea of Jean Muir’s self-serving ability: “Jean’s autonomous exploitation of 
the established female gender roles, her continuous switching of roles, as well as her 
subversive recombination of originally incompatible aspects of various types of 
womanhood renders her indefinable within the range of established gender categories” 
(216). Accordingly, Klaiber’s point that Jean Muir’s performance needs “the affirmation 
of her social co-actors and audience,” that is, the Coventrys (219), does not stand out 
much. 
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like an elder sister … with a quiet dignity,” follows and “devour[s] her with his eyes”; 
and he “makes himself the hero, Miss Muir the heroine, and lives the love scene with all 
the ardor of a man whose heart has just waked up” (26, 27). Similarly, Gerald, reiterating 
his earlier “fancy” about Jean Muir and Sydney to Edward, makes a point that it is his 
own formulation, piqued by Jean Muir’s silence at the most: “On Sydney’s account I 
take a slight interest in her; not that I expect to learn anything from her, for a woman 
with a mouth like that never confides or confesses anything. But I have a fancy to see 
what captivated him; for captivated he was, beyond a doubt, and by no lady whom he 
met in society” (19). And Gerald eventually confirms this “fancy” of Sydney’s love for 
Jean Muir when he sees “a half-open letter” fallen from her dress and catches a glance at 
one sentence, in “Sydney’s handwriting,” that says, “By the love I bear you, believe 
what I say” (57). In this light, if Jean Muir has an authorial “intention” towards the 
Coventrys with regard to the formation of her mask, it is to inspire—not dominate—
them to read that barely delineated and visible mask and make it out for her with the use 
of their imagination. By the same token, Jean Muir’s careful “reading and catering to the 
interests and actions of the household” that Dawson observes above would rather picture 
her as a popular-literature writer whose survival, owing to her spectral socio-legal status, 
hinges on her appeal to readers, and who therefore should write in accordance with what 
intrigues her readers most. 
Jean Muir’s non-dictatorial authorial intent to foster readers’ substantiation of her 
mask becomes more conspicuous as the Coventrys’ “fancies” about who she is develop 
into multiple “stories” about who she is. The Coventrys’ development of their “fancies,” 
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or a bunch of fragmented images, into “stories,” or coherent narratives, would highlight 
their, not Jean Muir’s, active creatorial and writerly role in the construction of her mask. 
After his passionate confession of love is rejected by Jean Muir and ends up hurting 
Gerald, who tries to calm the situation, Edward relates to Gerald in remorse “the history 
of the growth of his … passion” (36). During his relation, “Jean Muir’s character was 
painted in glowing color. All her unsuspected kindness to those about her was dwelt 
upon; all her faithful care, her sisterly interest in Bella, her gentle attentions to their 
mother, her sweet forbearance with Lucia, who plainly showed her dislike, and most of 
all, her friendly counsel, sympathy, and regard for Ned himself” (36-37). Thus Edward’s 
story of Jean Muir, grown out of his earlier fancy of her within the “love scene,” depicts 
her as a “wise, and kind, and sweet,” and “true” girl who “would make a man of me” 
(37). Then Edward reveals his suspicion, or “imagination” (37), that Jean Muir might 
have rejected him because she loves Gerald, and sparks Gerald’s own “imagination” 
with respect to her in spite of his initial fancy about Sydney’s involvement with her. 
After the conversation with Edward, Gerald sends for Jean Muir to loosen his bandage, 
and she appears “All in white, with no ornament” (38). The “whiteness” in her 
appearance, which overlaps with her ghostlike, “pale” and “colorless,” and nearly empty 
mask at the beginning of the novella, serves as a fresh, new sheet of paper upon which 
Gerald starts writing his story of her. He instantly conceives of her as no longer “the 
meek, nunlike creature” but “A fresh, gentle, and charming woman” (38, 39). And as 
Jean Muir takes a seat behind a white curtain (another reminder of her undefined mask) 
and stays there quietly while holding his hand, “a thousand fancies danced through his 
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brain” and become projected upon the translucent surface of the curtain/her mask (40). 
After this transaction, Gerald comes up with a romantic story of how “the piquant 
character of the girl … would lighten his ennui” (41).133  
Meanwhile, Sir John’s previous fancy of Jean Muir as the “interesting” 
governess becomes more solidified when he finds out that she is a daughter of the late 
Lady Grace Howard. To be exact, he gets the information from Jean Muir herself: “she 
only told me yesterday. I was looking in the Peerage and chanced to speak of the 
Howards. She forgot herself and called Lady Grace her mother. Then I got the whole 
story, for the lonely little thing was glad to make a confidant of someone” (48). Yet, still, 
it is Sir John, not Jean Muir, who sublimates her account of her being Lady Howard’s 
daughter into “the whole story.” Not to mention that he technically initiates the talk with 
Jean Muir about Lady Howard as he brings up the topic of the Howards, Sir John, prior 
to that talk, has personally already known of and been interested in that not-so-renowned 
lady. “I’m much interested in [Jean Muir], both on her own account and on her 
mother’s,” he explains to Gerald: “Her mother was Lady Grace Howard, who ran away 
with a poor Scotch minister twenty years ago. The family cast her off, and she lived and 
died so obscurely that very little is known of her except that she left an orphan girl at 
some small French pension. This is the girl, and a fine girl, too” (47). So we can imagine 
that, when he has heard Jean Muir momentarily addressing Lady Howard as her mother, 
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 Gerald’s story about Jean Muir awakening him out of boredom in a way foreshadows 
his feeling of excitement when he later observes Jean Muir’s performance in tableaux 
vivants at a party. Watching her pose, and acting with her in various fragmented scenes 
(both of which he has never enjoyed or done before), he “experienced another new 
sensation” and feels “thrilled … with a strange delight” (53).     
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Sir John might have eagerly inquired of her about what she means, offered himself as 
her “confidant,” listened to Jean Muir’s account in light of his historical knowledge of 
Lady Howard, believed in it, and turned it into a true story. It does not matter whether 
Jean Muir is really a daughter of Lady Howard, or whether any other information about 
her given throughout the novella is true. The issue of who Jean Muir is, let me stress, is 
entirely up to the Coventrys’/her readers’ judgment, just like whether a ghost exists or 
whether a ghost has appeared altogether rests upon its witnesses’ conviction.134 What is 
more, when Gerald shows his doubt about Jean Muir’s account—“I shall write to 
[Sydney] as soon as I discover his address … to make a few inquiries about Miss Muir, 
and prove the truth of her story”—Sir John vehemently objects by stating, “Don’t annoy 
me by expressing it, if you please. I have some penetration and experience, and I respect 
and pity Miss Muir heartily” (49). And his resolute objection immediately dismisses 
Gerald’s doubt: “I’ve neither time nor inclination to discuss the matter now, sir, but will 
be careful not to offend again” (49). In this manner, Sir John successfully establishes and 
consolidates the idea of Jean Muir’s filial relationship to Lady Howard as a valid story, 
while inventing, this time by himself, another story of Jean Muir as a highborn woman 
who “has had a hard life” but never lost “a brave spirit” (48).         
As such, the Coventrys’ composition of varied stories about who Jean Muir is 
leads to diverse personae or masks of her, which in turn provide her with equally diverse 
                                                 
134
 This said, I am refuting Fetterley’s obsession with the questions, “what is Jean’s real 
self? Who is she in fact?” and her conclusion that “the ultimate truth of this early story 
[by Alcott] is to tell us why she must write lies; Alcott’s final truth is that she can not tell 
the truth” (13, 14). 
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chances to become a wife of a Coventry: following Edward, Gerald soon breaks off an 
engagement with Lucia and proposes to Jean Muir, and Sir John develops a deep 
affection for her to the extent that “Formerly he said ‘father’ or ‘the old man,’ but lately 
he always spoke of himself as her ‘friend’” (78). These chances significantly point to 
Jean Muir’s lack of any original scheme of who she purports to be, and permit her 
instead to have the readerly versions of who she can be. Indeed, when she first sees the 
Coventry residence and garden, Jean Muir says, “Not bad … but the other may be better, 
and I will have the best,” and proceeds to look around Sir John’s neighboring hall and 
garden (13). This remark and behavior, far from illustrating how Jean Muir, “calculating 
every word, gesture, and action, achieves her aim and becomes Lady Coventry” (Bedell 
9), indicates that she is looking for opportunities.135 So when Lucia’s maid, Hester Dean, 
blames her for Gerald’s breakup with Lucia, Jean Muir states: “Take your hand away 
and treat me with proper respect, or you will be dismissed from this house. Do you know 
who I am? … I am the daughter of Lady Howard and, if I choose it, can be the wife of 
Mr. Coventry” (75, emphasis added). Yet, to be precise, she is led to choose—not 
chooses solely at will—“the best” and “last chance” (77) by the change of the 
Coventrys’/her readers’ attitude toward her. Edward, who is now away from home to be 
in commission, comes upon Sydney’s story that characterizes her as a femme fatale, and 
writes to her and requests her to leave his family in three days. Figuring the impact of 
                                                 
135
 Similar to Bedell, Douglas maintains that Jean Muir is “building up, objectifying in 
more and more extensive and concrete ways, the different facets of herself” (62), and 
Dawson claims that “In her disguise as a governess, her every action and gesture are 
calculated to achieve her desired position as a bride” (33). 
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Edward’s knowledge on Gerald’s feelings for her, she turns to Sir John’s “fancy [that 
she] would reject young lovers for an old man like [him]” and accepts his “plan” to 
make her his “little Lady Coventry” (81). In this way, Jean Muir’s indefinite, ghostlike 
mask with “a pale, absent expression” on it (83) comes to take the reader-sensitive, 
reader-proposed, and reader-defined form of Lady Coventry.136  
Accordingly, Jean Muir’s new mask as Lady Coventry must receive the final 
sanction from her readers. To that end, the novella re-affirms the absence of Jean Muir’s 
interiority so that the Coventrys can establish her mask of Lady Coventry as her actual 
identity. Toward the end of the novella, Edward comes back home and informs his 
family of what he has found out about Jean Muir by presenting her letters to a female 
accomplice, Hortense. The letters, containing Jean Muir’s first-person detailing of how 
she has willfully duped the Coventrys by using her acting skills to become “the” lady of 
the house, seem to reveal her true and authoritative (as written by herself) self as a 
dangerous lowlife hidden underneath as critics have largely agreed. Yet the expected 
revelation of Jean Muir’s essential self does not happen. First of all, we cannot be sure 
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 That the position of Lady Coventry is Sir John’s proposition becomes clearer when he 
and Jean Muir are talking about their wedding plan. Jean Muir suggests a somewhat 
skeletal plan: “Edward is coming home in three days. I must be gone before he comes. 
… And if you love me, tell nobody of your approaching marriage. … If I could have my 
wish, I would go to some quiet place tomorrow and wait till you come for me” (83). But 
Sir John enthusiastically insists on a solider “plan” of his own instead: “Tomorrow, if we 
like. A special license permits people to marry when and where they please. My plan is 
better than yours. … I will go to town tomorrow, get the license, invite my friend, the 
Reverend Paul Fairfax, to return with me, and tomorrow evening you come at your usual 
time, and … make me the happiest man in England. How does this suit you, my little 
Lady Coventry?” (83, emphasis added). Then he gets “so intent on hurrying the event 
that Jean had nothing to do but give a ready assent to all his suggestions” (84). 
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whether those letters are genuinely by and about Jean Muir. Though Edward and Gerald 
claim that they can recognize her handwriting in them, the same letters say that “You 
know I can imitate almost any hand” (100), and raise a question to the authenticity of her 
authorship. Also, when directly confronted by Edward with the letters, Jean Muir simply 
“shrugged her shoulders” (104) and exhibits her indifference to what the letters say 
about her (because, of course, it does not matter), which cuts down the authority of their 
content. And the letters become literally useless as Jean Muir tosses them into the fire 
and has them burnt to ashes.  
Still, the letters’ anticipated effect to uncover the real, inner Jean Muir becomes 
most decisively nullified when Jean Muir appears in front of the Coventrys with the 
mask of Lady Coventry on her. Finishing his reading of the letters, Edward states that 
“She is gone; no one knows the truth but Sydney and ourselves; he will be silent, for his 
own sake; we will be for ours, and leave this dangerous woman to the fate which will 
surely overtake her” (102). But his words are soon followed by at once “A soft voice” 
that utters, “Thank you, it has overtaken her, and a very happy one she finds it,” and, 
more important, by “an apparition” of “Jean Muir leaning on the arm of Sir John” that 
“appeared at the door, which made all start and recoil with amazement” (102). Here, 
Edward’s assertion that “She is gone” and his insistence on the family’s “silence” about 
her ironically erases, annuls, or kills the possibly true and authoritative, evil version of 
Jean Muir induced from the letters, and in effect disproves the essentialist view of her 
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character.137 Then Jean Muir, corresponding to this death of her possible a priori self, 
appears as “an apparition” or an insubstantial being that now only exists as the newly 
donned mask of Lady Coventry. And that mask becomes her substantial self through its 
appeal to her readers. Looking at Edward, Bella, and Mrs. Coventry, she calmly says that 
“You have been kind to me, … I thank you for it, and will repay it if I can. To you I will 
acknowledge that I am not worthy to be this good man’s wife, and to you I will solemnly 
promise to devote my life to his happiness”; and “Edward’s indignant eyes fell before 
hers” while “Bella half put out her hand, and Mrs. Coventry sobbed as if some regret 
mingled with her resentment” (104). Such a response of the family speaks their 
favorable answer for Jean Muir’s entreaty to consider her as the wife of Sir John, and 
foreshadows their eventual full acceptance of her into their family.138 In this way, Jean 
Muir’s indeterminate identity is finally, officially, and wholly acknowledged as the 
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 Apart from their belief in the letters’ disclosure of the essential Jean Muir, Keyser and 
Dawson offer some interesting observations. Keyser points out the letters’ simultaneous 
exposé of the truth of the Coventry family: “Jean’s letters to Hortense convey the 
unvarnished truth about every member of the Coventry family, and what begins as a 
revelation of Jean’s character becomes an indictment of their own” (56). Dawson argues 
for the inadequacy of Jean Muir’s letters to keep up the thrill of “Behind a Mask” as a 
whole: the letters’ “version of Jean’s story is not as compelling as the intriguing 
doubleness of the narration, during which Jean’s identity and deceptions, but not 
necessarily her malice and scorn, have been suggested, and it is this doubleness that 
enriches the narrative. When reduced to a single, transparent, and unambiguous 
history—as in the letters—Jean’s story appears as merely vindictive and self-serving, not 
as filled with the tensions of action and disguise so obvious in the domestic dramas” (37). 
138
 Christine Butterworth-McDermott misses this subtly yet certainly favorable reaction 
of the Coventry family when she argues that the family “remain[s] protected, different 
from the Other, who is sexual, foreign, outside of themselves” and predicts that “In the 
end, Jean may be no more than a walking tableaux vivant: a frozen, empty picture” (45, 
46). 
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socially legitimate identity of Lady Coventry by a socially legitimate group of her 
readers.139      
 The Coventrys’ acknowledgement of Jean Muir’s mask gives clues to the similar 
kind of reader-endorsement of Alcott’s pseudonymous writerly mask of A. M. Barnard 
as an author. Alcott scholars normally estimate that the trajectory of Alcott’s blood-and-
thunder writing, notwithstanding its enormous and continuing success in postbellum 
literary markets, mostly ended when she issued “Perilous Play” in 1869. Such an 
estimation is made chiefly in keeping with Stern’s claim that “The publication of Part II 
of Little Women in April, 1869, brought her the fame and fortune she coveted and set 
her on the path of sweetness and light from which she seldom strayed” afterwards, with 
one exception of the anonymous publication of A Modern Mephistopheles in 1877 by 
the request of her then publishers, Roberts Brothers, for their No Name Series (Plots 22). 
However, Alcott’s gothic career did not exactly stop according to her conscious desire 
for the security and respectability of a domestic woman writer. Stern herself 
inadvertently provides the reason: in the 1870s, “Astute and sometimes piratical 
publishers … did not hesitate to reprint the Alcott forays into the realms of darkness and 
from time to time, without her knowledge, her thrillers reappeared” as dime novels 
(Plots 22). Those thrillers include “The Mysterious Key,” “The Skeleton in the Closet,” 
                                                 
139
 Some critics reckon Jean Muir becoming Lady Coventry negatively. See Alan Louis 
Ackerman, Jr., who takes it as visualizing the conflicting cohabitation of the theatricality 
and the domesticity within nineteenth-century women’s life (182-183); and Butterworth-
McDermott, who regards it as contemporary women’s inability to be themselves (43-45). 
Both Ackerman, Jr., and Butterworth-McDermott, in their focus on the theatrical, 
demonstrate the dualistic reading of Jean Muir as a being whose inside is, and ought to 
be, different than the outside. 
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as well as “V. V.: or, Plots and Counterplots,” all of which were reprinted as numbers 
for the Ten Cent Novelettes of Standard American Authors series (Plots 22). This 
incident signifies more than the legal vulnerability of (especially women) writers within 
the markets at the time. Because dime novels were designed for faster and wider sales 
across the nation, piratical publishers would have chosen stories and writers for 
publication based on their sheer popularity. If so, among Alcott’s pirated stories, “V. V.” 
especially begs our attention in that the story at first came out anonymously in The Flag 
of Our Union in 1865, but it was “unbeknownst to Louisa May Alcott … again made 
available to the public” about half a decade later under the authorship of A. M. Barnard 
(Stern, Plots 23). Publishers’ ascription of that popular yet unauthorized story to A. M. 
Barnard not only reflects contemporary popular-literature readers’ acquaintance with 
that name, but also testifies to those readers’ characterization and recognition of the 
name, drawing on their reading of its previous gothic tales, as one of the most 
representative or “standard American authors.” In this respect, readers authorize A. M. 
Barnard by furnishing it with an effectual and concrete authorial position and reputation. 
Also, that authorization, as it happened “without Alcott’s knowledge,” brings to fruition 
her perception of the reader-directed constructability of an authorial being, her pursuit of 
not her current scholarly authorial identity as “the many-sided author of Little Women” 
(Stern, Plots 25) but multiple reader-made pseudonymous authorial identities in her non-
self-evident, ghostly state of being as a postbellum woman writer, and her ultimate 
realization of the ghost writer.140  
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 Even those who discuss the multiple authorial personae of Alcott fundamentally stand 
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In this chapter, we have examined how Douglass and Alcott, two representative 
social specters in nineteenth-century America who shared the lack of political, legal, and 
cultural forces, could put an end to their ghostly hovering over the borderlines of society 
and become fully located within it in the form of a renowned, prominent, and effective 
author thanks to their readers. Put another way, Douglass’s and Alcott’s cases illustrate a 
transition from a ghost to a ghost writer, or from a powerless, unrecognized “writer” to a 
reader-empowered and reader-recognized “author.” The following concluding chapter 
will give more focus to the relevance of the ghost writer to the nineteenth-century 
distinction between author and writer, by taking an example of one male “author” who 
also wrote a story about the reader-activated transfiguration of an unidentified writerly 
governess into a reader-created author “without a deliberate intervention” of his own: 
Henry James.    
 
                                                                                                                                                
in line with Stern. For example, Brodhead observes that Alcott, writing in the markets 
where multiple genres coexisted, tried “several publics and several models of authorship 
equally available to” her, but eventually chose sentimental domestic authorship and 
readership “because of the level of dignity” that could have “protected her against an 
inferior status, the company of story-paper writers being morally freer yet unacceptably 
‘low’” (80, 88). Due to this observation, which ignores Alcott’s knowledge and 
consciousness of readers’ power to establish her authorship, the value of Brodhead’s 
following comment is obscured: “Having come to her career at the time when literary 
boundaries were being socially organized, and having chosen a certain social audience 
and social ethic with her choice of work, Alcott would have understood the process that 
produced Richardson’s divided world. But she would also have known that that process 
made a different world from one she had seen: a world in which a writer could write 
across generic boundaries; could be an author of all kinds, at once ‘blood and thunder’ 
writer and high-literary aspirant and ‘the Thackeray, the Trollope, of the nursery and the 
school-room;’ and so could write toward the whole audience that was divided up in her 
time” (106). My argument in this section has aimed to prove that she did understand and 
know what Brodhead too cautiously suggests, and did write accordingly.   
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CHAPTER V 
FROM GHOSTWRITER TO GHOST WRITER: THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR 
IN HENRY JAMES’S THE TURN OF THE SCREW* 
 
As we have witnessed in the case of Louisa May Alcott from the previous 
chapter, the American literary sphere of the late nineteenth century was chiefly 
characterized by an ever-continuing expansion of the market for the popular taste. That 
expansion, threatening the dominance of the eighteenth-century conception of art as a 
transcendental and sovereign field of activity, subsequently caused the 
compartmentalization of the literary sphere into the high and the low. The status of high 
literature was assigned to the work of those who would take writing as a serious calling 
and devote their life exclusively to honing their creativity and achieving their artistic 
ideal. The label of low literature, by the same token, referred to the writing of those who 
would be mostly concerned with mass appeal and go after commercial (and ignoble) 
success. This hierarchical division of literature, in turn, testifies to the persistence and 
intensification of Young’s equally hierarchical division of an author (or an exceptional 
individual genius) and a writer (or an undistinguished story-manufacturer) at the time.  
My concluding chapter will address this division and, through an analysis of 
Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw (1898), describe its eventual collapse toward the  
____________ 
* Reprinted with permission from “Governess as Ghostwriter: Unauthorized Authority 
and Uncanny Authorship in Henry James’s ‘The Turn of the Screw’” by Kiyoon Jang, 
2007. The Henry James Review, 28, 13-25, Copyright 2007 by The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
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end of the nineteenth century. American literary scholars have commonly pinpointed 
James as a representative personage for the “author” of “high” literature, whose long-
time contribution to the period’s prestigious literary magazines such as the Atlantic 
Monthly distinguishes him from, and endows him with superiority to, mere scribbling 
“writers” like Alcott. However, James in fact not only partook in the intensely reader-
sensitive genre of the gothic, most famously by means of The Turn of the Screw, but, 
more important, problematized and dissolved in that novella the theoretical bifurcation 
between the author and the writer considering readers’ growing influence over literary 
production in reality. I will examine James’s heroine, the governess, as representing one 
of the most impotent writerly figures at the turn of the century, a ghostwriter. And I will 
show how she, deliberately letting her first-person narrative of the ghostly incidents at 
Bly, a country house in Britain, be presented to readers after her death, makes inevitable 
and mandatory readers’ signification and authorization of what she writes and converts 
herself into a ghost writer. James’s employment of a governess with no name and no 
distinctive personality to get across his reader-conscious point should remind us of 
Alcott’s unspecified governess Jean Muir and serve as more evidence of the blurred 
demarcation between James the “author” and Alcott the “writer” in terms of their 
relationship with a postbellum readership.141 Furthermore, the governess’s intended 
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 By saying this, I disagree with the common scholarly belief in the antithesis of the 
James-Alcott relationship. That belief generally counts on the fact that James criticized 
Alcott’s Moods (1864) as too sentimental, unnatural, and unrealistic in his review of the 
novel in North American Review 101 (July 1865): 276-281. Noticeably, in my 
delineation of their affinity in terms of their shared use of the governess figure to pursue 
a similar vision of reader-dependent authorial identity, Alcott would turn out to be 
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publication of her text after her death in The Turn of the Screw will point to at once the 
exigency of nineteenth-century “authors”’ willful murder of their own author-ity on 
behalf of readers’ formation of it and the essential reader-contingency of the very notion 
of the author. At the end James himself will emerge as a new representative figure for a 
ghost writer, whose authorial performance in (and out of) The Turn of the Screw 
captures and puts into practice both the Barthesian death of the author and the reader-
reliant afterlife of that dead author.  
 
1. Ghostwriting Governess: James’s The Turn of the Screw 
As much as he was notoriously prolific throughout his writing career, Henry 
James is probably the most frequently and diversely discussed among nineteenth-century 
American writers. Indeed, as David McWhirter neatly puts it in 1995, “Recent James 
criticism” is nothing short of “a virtual encyclopedia of the pluralistic universe of 
contemporary literary theory” itself (1). This pluralistic effect of James, however, does 
not seem to have been exercised on studies of nineteenth-century American literature in 
general. Though McWhirter goes on and opines that “The myth of the master initiated by 
James and reinforced by generations of his commentators has increasingly been 
challenged by critics” (1), American literary scholars have continued positing James as 
one of the nation’s exemplary literary “masters,” or authors whose stubborn pursuit of 
their own aesthetic perception and belief, regardless of what the (common) audience 
                                                                                                                                                
someone who knew about the reality she was living and writing in and executed that 
knowledge truthfully.   
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expected, has conduced to the establishment of classical, respectable American literature. 
Richard H. Brodhead, in his study of the stratified literary domain in nineteenth-century 
America in Cultures of Letters (1993), places emphasis on James’s postbellum affiliation 
with the Atlantic Monthly, “the premier organ of literary high culture in America” that 
constituted “a zone of artistic, cosmopolitan, and classical production,” apart from those 
of working- and middle-class-centered productions of story papers and popular domestic 
fiction (79). Such an affiliation, Brodhead adds, doubtlessly designates James (along 
with the editor and fellow contributor of the Atlantic, William Dean Howells) a 
prototype of “the idealized writer” in nineteenth-century America who is supposed to be 
a “single-minded devotee of a highly specialized craft whose work derives value from its 
mastery of its art” (81). Brodhead’s delineation of James as a masterly, masterful, and 
admirably self-absorbed artist still reigns, as evinced when Susan S. Williams, in her 
investigation of postbellum theories on and modes of women’s authorship in Reclaiming 
Authorship (2006), briefly discusses the (gendered) difference between the author and 
the writer during the period. Whereas authors, Williams contends, “were associated with 
a discrete, original, and prophetic imagination, a proprietary model of production, and a 
personality anterior to the work of art,” writers were “seen as occupying a lower 
(heteronomous) cultural plane than autonomous authors,” being “defined as those who 
wrote from experience or observation rather than from unique genius or imagination” (5). 
Then she argues that contemporary (women) “writers” mostly struggled to emulate 
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“authors,” whose tradition, as originated in Nathaniel Hawthorne and maintained 
through Herman Melville, had finally reached its peak with Henry James.142  
Such a quintessentially Youngian (and Modernist) authorial image of James is, as 
in the case of Edgar Allan Poe and The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym in Chapter II, 
effectively counteracted by James’s most well-known “popular literary” text: The Turn 
of the Screw. The novella, despite James’s own passing remark on it as a simple 
“potboiler,” has been “the site of a long-standing and seemingly intractable critical 
controversy” (J. Williams 43). The earlier phase of the controversy was characterized 
mainly by two different perspectives, one inspired by Edmund Wilson’s Freudian 
analysis in “The Ambiguity of Henry James” (1934) and the other brought up by Robert 
Heilman’s “pro-ghost, pro-religious” (Banta 115) argument in “‘The Turn of the Screw’ 
as Poem” (1948).143 These two readings—one that interprets the governess’s narrative as 
a Freudian case study of repressed female sexuality and the other that sees the governess 
as a preserver of Christian morality fighting against evil forces to save a childlike Adam 
and Eve from the fall—in turn gave rise to an approximately thirty-year-long scholarly 
debate on how to read this complex piece of fiction.  
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 For instance, Williams, in her chapter on Louisa May Alcott, claims that Alcott’s 
writings, ranging from “Pauline’s Passion and Punishment” and Moods to Little Women, 
suggests that she models her authorship first after that of “the tradition of Hawthornean 
romance” and then after that of Jamesian realism (101). 
143
 According to Jeff Williams, earliest critics generally agreed that The Turn of the 
Screw is at any rate a ghost story, attending to “James’s efforts, after failing as a 
playwright, to write a sensationalist bestseller—in his famous formulation, a potboiler” 
(43). This somewhat naïve reading then began to get complicated through Wilson and 
Heilman.   
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The debate then took a new turn in 1977 through Shoshana Felman’s 
groundbreaking “Turning the Screw of Interpretation,” where she nullifies the up-to-then 
standard question of how to interpret the novella by questioning the very possibility of 
its interpretation. Many critics subsequently aligned themselves with Felman’s argument 
that the story produces a “reading effect” which is very “uncanny” in that “whichever 
way the reader turns, he can but be turned by the text, he can but perform it by repeating 
it” (101). Consequently, instead of the interpretive effort to pinpoint the meaning of the 
text, textual ambiguity itself has been regarded as a key critical principle.144  
The discovery of uncertainty or limitless interpretability, however, has rarely 
extended to the reading of one particular element of the novella—the governess. Earlier 
critics doubted and downplayed the credibility of the governess’s narrative. They 
deprived her of any authority as a narrator because her account is narrated in the first 
person and doubly framed by two other characters, Douglas and an unidentified frame 
narrator “I.” Later, Felman views the unreliability of the governess as a translucent 
reflection of textual ambiguity. She states that “the governess’s whole adventure turns 
out to be, essentially, a reading-adventure, a quest for the definitive, literal or proper 
meaning of words and of events” (153), so that she stands for any reader who tries in 
vain to capture the meaning of the text and thus contributes to illuminating the textual 
ambiguity. In Felman’s identification of the governess with the unrewarded reader, the 
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 J. Williams points out that The Turn of the Screw eventually becomes “an exemplary 
metacritical text, offering a case study of the processes of interpretation” (44, emphasis 
added). For a more extensive overview of the history of criticism of the novella, see 
Peter G. Beidler, “A Critical History of The Turn of the Screw,” Henry James: The Turn 
of the Screw, ed. Peter G. Beidler (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1995) 127-51. 
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governess becomes a kind of transparent medium through which the uncertainty of The 
Turn of the Screw keeps producing its effects. John Carlos Rowe likewise emphasizes 
the medium-like quality of the governess when he insists that her narrative merely enacts 
and re-enacts the “absent authorities” of the master and James (Theoretical 125).145 That 
is, her textual existence functions only as the representational mediation for the 
otherwise unrepresentable features of other para/textual characters.  
The problem is that such constructions of the governess do not sufficiently 
correspond to James’s own emphasis on her authority. In the preface to the New York 
Edition volume that included The Turn of the Screw, James affirms that “She has 
‘authority,’ which is a good deal to have given her” (AN 174).146 Truly, the governess 
can be said to have a kind of “authority” since it is she who writes the story of what 
happens at Bly: what we see or read in the novella is, fundamentally, her manuscript. 
Yet her “authority” is not her own. As will be shown in detail, it is delegated to her by 
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 Rowe, in so doing, translates Felman’s formation of an “association between James 
and the Uncle” or the master into their achievement of mastership by means of self-
effacement (Theoretical 129). 
146
 Heilman, in his critique of Wilson’s Freudian reading of the novella, mentions 
James’s comment on the governess’s authority. Yet he states that it just means that James 
tells the story “entirely from the governess’s point of view” for the highest effect of the 
ghosts and concludes that “the governess is not his subject” (“Freudian” 434, 435). 
Similarly, J. S. Leonard refers to the same comment but asserts that “the governess’s 
authorial narration” only functions as James’s “central reflector” for the impression the 
ghosts produce in the core of the story (46, 47). Later, McWhirter gives some credit to 
the governess’s authority by reading the comment in terms of James’s attitude towards 
gendered cultural values in society. According to McWhirter, the governess being 
invested with authority signifies James’s experimental “investment in the feminine” and 
his attempt “to see the invisible, to say the unsayable, … to express the experience of in-
betweenness for which our language and culture, and all the genres of genre they entail, 
possess no adequate terms” (“Authority” 142).   
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her absent superiors: the master, the ghosts of Peter Quint and Miss Jessel, and Henry 
James. The fact that she creates a text for them remains unacknowledged, so that the 
ownership of her text can be attributed to her superiors and her “authority” can be 
displaced to them.   
In order to understand this peculiar type of writerly authority, we need to 
contextualize the governess in terms of contemporary notions of writer, author, and 
authorship. In the nineteenth century there was a clear distinction between writers’ and 
authors’ relationships to texts. According to Michel Foucault, the distinction came from 
the modern “form of ownership” that appeared in the eighteenth-century juridical system 
corresponding to the advent of individualism and private property. At the time, 
discourses became “objects of appropriation,” while the text became understood as a 
possession of the author protected by law (148). And the author was differentiated from 
a writer insofar as the author’s proper name functioned as the indicator of this textual 
proprietorship.  
The author’s proper name further distinguished the author from a writer as it 
guaranteed authorial participation and presence in the production of a text. The name of 
the author on a book cover ensured, supposedly at least, that the named person actually 
wrote the text, that the text was made by and of him or her. This implication of the 
author’s proper name in turn brought forth what Leah Price calls “the cult of authorial 
authenticity” at the turn of the century (215): readers came to expect that by reading the 
text they could encounter and get a glimpse of the author as a real person, and this 
expectation was demonstrated in the popularity of renowned figures’ autobiographies at 
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the time. But this cult also accounted for the rise of a uniquely modern writerly figure, 
the ghostwriter, that is, a person “who writes for and gives credit of authorship to 
another” (“Ghostwriter”). As Price reports, a high proportion of celebrities in truth 
secretly hired unknown writers to compose their life stories in their stead (214-215). 
That the ghostwriter was necessary to maintain the author-function is further revealed in 
another contemporary sociocultural phenomenon: the growing number of female office 
workers. According to Price, among various jobs allowed to women, “the most common 
‘New Paid Occupation for Women’” around 1893 was “to take dictation,” a task usually 
assigned to female secretaryship.147 Price suggests that this modern version of the female 
secretary figure, who is employed to produce a document signed by a male boss, easily 
overlaps with the image of the ghostwriter, who is “normally hired to execute an idea 
conceived by wealthier employers” (212-214).  
Drawing on this context, I propose an analogy between the secretarial 
ghostwriter-figure in the nineteenth century and the governess in The Turn of the Screw. 
Both figures are situated in a system of delegation. Placed in an intermediary position 
between a text-property and the author-proprietor, they substitute for the latter while 
carrying out and materializing the former. The materiality of their writing disguises the 
absence of the author-proprietor in the creation of the text. Each of them remains a 
writer but not an author because their names are kept invisible in the text. In the case of 
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 As to the increase of female office workers at the turn of the century, Price informs 
that their number “multiplied more than eighty times between 1850 and 1914, going in 
the same period from 2 to 20 percent of the total number of British clerical workers” 
(213). This is, Price adds, “why late nineteenth-century employers suddenly turned to 
women to fill the office jobs formerly monopolized by men” (213).  
  
202 
the governess, however, we have a more complicated version of the ghostwriter. She not 
only plays the conventional role of ghostwriter, that is, a writer who exists and functions 
through her ghost-like presence, but also turns it into the role of ghost writer, that is, a 
ghost who writes.148 The governess transforms herself into a ghost, and re-defines her 
writerly identity as a new type of author. In that process, an unauthorized authority of the 
ghostwriter changes into an uncannily authorized authorship by readers after her death. 
This chapter will investigate how the governess’s self-transfiguration from the 
ghostwriter to the ghost writer reveals James’s fin-de-siècle vision of the author-figure, 
which suggests a new relationship between authors, readers, and texts—a relationship 
not bound to the author’s proper name or the author-function—and offers a critique of, 
and an alternative to, the Foucauldian notion of the author-figure.    
In the beginning of The Turn of the Screw, the governess appears as the 
ghostwriter for the master by being delegated his authority, that is, the authority in his 
name and in his ownership of Bly. As for the master’s proprietorship of Bly and his need 
to entrust his authority to the governess, Rowe provides a detailed explanation, backing 
it up with William Blackstone’s study of English inheritance laws. According to Rowe, 
the master might not be a proper possessor of Bly, even though he is the first son of his 
parents: in the novella, the children’s father is his “younger” brother (Theoretical 132), 
and there are no allusions to the possible existence of any other brothers. “[M]ost 
nineteenth-century English gentry,” Rowe continues, “devised some means (generally 
                                                 
148
 Usually, critics use the terms “ghostwriter” and “ghost writer” interchangeably, and 
the distinction of these two in this chapter is my own formulation. See Marjorie Garber; 
Price; and Helen Sword. Also see Julie Rivkin 13-15. 
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during the father’s lifetime) of settling a ‘suitable’ inheritance on younger sons, 
especially those who had married and had children” (Theoretical 133). Because the 
master remains a bachelor, Miles is in truth “most likely ... heir to some competence or 
other inheritance descending from his father, the Uncle’s younger brother.” The master’s 
ownership of Bly is further undercut by the fact that “English law distinguishes between 
two basic claims to property: possession of property and the right to property”; a 
complete legal title requires the combination of the two claims. Since it is Miles, not the 
master, who actually lives at Bly, he is better equipped to claim possession of the Bly-
property: in the novella, we do see him called “Master Miles” (65) by the servants at 
Bly.149 Meanwhile, if the master wants to claim ownership of Bly, he would have to live 
there with the children, but that means the master “risks his reputation as ‘a gentleman, a 
bachelor’” (Rowe, Theoretical 133). He should, I would add, degrade his name-value 
that is built upon his single life with “a glow of high fashion, of good looks, of expensive 
habits, of charming ways with women” (4). In this circumstance, the presence of the 
governess at Bly is urgently needed by the master, because his “employment of a 
governess to represent his guardianship at Bly enables him to maintain his ‘right of 
possession’ without requiring his physical presence” (Rowe, Theoretical 133). In other 
words, the master employs the governess in order to make her produce the effect of his 
presence in his absence, or to disguise his absence with her presence, while keeping his 
name untainted and his ownership of Bly unbleached.    
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 Henry James, The Turn of the Screw, eds. Deborah Esch and Jonathan Warren (2nd 
ed., New York: Norton, 1999). All references to this novella will be from this edition. 
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The “main condition” of their contract (6) gives us more clues to the governess’s 
status as the ghostwriter for the master. It stipulates that the governess should never 
attempt to contact the master but “take the whole thing over and let him alone” (6). The 
master possesses Bly, but the governess has the whole responsibility for its management 
under his dictation of the law. The very nature of their contract thus resides in the 
master’s intention of making “a relation of non-relation” and of “disconnection” with the 
governess (Felman 145). In this way, he can block any chance of her being associated—
and even identified—with his name and preserve his name-value from whatever happens 
within Bly, while garnering the “respectable” effect from what the governess eventually 
makes out of Bly (5). Indeed, the master, in his interview with the governess, 
emphasizes to her the importance of being “respectable” at Bly, remarking that Miss 
Jessel, her predecessor, “was a most respectable person” and that all the people at Bly 
are “likewise thoroughly respectable” (5).  
The governess tries to protect the master’s name from contamination and endow 
it with respectability by writing a story under his name. More specifically, she 
comprehends that her “supreme authority” (5), given by the master, is to (re)create Bly 
as a kind of fictive text by means of her novelistic perception. As soon as she arrives at 
Bly, the governess discovers “the textual quality of life” there (Cappello 155)150: she 
perceives it as a place that “would somehow ... take all colour out of story-books and 
                                                 
150
 Even though Mary Cappello observes the fictive characteristic of Bly, she reads it in 
a different way. She suggests that what the governess encounters at Bly is the “fairytale 
quality of the bourgeois context” (155), which she can neither read nor (re)write due to 
her failure to overcome the class difference. Therefore, Cappello contends, the governess 
remains a painter or illustrator—“the choice of a disempowered author” (156). 
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fairy-tales,” and finds the house equipped with all the necessary elements for a story, 
such as “all the romance of the nursery and the poetry of the schoolroom” and “a 
roomful of old books” (9, 18, 38). She even interprets her first sight of the ghost of Peter 
Quint as a part of the fictional aspect in Bly: “Was there a ‘secret’ at Bly—a mystery of 
Udolpho or an insane, an unmentionable relative kept in unsuspected confinement?” (17). 
All these textual elements of Bly are, however, left fragmented, disjointed from one 
another, and thus meaningless as a whole, due to the—probably intentional—neglect of 
them by their owner, the master. It is the governess who would interweave them into a 
coherent and meaningful narrative.151 She sees that Bly has “neither bad name nor ill 
fame” (26), and determines to keep it that way for the name of her “superior”: she 
describes the master as “my exalted stamp” that would be on the cover of her Bly-
narrative and imagines that he would be “happy and highly distinguished” by her 
successful (re)rendering of Bly (28). 
The governess’s recognition of her ghostwriting job for the master is also 
revealed when she discusses with Mrs. Grose, the housekeeper of Bly, the matter of 
writing to him about Miles’s dismissal from school. Because of the main condition of 
her contract with the master—the edict of discommunication between them—the 
governess hesitates to write, and Mrs. Grose suggests letting the bailiff do so instead. To 
this suggestion, the governess, with “a sarcastic force,” asks: “And should you like [the 
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 David Punter reads the governess’s attempt to reconstruct Bly in terms of a Victorian 
impulse towards social stability. He argues that the governess is urged to “fulfill all the 
duties of social reinforcement” and, equipped with “the guardianship of the ‘line’” 
between the proper and the improper, endeavors to “reconstruct” and “impose control” 
over the “microcosmic society” of Bly-world (298-299). 
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bailiff] to write our story?” (59). Here, “our story” does not mean the story of the 
governess and Mrs. Grose, because Mrs. Grose, in effect, does not—and cannot—
participate in the process of writing: she is illiterate, neither reads nor writes, so that she 
cannot be the ghostwriter for the master. Therefore, “our story” should mean the story of 
the governess and the master, a story which she would write under his name. Based on 
this implication, the governess’s question about “writing our story” effectively re-asserts 
that it is she who is employed to write the story of and for the master, and leads Mrs. 
Grose to re-affirm her position as his ghostwriter by answering, “Ah Miss, you write!” 
(59). 
The governess’s function as ghostwriter gains a new dimension through her 
relationship with the ghosts of Peter Quint and Miss Jessel. In this relationship, she 
serves to provide them with an effect of presence—a reality and materiality of being—
through her own physicality. To be more exact, the governess performs the role of 
medium in relation to the ghosts:  
There were exactly states of the air, conditions of sound and of stillness, 
unspeakable impressions of the kind of ministering moment that brought back to 
me, long enough to catch it, the feeling of the medium in which, that June 
evening out of doors, I had had my first sight of Quint, and in which too, at those 
other instants, I had, after seeing him through the window, looked for him in vain 
in the circle of shrubbery. (50) 
From the beginning, the ghost of Peter Quint imposes on the governess a “feeling of the 
medium” that compels her to “look for him” almost dutifully and compulsorily. In fact, 
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the “medium” is a key term to explain the governess’s function of making the ghosts real 
and present, especially with regard to the fact that one of many different definitions of 
the term is “a person thought to have the power to communicate with the spirits of the 
dead or with agents of another world or dimension” (“Medium”).152 Considering this 
definition, we can see a similarity of the governess’s condition to that of the medium, in 
which “a departed spirit enters or seems to enter, the body of a person still living, using 
it in its own way, speaking with its mouth, hearing with its ears, and so forth” (Beidler, 
Ghosts 160).  
Rather than being possessed by and speaking as the ghosts, the governess 
embodies the disembodied ghosts through her writing and physicality. She describes, for 
instance, her first encounter of the ghost of Peter Quint as if her “imagination ... turned 
real” (15). And when she meets his ghost later again, she narrates that “He was 
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 The female medium was a very popular phenomenon at James’s time: Martha Banta 
reports that “during the last decades of the nineteenth century women mediums and 
telepathists flourished” (154). Henry James was associated with this figure through his 
brother William. According to Beidler, William became acquainted with Mrs. Leonora 
Piper, “the most famous and most unquestionably honest medium,” via his mother-in-
law’s visit to her (Ghosts 150). His initial skepticism about Mrs. Piper’s mediumship 
vanished after his own visit to her, which led him to write a report about her psychical 
abilities to the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research in America in 1886. 
His report drew attention from the British Society for Psychical Research, which decided 
to publish it in their Proceedings. Henry James, who lived in London at the time, read a 
letter-form statement about the report at a meeting of the Society in 1890 on behalf of 
William, who was in America. The letter, Beidler writes, would have invoked James’s 
interest in female mediumship, though he had admitted his “lack of knowledge about 
psychical research” and “‘aversion’ to mediums” (Ghosts 153). James’s use of the term 
“medium” to describe the governess, I would suggest, attests to Beidler’s speculation. 
For William James’s involvement with psychical studies, see Deborah Blum, Ghost 
Hunters: William James and the Search for Scientific Proof of Life After Death (New 
York: Penguin, 2006). 
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absolutely ... a living detestable dangerous presence” (39). Moreover, the governess’s 
attempt to indicate to Mrs. Grose and Flora “the hideous plain presence” of the ghost of 
Miss Jessel “with [her] pointing hand” (69) signifies her attempt to physicalize the 
insubstantial being of the ghosts by means of her own body. In this way, she furnishes 
the ghosts with her corporeality, converting their “elusive/illusional qualities” into a 
“reality” and “concretiz[ing] the influence of the ghosts” (Leonard 48).153 
This medium-like function of the governess is closely connected to her role of 
the ghostwriter. Mrs. Grose describes her, right after her second encounter with the ghost 
of Peter Quint, as being “as white as a sheet” (21). Indeed, she is for the ghosts a “sheet” 
of paper upon which they project themselves and make visible the effect of their 
presence. This aspect becomes clear when she recalls her first confrontation with the 
ghost of Peter Quint: “I saw him as I see the letters I form on this page” (16). The 
governess’s writing literalizes the ghosts’ hazy existence so that we can see what we 
otherwise cannot see. And, in the end, the governess succeeds in representing the ghosts 
as “the hideous author of our woe” (84), an author of her record of their effect or impact 
on Bly. She has Miles—the last one who denies the presence of the ghosts—admit their 
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 Leonard sees the ghosts of Peter Quint and Miss Jessel as “perceptual loci, or foci” of 
The Turn of the Screw, and states that James’s intention is to make them “become 
potent—and therefore real—forces to be reckoned with” (46).  
 The governess’s use of her physicality to capture the horrible effect of the ghosts 
of Peter Quint and Miss Jessel should remind us of Teresa A. Goddu’s suggestion in the 
previous chapter that Douglass and other slave writers focus on slaves’ gothic bodies—
tortured, wounded, and bled—to make real the otherwise unreal terror of slavery to 
readers. If so, the governess in her relationship with the ghosts can be viewed as a 
skillful gothic writer who knows how to produce a substantial sense of horror in readers’ 
minds. 
  
209 
existence as he specifically names them, “Miss Jessel, Miss Jessel!” and “Peter Quint—
you devil!” (84, 85), and fully accomplishes her role of the medium-ghostwriter for the 
ghosts by effecting the confirmation of their authentic presence. Using Helen Sword’s 
definition of ghostwriting as “a medium’s publication of written messages supposedly 
authored in the spirit world” (11), the governess finally declares the ghosts’ nominal 
authorship of what she writes/speaks for them.154 
The governess’s function as ghostwriter is not just established and developed 
within the text of The Turn of the Screw but extended outside the text, by her ultimate 
superior and nominal author in the power system of ghostwriting: Henry James. In this 
relationship, the governess’s writing gives a palpable narrative form to James’s formless 
authorial design and imagination and visualizes his invisible authorship within the text. 
In order to comprehend this relationship, we need to take a look at what James originally 
expected the governess to do. In the New York Edition preface, he mentions that one of 
his readers has rebuked him for his not having “sufficiently ‘characterised’ [his] young 
woman engaged in her labyrinth,” not having “endowed her with signs and marks, 
features and humours,” and not having “in a word invited her to deal with her own 
mystery as well as with that of Peter Quint, Miss Jessel and the hapless children” (AN 
173). To this complaint, James responds: 
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 Leonard similarly points out that Miles’s speaking of the names of the ghosts is “the 
final achievement of [their] concreteness” (49). I disagree, however, with his conclusion 
that by this speech act the ghosts are ultimately “exorcised” and “vanish,” which he 
views as the governess’s ultimate intention (49). 
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It was ‘déjà très-joli,’ in ‘The Turn of the Screw,’ please believe, the general 
proposition of our young woman’s keeping crystalline her record of so many 
intense anomalies and obscurities—by which I don’t of course mean her 
explanation of them, a different matter; and I saw no way, I feebly grant ... to 
exhibit her in relations other than those; one of which, precisely, would have 
been her relation to her own nature. We have surely as much of her own nature as 
we can swallow in watching it reflect her anxieties and inductions. It constitutes 
no little of a character indeed, in such conditions, for a young person, as she says, 
‘privately bred,’ that she is able to make her particular credible statement of such 
strange matters. She has ‘authority,’ which is a good deal to have given her, and I 
could n’t have arrived at so much had I clumsily tried for more. (AN 173-174) 
What is suggested in this response is that James planned the governess mainly as a figure 
who would “record” what happens at Bly “as it is.” He does not deny that her account 
registers some portion of her own personal traits—“her anxieties and inductions”—but 
they are de-emphasized as he promptly excludes from the scope of his discussion her 
“explanation”—her own interpretation and re-construction—of the Bly-situation as “a 
different matter.” James, instead, underlines her ability “to make her particular credible 
statement.”    
The governess as recorder attributes the “merit” of conceiving The Turn of the 
Screw to James’s imagination, since the novella is “a perfect example of an exercise of 
the imagination unassisted, unassociated,” where he could allow his imagination 
“absolute freedom of hand ... with no ‘outside’ control involved” (AN 170-171). He was 
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aware that authors’ excessive concern with how to communicate what they intend to 
write might hamper the productive working of their imagination. To do so, James writes, 
he had to deal with the difficulty of “improvisation, the running on and on of invention”: 
he wanted his imagination to be exercised “freely ... with extravagance” but 
“controlled,” since otherwise it would terribly overspread and eventually destroy “our 
sense of the course and the channel, which is our sense of the uses of a stream and the 
virtue of a story” (AN 170-172). This is where the governess as a ghostwriting recorder 
comes into James’s textual play. As she is charged to put into practice the idea contrived 
by him, her narrative, articulating and realizing what James imagines, functions as a 
vessel into which he pours his overflowing imagination and a mold through which he 
shapes his “high fancy” (AN 169) in the well-regulated and materialized fictive world of 
Bly. The governess’s text truthfully presents the products of James’s profuse 
imagination—“so many intense anomalies and obscurities” and “such strange matters”—
without her intrusive “explanation” or re-writing of what he initially wished to be written, 
and the text becomes the “crystalline … record” and “credible statement” of James’s 
authorship. In this light, the “authority” that the governess has is fundamentally James’s 
own, “given her” by him only to inscribe visibly within the text the effect of his authorial 
imagination in his absence.  
James’s employment of the governess as his ghostwriter is remarkably analogous 
to his concurrent use of typists, or typewriters as they were called during the 1890s. 
Rowe reports that James was very anxious to preserve “virtual possession” of what he 
dictated and thus preferred the direct dictation to a Remington to his typewriters’ 
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stenography. Since James himself had no knowledge of shorthand transcription, Rowe 
infers, he might have felt somewhat threatened by his typists’ composition of a text only 
readable to them, not to him. Indeed, James’s former typists Theodora Bosanquet and 
Mary Weld agreed that during his dictation, James wanted them simply to be “part of the 
machinery” in order to ensure the congruence of what they typed with what he uttered, 
which Rowe interprets as an indication of James’s “desire for a ‘typist without a mind’” 
(Other 157-158). James’s desire for the mechanization of his typewriters coincides with 
his intention not only to reduce the distance between his speech and its written version 
but also to promote the unrestricted performance of his creativity.155 Pamela 
Thurschwell notes that to James “The new technologies of machine culture 
paradoxically serve to imbue writing with a sense of presence, and the author with a 
corresponding prolixity”; “One’s own hand hinders writing,” Thurschwell goes on, “but 
somebody else’s hand attached to a typewriter enhances it, makes for what amounts to 
an unstoppable flow for James” (13). James’s amanuenses were, as their very title 
etymologically says it, to substitute for his writing hands so that he could overcome the 
                                                 
155
 Rivkin, in her analysis of the mode of delegation and representation in James’s fiction, 
quotes Jacques Derrida’s association of the “speechwriter” or “logographer” to the 
ghostwriter in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968). According to Derrida, she says, a Platonic 
logic of representation assumes that speech is “prior to and more authentic than writing,” 
since the latter is “a secondary copy” of speech and only serves to “preserve that speech 
in the speaker’s absence” (14). But Derrida argues that writing is in fact “not attached to 
a living presence” of the speaker and thus possibly deviates from the effect of speech 
intended by the speaker. The speechwriter-ghostwriter embodies Derrida’s argument in 
that the figure “not only reverses the order of temporary priority between speech and 
writing but also exposes as illusory the conviction that speech guarantees living presence 
and authenticity” (14). Rivkin’s restatement of Derrida reassures us that the ghostwriter 
has potentials for exposing and subverting the myth of the author’s origination of and 
presence in the text.  
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frustrating elements in his physical involvement with the writing process—elements 
ranging from his rheumatism in his right wrist to the hindrance of the stream of his 
creative thought caused by its textual reproduction with his own hands—and equip his 
literary genius with uninterrupted freedom.  
Furthermore, James’s attitude towards his amanuenses corresponds to the 
relationship between the female secretarial ghostwriting typewriters and their male 
bosses in the late-nineteenth-century workplace. The typewriters were obliged to 
compose a text the content of which was to be in strict accordance with their bosses’ 
intent. Their text was expected to be a transparent representation of their bosses’ idea 
with the effect of presence, not a re-creative translation. Their intermediary position 
between their bosses and the text required them, with a degree of anxiety on the part of 
the former, to remain impersonal, mindless, and spectral, and to serve only as an 
obstruction-free conduit of their bosses’ dictation into the text. This speculation 
identifies James’s secretarial typewriter—a figure that “meant both typing machine and 
female typist” toward the end of the nineteenth century (Kittler 183)—with the 
governess, drawing an image of James as a male boss who employs the ghostwriting 
amanuenses to compose a work for and under his name.156 
                                                 
156
 Friedrich A. Kittler explains how the “typewriter” comes to mean “both typing 
machine and female typist”: “it is clear that the statistical explosion begins in 1881, with 
the record sales of the Remington II. Although the number of men dwindles like a bell 
curve, the number of female typists increases almost with the elegance of an exponential 
function. As a consequence, it might be possible ... to forecast the year in which typist 
and woman converge” (183). The fact that James insisted on hiring female typewriters 
except for the first one—William MacAlpine—might reflect this shift of gender 
economics in the typewriter market at the time. 
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The governess, however, does not remain merely James’s “small recording 
governess” (AN 71). She does have “authority” of her own, though this is not easily 
discernible. James does not name the governess, which means that her manuscript is 
presented without any proper name of its author, and thus without any Foucauldian 
author-function. Besides, her narrative does not have any title. As Richard Sawyer points 
out, a title is supposed to reflect the author’s intention for his or her story by 
“identify[ing] the style or genre in which a story is composed” and “perform[ing] a 
‘nominal’ role ... to identify ... a central character in the work, or where the important 
action takes place” (56). The untitled manuscript of the nameless governess, in sum, may 
be seen only as an anonymous writing. Nonetheless, the governess does not coincide 
with the Foucauldian author-figure. Her authority arises precisely from the absence of 
her name, from a possibility that she may intentionally erase her name and the title from 
her manuscript. And it is with this possibility that we can get a hint of how the 
governess’s role of ghostwriter changes uncannily into that of ghost writer.  
What mainly contributes to the governess’s self-transformation from the 
unauthorized ghostwriter to the authoritative ghost writer is the condition of the 
circulation of her manuscript. Her narrative is mediated and circulated by two other 
writerly figures: Douglas and the frame narrator “I.” Yet it is precisely through the 
interventions of Douglas and the frame narrator “I” that she finally finds a genuinely 
“magnificent chance” (27) of her own. The governess is already dead when her 
manuscript is read by Douglas and later transcribed by the frame narrator “I,” so that she 
in reality exists as an absence in her text. Her absence, however, comes to produce an 
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effect of presence through the writing acts of Douglas and the frame narrator “I”: both 
mediators become the ghostwriters for the dead governess, and, by the same token, the 
dead governess becomes her own ghost, that is, the ghost who (re)writes her own story 
by means of her ghostwriters.  
Douglas serves as a ghostwriter for the governess through his reciting of her 
manuscript, as we see in the prologue of The Turn of the Screw. Douglas’s voice, 
however, does not cover or efface the traces of her act of writing but rather revives them. 
He reads her manuscript with “a fine clearness that was like a rendering to the ear of the 
beauty of his author’s hand” (6). Douglas’s voice simultaneously foregrounds the 
governess as “his author” and evokes her writing “hand,” so that his reading of the 
manuscript illuminates what he reads as her manu-script, not as its verbally re-articulated 
version by him. Consequently, Douglas’s listeners feel touched by not only Douglas’s 
voice but also the hand of the dead governess revived in his voice, and the governess’s 
manuscript generates the effect of her presence via his reading of it. Douglas’s 
ghostwritership for the governess, then, becomes a form of ventriloquistic articulation of 
her authorship, through which, borrowing Marjorie Garber’s words, “the dead hand of 
the past reaches over to our side of the border” (xv) and (re)writes her narrative. His role 
as the governess’s ghostwriter is also verified when he is asked by one of his listeners, 
“What’s your title?” (6). He not only answers that “I have n’t one,” but also ignores the 
frame narrator “I”’s intrusive assertion that “Oh I have!” (6). By refusing to endow the 
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governess’s manuscript with a title, Douglas preserves its original condition and thus 
remains a pure reflector of its authorial design.157    
The frame narrator “I” works as the ghostwriter for the dead governess by virtue 
of his or her unidentified identity: James never reveals the name, social status, or the 
gender of the frame narrator “I.”158 The indeterminacy of “I” is very significant in that 
the governess also remains almost unidentified—once again, as in the case of Alcott’s 
governess Jean Muir, we are given no solid information of her identity or background, 
except her brief remark early in the novella that “I was in receipt in these days of 
disturbing letters from home, where things were not going well” (19)—and is also 
addressed as “I” in her narrative. Hence, two unspecified “I”s exist within the novella. 
These two “I”s, in turn, may merge into one when the frame narrator “I” becomes the 
very person who transcribes, or—considering another definition of the term 
“transcribe”—“represents by symbols” or words, what another “I,” the dead governess, 
originally writes. If so, there emerges a new sign of “I,” which means the returned dead 
                                                 
157
 Douglas’s ventriloquism that maintains the indeterminacy of the governess’s 
manuscript and foregrounds the reader-inviting principle of her authorship may overlap 
with Carwin’s ventriloquism that voices the absent readers of Clara’s narrative and 
highlight the reader-contingency of her authorship of Wieland in Chapter I. 
158
 Many critics assume that “I” would be a male in terms of the highly homosocial and 
androcentric atmosphere of the prologue. For example, John H. Pearson observes that 
the prologue as well as James’s preface are “unquestionably male voices” and, along 
with “the female voice of the governess’s narrative,” construct the “models of 
engendered transference of authority” (96). Also, Priscilla L. Walton says that the 
governess’s narrative is “structurally trivialized as a result of the prologue” and, referring 
to the frame narrator “I,” concludes that “her ‘I’ commands less authority than her male 
counterpart’s” (260). The gender of the frame narrator “I” is, however, “never explicitly 
identified as male” (“Authority,” McWhirter 132-133). 
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governess. In this newly signified word “I” the dead governess becomes embodied and 
reified through the medium of the living body of the frame narrator “I.”159 
Douglas and the frame narrator “I” then do not obscure the fact that it is the 
governess who actually writes and owns the manuscript. Rather, their intermediate 
stance as her ghostwriters reinforces her authorship of the manuscript. The frame 
narrator “I” in particular appeals to us as not just the (ghost)writer but also readers of the 
governess’s manuscript: even though Douglas is the initial listener and reader of the 
governess’s narrative, what is presented to us to read in The Turn of the Screw is, 
structurally, the reading (and transcription) of it by the frame narrator “I.” The unnamed- 
and ungendered-ness of “I” allows any of us, regardless of our individual differences, to 
put our own “I”s in his or her place, and we come to read the governess’s story as if we 
were the frame narrator “I.” Our readerly “I”s, then, come to identify with the governess 
through the merging of the frame narrator “I” with the governess’s “I,” which occurs, as 
shown above, via his or her ghostwritership for the governess. Accordingly, we read the 
governess’s narrative from her point of view and in her position. Eventually we become 
the ghostwriters for her, by (re)enacting her writing in her stead and incarnating her 
ghost in our own “I”s. In so doing, we come to recognize her authorship, since we 
perform her writerly role under her dictation of what is “most essentially ... her account 
of her own experience” (“Authority,” McWhirter 137).  
                                                 
159
 Douglas is already dead when the frame narrator “I” receives the governess’s 
manuscript from him: “Poor Douglas, before his death—when it was in sight—
committed to me the manuscript” (4). Hence the frame narrator “I” is the only one who 
is left alive and conveys the governess’s story to readers. 
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The governess’s “I” is, however, not the type of dictation that controls or 
determines our reading and (re)writing of her narrative. This is the very point where the 
authorship of the governess as ghost writer deviates from the one defined by the 
Foucauldian author-function and exposes the inherent contradiction in it. For Foucault, 
the author, or his or her proper name, exists as “the principle of thrift in the proliferation 
of meaning,” a principle “by which ... one limits, excludes, and chooses” the 
interpretation of a text or discourse and “by which one impedes the free circulation, the 
free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction” 
(159). Authorship manifests its authority as forcing us to seek a particular and proper 
relationship with the text, a relationship both authorized by and authorizing the authorial 
intention. The author functions only to limit and channel readers’ analysis of and 
connection with the text, and that power of limitation and channeling is the very source 
of authorship, of the delineation and demarcation of the author’s authority. Yet under 
this scenario, the interpretation of a text is meaningless, because each interpretation is 
essentially the mere replication of the one and the same authorial message and purpose 
of the text. The governess’s “I” does not perform her authority in this way. James’s 
earlier decision to exclude the governess’s “explanation” from her record-narrative 
defines the absence of her explanation as the absence of any authoritative way of reading 
her narrative. Instead, the governess’s unexplained record-narrative invites us to account 
for it in our own ways. Nevertheless, the governess is not deprived of narrative authority 
because the meanings that we make out of her narrative basically originate in, as 
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discussed above, our readings of her story, the merging and identification of our “I”s 
with her “I.”    
Such an interrelationship between the governess and readers demonstrates 
James’s attempt to invoke the ceaseless relationship of signification. Trying to figure out 
the best way of conceiving the “sense of the depths of the sinister” in the two ghosts (AN 
175), he concludes that he should let readers do so for themselves: “There is for such a 
case no eligible absolute of the wrong; it remains relative to fifty other elements, a 
matter of appreciation, speculation, imagination—these things moreover quite exactly in 
the light of the spectator’s, the critic’s, the reader’s experience” (AN 176). James’s 
conclusion emphasizes and acknowledges that readers’ reading experience is an essential 
part in the process of the creation of the meaning and the production of various versions 
of the text. Authors benefit from readers’ participation like that in that they are “released 
from weak specifications” and can avoid “the charge of a monstrous emphasis, the 
charge of all indecently expatiating” (AN 176, 177), the charge of the despotic—and 
destructive—authority upon the construction of the reader-text relationships. The 
governess in The Turn of the Screw receives the same benefit: her semiotic intention, 
like her authorial stance, remains unspecified and ghostly, and by presenting herself as a 
nameless ghost, she intentionally permits readers to explain and re-explain her story 
diversely and endlessly. In this way, the governess as ghost writer ultimately makes 
possible the never-ending trialogue of authors, readers, and texts, which is evinced in the 
ongoing critical debates on, and numerous adaptations of, The Turn of the Screw.  
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The governess’s transformation from ghostwriter to ghost writer illuminates at 
once the instability of the existent mode of authorship at the turn of the century as well 
as throughout the nineteenth century and James’s creative re-interpretation of that 
instability. That the ghostwriter was in great demand to maintain the power of the 
author’s proper name betrays the incongruency between the author and the author’s 
name, between the author’s name and the text, and between the author and the text. 
From the ghostwriter’s intermediary position, James discovers—in his well-known 
expression—a “germ” of uncannily authorized authorship. He develops it in the 
character of the governess, who in turn ghostifies herself and re-defines the powerless 
spectrality of the ghostwriter as the productive indefiniteness of the ghost writer. In the 
process, James embodies this new kind of author-figure in himself, by remarking that 
“my values are positively all blanks” (AN 177) in the novella, and by allowing “this 
perfectly independent and irresponsible little fiction” (AN 169, emphasis added) to float 
around joyously in the middle of flourishing interpretations. And, most important, he 
does so by not having “clumsily tried for more” with his own authorial hands.  
 
2. Conclusion: Ghost Writer, the Gothic Afterlife of the Dead Author 
With James’s unnamed dead governess at the end, we now have an interesting 
array of author-figures that also includes Charles Brockden Brown’s Clara the self-
righteous isolato and Carwin the ventriloquist, Poe’s Pym the sailor, Douglass’s 
Frederick Douglass the fugitive slave, and Alcott’s Jean Muir the governess. A brief 
contemplation on the significance of those figures will help wrap up and theorize my 
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discussion of the notion of the ghost writer. Seemingly heterogeneous, these figures 
from nineteenth-century American gothic literature share certain ontological traits: none 
of them have a secure, fixed, or licit place in mainstream society; none of them have a 
solid and coherent identity; and, therefore, none of them can exist or operate of their own 
will. This shared liminality, fluidity, and dependency of being, of course, aptly serves to 
evince the virtual nonentity of the author within gothic literature, to represent the non-
self-evident basis of the author that Roland Barthes, Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and their 
followers have argued for, and to illustrate the heteronomous mode of authorship that 
nineteenth-century American writers in the reader-centered literary domain were actively 
pursuing. As such, the figures validate this study’s proposal of the ghost writer as an 
alternative, reader-oriented notion to the author by conjoining current gothic criticism, 
modern authorship theories, and studies of nineteenth-century American literature.  
Among those figures, that of the governess in particular attracts our attention. 
Appearing twice in this study through Alcott and James, the figure performs the 
aforementioned representational and validating service with extra effectiveness. It does 
so first by means of its characteristically other-reliant positioning within a (familial) 
society: the governess is in principle not a part of the society, but becomes one only 
through the society’s members’ acceptance of her among them. Also, only through such 
an agreement can the governess have certain social identity as a governess: one cannot 
act or live as a governess on one’s own, but should be hired, and thus “made” to do so. 
In this respect, the governess is very apposite to the ghost writer, which does not 
“govern” the trajectory of its own authorial life and career but is “governed” by the mass 
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opinions or judgments on that matter, and which works for its employers, not itself, in 
order to bring to an end its ghostly wandering around the rim of society and settle down 
within.     
All those author-figures from Brown’s Clara to James’s governess, furthermore, 
offer effectual answers for the most likely anticipated—and highly valid and valuable—
questions against the notion of the ghost writer: so where are we going with this 
incessant creatability of the author by readers? would it not be possible that allowing for 
this incessant formation of the relationship between authors, readers, and texts is 
ultimately a nihilistic—because “any” relationship is acceptable—gesture? can the 
notion of the ghost writer really be a “meaningful” alternative to the dead author? Here, 
the main issue is the hazard of the meaninglessness implied in the idea of “boundless” 
possibilities. In fact, that hazard is exactly what I have observed in the mostly 
deconstructive current authorship theories and tried to overcome with the ghost writer. 
As I have mentioned in the Introduction, since Barthes’s pronouncement of the death of 
the author in 1968 most theorists have been in essence merely reiterating Barthes by 
marking and re-marking the inherent limit of the author’s ultimate control over the ever-
interpretable text and ever-interpreting readers. The problem of that reiteration is that 
those theorists have approached the death of the author as if it means the end of the 
author per se, rather than considering a more positive prospect of the beginning of a new 
type of writing subject. For this reason, the theorists could afford us seemingly endless 
ways of analyzing how the text has a de-centering and fragmenting effect on a single 
authorial voice and intention, but not a viable way of grasping a newly emerging reader-
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contingent writing subject out of those (over)analyzed, disintegrated pieces of the 
author’s cadaver.   
To me, such fruitless self-repetition of deconstructive theoretical discourses can 
come to a halt and get somewhere with sufficient literary discussions of how the writing 
subject is actually producing a text and making a relationship with readers after its own 
death. Accordingly, I have examined how representative nineteenth-century American 
gothic writers—rather than being and staying dead—delineate the reader-constructed 
author-figures and develop the reader-conscious notion of the ghost writer out of those 
figures in their gothic works. What has happened during the examination is, significantly, 
that the abstract idea of the boundlessly deconstructable author is specifically captured 
or circumscribed, as it is represented in the particular author-figures from Brown’s Clara 
to James’s governess and conceptualized as the particular notion of the ghost writer. 
This circumscription, therefore, puts to practical use, and enhances the importance of, 
the deconstructive exposé of the reader-factor in Youngian authorship while preventing 
that exposé from remaining a mere present-day philosophical trend. As such, the 
circumscription of the dead author by/as the ghost writer is constructive rather than 
constrictive. By extension, my study, “Gothic Authors/Ghost Writers,” demonstrates that 
our author-ization of a writer should be never purely boundless but, paradoxically, 
boundless within certain boundaries.  
Such a paradox seems to be truly necessary and even advantageous. Sigi 
Jöttkandt, in her Lacanian and Kantian analysis of James’s ethical aesthetic in Acting 
Beautifully (2005), points out a predicament caused by the recent intellectual emphasis 
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on unlimited differences. As “The concept of universality,” Jöttkandt remarks, “has been 
the target of some of the most sophisticated critiques of contemporary thought,” namely, 
deconstruction, so “the ethics of the particular, specifically of the rights of particulars to 
differ from the all-encompassing, hegemonic Same,” has come to thrive (99). 
Apparently more liberal and open-minded, this modern ethical attitude betrays yet a 
critical problem in Jöttkandt’s view: “without some workable concept of universality 
ethics dissolves into mere cultural relativism and the ‘free play’ of endless, metonymic 
slippage” (100). To this problem, Jöttkandt urges us to focus on “how to resurrect the 
concept of universality, but without repeating the excesses and violent impositions that 
this concept historically has invoked,” or without “imply[ing] the (surreptitious and 
illicit) dominance of one particular at the exclusion of another” (100). Jöttkandt is 
suggesting the usefulness of the basic common ground of signification for ceaselessly 
produced diverse opinions: by having a certain larger shared understanding by which we 
build up—but not channel—our opinions, we can make the differences among those 
opinions practically mean something. As shown in this chapter, by only agreeing that the 
narrative of The Turn of the Screw is by and about the governess, our varied and ever-
continuing readings of the novella could add up to “her” varied and ever-re-conceivable 
authorial personae, and constitute and actualize a reader-made authorship or ghost-
writership. Without such an elementary consensus, the multiple readability of The Turn 
of the Screw would have been deemed as simply another facet of its notorious (and, in 
many cases, frustrating) ambiguity, as it has been so within the general criticism of the 
novella. Put another way, there can be, and needs to be, what may be called productive 
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boundaries. And it is one of those boundaries that I expect the ghost writer, and the 
ghostly author-figures that physically manifest the ghost writer, to perform for our 
continuing constructions on the deceased Author-God, while going beyond the futilely 
ever-particularizing post-Barthes dissection of the totalizingly universal eighteenth-
century conception of the author.160  
Lastly, that the author-figures in this study embody readers’ circumscribed yet 
productive re-configuration of the author as a ghost writer sheds light on how the notion 
of the ghost writer defines the author-reader relationship significantly anew. It seems 
that even after Barthes’s revolutionary declaration of the author’s ineluctable and 
requisite death, the general understanding of the author’s relationship with readers has 
not greatly changed from that of the eighteenth century. More specifically, the 
Barthesian death of the author has been normally (mis)understood as the author’s demise 
“by readers” as well as by the text, and the author-reader relationship has for the most 
part remained mutually exclusive, if not antagonistic. The author after Barthes has 
                                                 
160
 Jöttkandt, in her reading of James’s “The Altar of the Dead” (1895) in Acting 
Beautifully, notes the similar fruitlessness of deconstruction’s self-repeating tendency. 
To encapsulate her point, deconstruction is surely effective as it can reveal the inherent 
impossibility of our system of representation, but it simply repeats such revelatory acts 
on and on without pointing to what is, and can be, beyond that impossibility, and 
ultimately remains “the sheer, senseless, mechanical repetition of language voided of its 
(illusory) transcendent powers” (109). Then Jöttkandt re-locates deconstruction’s 
problem within the context of the Symbolic and proposes solving it from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. She introduces a psychoanalytic para-Symbolic concept of 
the Real, and re-defines deconstruction’s self-repeating revelation of the Symbolic 
impossibility, or limit, as that of the threshold between the Symbolic and the Real. As a 
consequence, Jöttkandt is able to contend that our deconstructive reading of literature is 
our diverse re(-)presentation, within the limit of the Symbolic, of one (psychological, 
and non-imposing) universal truth: “every speaking being is castrated” (130). 
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become not only susceptible to and dependent on readers, but also incompetent and 
impotent in contrast to readers. Accordingly, talking about the author’s “intention” 
regarding readers, implying the former’s dictatorial power over the latter, has become 
shamefully anachronistic and customarily tabooed. However, our author-figures’ 
function as not constrictive but constructive boundaries for our readerly act confirms that 
the author, rather than seeming self-concerned and egocentric, can have a harmonizing 
and mutually beneficial intention as regards readers. In so doing, those figures also 
testify to the fact that the author’s relationship with readers should be in a real sense a 
“relationship,” that is, should be cooperative and interactive with one another. In this 
way, our author-figures, with their absent-present, ghostlike standing within texts and for 
readers, underscore the ghost writer’s, and nineteenth-century American gothic writers,’ 
clarification of the truly reader-involved implication of the author’s death and realization 
of the dead author’s afterlife “along with” readers.   
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